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Summary 
In this study, I propose a reading of Derrida as a Cartesian thinker. The mode 
of reading is closely textual and not historical; and the analysis focuses on the 
methodological or dispositional affinities between a sceptical Descartes in cogitation 
and a deconstructive Derrida, to the exclusion of the onto-theological aspects of their 
arguments. I locate the source of such epistemological affinities between them in the 
self-reflexivity of philosophical self-doubt or self-criticism, and highlight, in the 
course of analysis, the formatively self-referential aspects of both Cartesian 
scepticism and Derridian deconstruction; The point of contention is that, in both 
cases, the starting point of thinking is the self that self-reflects. 
Standard interpretations tend to view Derrida as an anti-Cartesian thinker; 
Against this reading, I advance the following two points of contention. Firstly, I argue 
that Derrida can be read as a Cartesian thinker in that his reflexive tendency is 
indicative of his implicit commitment to the methodological or epistemological 
Cartesianism, i. e. the reflexive mode of cogitation. The claim here, limited to such an 
extent, is that there is a structural resemblance between the reflexive form of 
Descartes's cogilo and that of Derrida's deconstructive move in that both thinkers 
follow performatively reflexive, and reflexively repeated moves; The Derridian move 
is only one "step" beyond, and in this sense derivative from, the Cartesian. Secondly, 
I argue further that Derrida can be read as a radical Cartesian. For this, I present a 
reading of Derrida's reflexive hauntology as a sceptical radicalisation of Descartes's 
reflective ontology. By bringing to the fore a structurally Cartesian dimension which 
underlies the Derridian economy of writing and thinking, I argue, against Derrida's 
self-understanding of his (non-)project, that deconstruction is to be read as a 
conservative intra-metaphysical trajectory rather than as a transgressive endeavour to 
go beyond metaphysics. In highlighting the traditional aspects of deconstruction as 
opposed to the revolutionary sides of it, my aim is both to explicate the significance 
of Derrida's deconstructive project and, at the same time, to expose its constitutive 
limits, deconstruction taken as a meta-critical, reflexive endeavour to transcend the 
limits of philosophy by philosophy. The critical point I raise against Derrida is the 
following: Insofar as the logic or strategy of his deconstruction remains structurally 
locked in, and at the same time exploitative of, the implicit binarism of Cartesian 
scepticism, i. e. the logic of either-or, the deconstructive gesture that attempts to think 
"the Other" by reflecting critically upon its own condition of thinking, is bound to be 
self-reflexive or self-referential, therefore, self-corrosively ineffectual. 
Part I sets out to articulate the aforementioned two contentions of thesis. It 
aims to discover the recursively self-reflexive movements in the writings of Derrida. 
For this, chapter 2 offers an analysis of some of Derrida's central terms of hauntology 
that are descriptive of the movements and moments of meta-reflection, viz. double, 
mark, fold, interest, and law. Although Part I deals mainly with Derrida, the reflexive 
dimension of Descartes's cogito argument is also analysed in an early stage [1.31] to 
the extent that it can set the terms for the subsequent reading of Derrida as a Cartesian 
[1.32 -2.3]. Part II elaborates the key points made in Part I, first by providing a 
detailed account of the Cartesian economy of self-reflexivity [Chapter 4], and second, 
by closely reading selected passages from Den ida's essay on Descartes, `Cogito et 
histoire de lafolie' [Chapter 5]. Derrida's defensive and sympathetic reading of 
Descartes's madmen against Foucault's, the last chapter argues, exemplifies a case of 
Derrida as a committed Cartesian with a mind bent on methodic meta-reflection. 
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Abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations have been used in the text and notes for 
frequently cited works by Descartes and Derrida. Full publication information for 
these works is given in References. Citations of both original and English translations 
take the form of [DG 90/611; refer to Note on Notations and Quotations for details. 
<Works by Descartes> 
[Disc] Discours de la methode/Discourse on the Method 
[Med] Meditationes/Meditations 
[Op] De la dioptrique. 1 Optics 
[Pri] PrincipiaPhilosophiae/Principles of Philosophy 
[R] Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii/Rules for the Direction of the Mind 
[Rch] La recherche de la verite/ The Search for Truth 




[C] Feu la cendre/ Cinders 
[D] `Desistance'/ `Desistance' 
[DG] De la grammatologie/ Of Grammatology 
[Diss] La dissemination/ Dissemination 
[ED] Ecriture et d ferance/ Writing and Difference 
[FM] `By Force of Mourning' 
[Four] `Fourmis' 
[Glas] Glas/Glas 
[U] `Lettre ä un ami japonais'/ `Letter to a Japanese Friend' 
[MA] Memoires d'aveugle/Memoir of the Blind 
[MP] Marges de la philosophie/Margins of Philosophy 
[MPM] Memoires pour Paul de Man/Memories of Paul de Man 
[Pass] `Passions'/ `Passions: an Oblique Offering' 
[Po] Points de suspension/ Points 
[Pos] Positions/Positions 
[PR] `Les pupilles de l'universite: le principe de raison et l'idee de 1'universite'/ 
`The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupil' 
[Problem] Le problem de la genesis dans laphilosophie de Husserl 
[SN] `Sauf le nom'/ `Sauf le mom' 
[SpecM] Spectres de Marx/Spectres of Marx 
[Sur] `Survivre'/ `Living On' 
[TOJ] `The Time is Out of Joint' 
[TT] `Pontuations: le temps de these'/ `Punctuations: the Time of a Thesis' 
[VP] La voix et le phenomene/Speech and Phenomena 
[VPT] La verite en peinture/ The Truth in Painting 
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Notes on Notations and Quotations 
1. For primary sources, both original texts (Latin and French) and translations 
(where available) have been used. Accordingly, all page numbers noted are those 
appearing in original and translations; for example, [VPT 14/8] refers to page 14 of 
La verite en peinture, and page 8 of The Truth in Painting, respectively. When a 
translation is either not available for the text in quotation at the time of writing, or 
not used, I provide my English translation and refer only to the page number(s) 
appearing in original; for example, [Alt 82] refers to page 82 ofAlterites [Derrida 
1986a]. 
2. For secondary sources, when the use of original word(s) is of critical importance, 
both the original and the translation (where available) have been used; the format 
used for quotation of the primary sources also applies to this case. When only the 
translation is used, that is, when the quotation of the word(s) appearing in original 
is of a secondary concern, I indicate it either by noting "trans. " (e. g., 
[Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 371, trans. ]) or by providing the English title of the original 
( e. g., [Husserl, Ideas I, § fl). 
3. Also note the difference appearing in the main text between emphases in original 
and my emphases added; when a need arises to put an extra stress on the words or 
phrases that have already been emphasised in the original, I indicate it by 
underlining them. 
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0. Introduction 
0.1 Doing Without Descartes? :A Starting Point 
Introduction 
Anti-Cartesians cannot be against Descartes without themselves being, in a 
sense, Cartesian. In `The relevance of Cartesianism [Carraud 1987: 69-811, ' Vincent 
Carraud makes an interesting point. He begins his essay by saying: 
A philosophy need not be afraid of being out-of-date. Any true philosophy, 
ultimately as soon as it is published, necessarily remains so, thus necessarily 
remains relevant. This is the case of Descartes's philosophy. [... ] if the 
relevance of Cartesianism does exist, it is the true one, the original one. So, even 
nowadays, we cannot philosophise without Descartes (even though some people 
would like to philosophise against Descartes). [69] 
We cannot philosophise without Descartes, even when we do so against Descartes. 
His claim is that we the 20th century post-Cartesians, we Heideggerians, and we 
Levinasians, for example, are "required to think from Descartes [76]" every time we 
attempt at a radical beginning, at a radical break with Descartes. 
Amongst several contemporary examples Carraud introduced here, perhaps 
the most illuminating and specific is his discussion of the way in which "Emmanuel 
Levinas's reflection on the infinite transcendence of God is organised [75, see 
75-6]. " Carraud's contention is that Levinas's version of God appearing in Totalize et 
Infini can be read as a sequel to Descartes's drafted in Meditationes. Seen from this 
point of view, Levinas's point of departure can be said to lie precisely in "the 
paradoxical nexus" around the concept of the infinite Descartes has originally 
formulated and left unresolved in the third MeditationeI. 
I Derrida makes the same point in [ED 154.7/104.6]. 
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The fundamental aporia of the cogito troubling the res cogitans of the infinite, 
which Descartes has articulated, is that the idea of the infinite exceeds the cogitatio 
(thought) itself. As Derrida says in the same vein, 
Descartes, in his reflexion (la refexion) on the cogilo, becomes aware that the 
infinity not only cannot be constituted as a (dubitable) object, but has already 
made infinity possible as a cogito overflowing the object [ED 156-7/106, 
translation revised]. 
Namely, the Cartesian aporia of thinking infinity2 is this: when thinking (of) the 
infinite, I think more than I think (of it), therefore, I think an un-thought, an 
unlimited thought of excess. Facing this paradox, as Carraud rightly observes, 
Descartes uses it as a means by which to prove that "therefore, God exists. " The point 
to be noted is that, for Descartes, it is the very experience of the limit, i. e. the 
thinking ego's inability to capture infinity by the cogito, that "proves" the existence 
of God; according to him, God exists because the infinite being, God, must be the 
cause of the very cogitatio of the infinite that is present in the cogito. What becomes 
conspicuous in this picture of thinking infinity or God is the locus of the cogitational 
subject, the "I" that attempts to think such an un-thought. Attention is drawn to the 
very experience of failure. Descartes focuses upon the act of thinking, the cogito, and 
the subject of thinking, res cogitans, thereby, deduces from the self-presence of this 
act the existence of that which is thought in that present tense, cogitatum, i. e. God. 
Levinas follows this Cartesian line of thinking God, but at the same time, 
attempts to think otherwise, i. e. to think the same (non-)thought from the other point 
of view. What Levinas does, as Carraud points it out, is to shift the focus, to re-direct 
2The notion of infinity referred to here, characterised as an "aporetic" one, is the kind that the sceptical 
Descartes conceives in a narrowly methodological or strictly epistemological manner, that is to say, 
without any preconceptions of the idea of God; the philosophical recuperation and subsequent 
consolidation of Descartes's faith in God takes place later, after this philosophical experience of aporia, 
in the form of his proving the existence of God on the basis of the notion of infinity discovered as such 
within his cogitational self. 
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the phenomenological attention, from the cogito or the res cogitans to the cogitatum. 
He turns to the other side of the same matter and does so without disturbing the very 
Cartesian form of thinking. 
[... ] What Levinas is interested in here is not that God should be proved: it is 
rather the fact that the idea of the infinite cannot start from myself; that in it, the 
movement should start from what is thought and not from the thinker, from 
the cogitatum and not from the res cogitans. [... ] Of thinking the infinite, 
Levinas says, "it is doing more or better than thinking. " [ 1987: 75-61 
According to this reading, Levinas's reflection is viewed to take place within 
the milieu of Cartesian problematic. Two points comprise this thought: first, 
Levinas's point of departure cannot be posited outside the path of the cogito 
Descartes has opened up; second, even when Levinas's reflection moves against the 
direction Descartes has chosen to follow, precisely by virtue of following the other 
direction, the untrodden path deserted within the incomplete tradition of thinking (of) 
God, of reflecting (upon) God, the very transgressive gesture towards the absolute 
transcendence of God remains, in this sense, caught up in the Cartesian tradition. 
Again, the lesson exemplified here is the following: we cannot philosophise 
without making a certain Cartesian commitment to philosophy, even when we do so 
against Descartes. This point should become clearer, particularly when we 
understand the meaning of "Cartesianism" in a broad methodological sense in which 
it is loosely defined as a philosophical orientation of the mind, as Jean-Marie 
Beyssade is quoted as saying [Carraud 1987: 73], which "allows after following the 
movement which reminds the spirit, to turn towards thing, to take on an exact 
attitude in the temporal action. " Carraud's open-ended conclusion is instructive in 
this regard: "perhaps Descartes's philosophy is more interesting through the 
breaking-up, the contradictions, the aporias it originates in Cartesian's Cartesianism 
[75]. " Cartesian thinkers, characterised in the broadest terms, are those who think by 
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relying on reflective "turns" of the mind. As long as we "allow" our minds to 
"follow" the deeply aporetic Cartesian "movement" of the cogito, we the 
post-Cartesians, as Carraud argues, are perhaps more Cartesian than un-Cartesian, 
even when we decide to become anti-Cartesian. At a fundamental level, we remain 
committed to Cartesianism even when turning against Descartes precisely because we 
are bound to be anti-Cartesian, as long as we allow the reflective model of thinking 
to be taken as the norm. Any critical meta-reflection upon Descartes's cogito is 
bound to resemble that which it reflects, namely, the cogito, in so far as the critical 
force of metalogical movement originates from the reflexive rationality of Cartesian 
cogitation. One is bound to "turn" towards Descartes even when turning "against" 
Descartes, as long as the mode of "turning", i. e. the mode of reflection, whether it be 
faithful (turning-towards) or transgressive (turning-against), is predetermined by, and 
locked in, the Cartesian structure of double-thinking. This is the phenomenon one can 
observe in Levinas's reflection on Descartes's God; and in what follows, we shall use 
this insight as a starting point in our reading of Derrida in relation to Descartes. 
0.2 Derrida with Descartes :A Stage Set-up 
If Levinas resembles the onto-theological Descartes in and after the third 
Meditation, Derrida, by contrast, resembles the sceptical-rationalist Descartes that 
comes before it, i. e. the Descartes of the first Meditatione (entitled, `What can be 
called into doubt') and the second (entitled, `The nature of the human mind, and how 
it is better known than the body'). In the sense that both the philosophy of Levinas 
and that of Derrida can be interpreted from such a Cartesian point of view either as a 
"sequel" to Meditationes (the case of Levinas) or as a derivative from them (the case 
of Derrida, as the thesis will argue), it can be said broadly that both thinkers think 
within the tradition of Cartesianism. Within such constitutive or originary 
Cartesianism discoverable both in Levinas and in Derrida, there is, however, a 
notable difference between the way Levinas's pathos of thinking reflects Descartes's 
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and the way Derrida's does. If the philosophy of Levinas can be said to be a version 
of onto-theological Cartesianism, that of Derrida, by contrast, can be characterised as 
a version of sceptical Cartesianism. 
To expand on the aforementioned difference only briefly, Levinas, the thinker 
of the radical Other, follows the onto-theological Descartes; Descartes in good faith; 
the Descartes after the second Meditatione [Med II, AT VII 25/CSM 11173] in which 
the first conclusion of sum is reached, who then moves on to the third round of 
meditation in order to solidify the grounds of his first discovery of sum on the basis of 
"the existence of God, " which is the title of the third Meditatione. A thematic link 
between Descartes and Levinas can be found more explicitly later, for example, in the 
fifth Meditatione, where "the existence of God" is "considered second time, " 
particularly towards the end of that final meditation: "Thus I see plainly that the 
certainty and truth of all knowledge depends uniquely on my awareness of the true 
God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge about anything else 
until I became aware of him [Med V, AT VII 71/CSM 11 49]. " An instructive point to 
note is that the whole of Descartes's meditations conclude with a thought on the 
radical alterity of God, God the absolute other, with regard to whom the thinking ego 
remains inadequate and insufficient. Interesting to see further, in this context, is a 
textual effect of what may be described as a God-centric, as opposed to an 
ego-centric, mode of cogitation, adopted therein: the de-centralisation of the 
epistemological status of the ego of ego sum. What it signifies is that a shift of focus 
takes place within Meditationes: the shift of a perspective from a thinking ego that 
thinks of itself, to another thinking ego that attempts to thinks the other. In this 
regard, it can be said that the first two Meditationes draw on the self-generative 
reflexivity of the cogitational self, and that of the rest of Meditationes, on the 
self-effacing non-reflexivity of the non-cogitational self. The self that appears in, and 
governs the production of, the writings of Derrida resembles the ego-centric, 
3"So 
after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. " 
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reflexive self of the first and second Meditatione. One aspect of Derrida's 
Cartesianism which this study attempts to bring to the fore is the Derrida who, against 
the Levinasian Descartes, follows and re-stages, in his text, the sceptical and 
rationalistic Descartes of the first two Meditationes: the Descartes before the third 
Meditatione: the pre-onto-theological and, in this narrowed sense, epistemological 
Descartes: the Descartes in the metaphysical predicaments of reflexive egocentrism: 
the Descartes in bad faith. 
Derrida's epistemological Cartesianism is implicit in his general 
"undecidability" thesis that underlies most of his philosophical "aporias". His 
undecidability thesis, which argues for the impossibility of knowledge by 
destabilising the referential security of language and the self (particularly, the 
language of the self), can be read as a form of scepticism, and specifically as a kind 
of radical and yet paradoxical scepticism that ends up putting in question the 
epistemo-ontological validity of everything conceivable in the world except for the 
implied epistemological supremacy of the sceptic himself. Descartes stages this 
paradox at the beginning of the second Meditatione, rather cautiously and implicitly: 
"I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. [... ] So what remains true? 
Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain. [Med II AT VII 24/CSM 11 16]"; The 
paradox here, of which Descartes seems to be aware albeit vaguely (the word 
"perhaps" is a hint of such awareness), is that such a self-involving sceptic must be at 
least "certain" of "just the one (very) fact that nothing is certain" in order even to 
make sense of his own scepticism, not to mention the validation of it. Observable 
here, to say in an anticipation of the key contention of the thesis, is a structural 
similarity between the sceptical Descartes's meta-reflective move, illustrated in the 
quoted passage, and Derrida's meta-certainty about his "undecidability" or 
"indeterminacy" thesis, indicated by the excessive degree of repetitive persistence 
and tenacious consistency with which such thesis is proposed in his texts. Not 
surprising, in this regard, is that some commentators characterise Derrida who 
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ceaselessly invents meta-words - e. g. d ferance, 
4 with which he creates a meta-world 
of hyper-reflection - as a "linguistic" kind of "malin genie (evil genius) [McKenna 
[ 1992: 54ff]. 5" 
It is with such a specifically delineated, and narrowly defined, frame of 
reference in mind that I will pursue a Cartesian reading of Derrida. Accordingly, 
when the word "Cartesian" is used hereafter in relation to Derrida, its specific 
meanings and restricted range of references are to be noted: It refers specifically and 
narrowly to Descartes the ego-centric thinker appearing in the first two Meditationes, 
i. e. the epistemological or methodological Descartes in the sceptical phase of 
thinking; It excludes, therefore, Descartes the God-centric metaphysician appearing 
in the rest of Meditationes, i. e. the ontological or theological Descartes in a restored 
good faith. 
Within this framework of reading thus delimited, the thesis sets about 
disclosing Derrida's reflexive formalism, which I identify as characteristically 
proto-Cartesian and ultimately pro-Cartesian. By reflexive formalism, I mean the 
methodological normalisation of the Cartesian form of thinking, i. e. the 
self-referential form of reflexive cogitation as a pre-given, and in this sense 
insurmountable, historical condition of thinking. David wood also points out a 
"formalist" dimension of Derrida's de-constructive philosophy by saying 
Deconstruction is essentially a kind of, formalism because it interprets as 
symptoms of a metaphysical syndrome [... ] what are actually the internal 
reflections of the other historical conditions of a text's production. [ 1988: 631 
4The question of in what sense diferance can be read as a meta-word or meta-concept will be 
addressed later towards the end of the introduction [0.3], where its meaning is explained briefly in the 
context of discussing the economised dimension of Derrida's meta-reflection. 
5 John Caputo [1997], in a theological context, characterises Derrida as a "Jewish Augustine [1997: 
27], " as a potential "devil" lurking in the eyes of the prayer; for this reason, he prays for Derrida, for 
deconstruction, for the destiny of Derrida's deconstruction to come, by opening his 'Short Concluding 
Amen [ 1996: 201-2]' with the following blessing: "eve cannot deny that the devil is in Derrida's eye, 
[... ] and deconstruction is hanging on by a prayer [201]. " 
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To explain, by means of explaining the words of Wood, what is meant by reflexive 
formalism in this context, to which, the thesis argues, Derrida is committed: An 
example of what Wood refers to as "the other historical conditions of a text's 
production" is the Cartesian mode of reflexive cogitation; An example of "the 
internal reflection" of such historical conditions, which the current study intends to 
show, is Derrida's further reflection on, i. e. his reflexive doubling of, the Cartesian 
condition of reflexive predicament; An example of "interpreting as metaphysical 
symptoms" such reflexive doubling of the historically given condition of thinking is 
Derrida's self-diagnosis of his implicit and exclusive commitment to the Cartesian 
mode of self-reflexion as a metaphysical illness that cannot be cured by any 
intra-metaphysical means. Such a reflexive movement of self-delimitation, a move 
towards the philosophical awareness of the historical "necessity, " to which Derrida 
"submits" his discourse, effects the philosophical "rigour" and "sophistication" of his 
de-constructive project, which renders "unreflective" and "naive" all other possible 
philosophical forms lacking the reflexive awareness of their pre-given conditions of 
thinking. The formalisation of a form of thinking in this case means therefore the 
absolute legitimisation of an inherited form of thinking as an indestructible, pre-given 
milieu of thinking; Derrida the formalist thinker sees himself caught up in such 
bounds of the philosophical tradition of the West, from which he cannot extricate 
himself. 
The particular point my study highlights, in taking note of the formalist 
dimension of deconstruction, is regarding Derrida's implicit absolutisation of, in 
other words, his refusal to let go of, the reflexive mode of thinking. Hence, Derrida's 
"reflexive" formalism. The thesis as a whole shall argue that Derrida's 
deconstruction can be viewed as a "symptom" of Cartesian "syndrome"; If 
deconstruction is, as Wood argues, a kind of meta-philosophical diagnostics that 
interprets all historical philosophical discourses as that which simply "reflects, " 
without having a cognitive mastery over, the more fundamental, un-bendable laws of 
thinking (e. g. a traditional, philosophical desire for self-presence viewed as inevitable 
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"symptoms" of logocentrism), Derrida's deconstructive trajectory itself, I shall argue, 
is to be also diagnosed as a metaphysical "symptom" (e. g. as a manifestation of the 
cogitational self-reflexivity of the self), insofar as it is also operative within a certain 
framework of thinking to which it remains implicated and yet blind. On this note, the 
task of the thesis can be further articulated in both general terms and specific terms. 
At a general level, the thesis seeks to provide a critical reading of Derrida's 
texts in light of Descartes's. And the approach here will be closely textual, in other 
words, not specifically historical; the task of analysis is not to trace a certain 
historical or genealogical link between Descartes and Derrida, but to explore a 
methodological affinity between them. The general concern of the thesis is to show 
Derrida, first, as a Cartesian thinker, and second, as a radical Cartesian. The thesis 
shall argue this case by closely analysing the strategic ways in which Derrida 
appropriates and radicalises what I see as the proto-Cartesian force of the cogito; 
What Derrida "appropriates" in a methodological manner, as I will argue hereafter, is 
the dual structure of phenomenological self-reflection - the structuralised state of the 
split-self - which the Descartes of the first two Meditationes creates reflexively, and 
from which he also suffers intellectually; What Derrida "radicalises", as I will show 
further in this regard, is the transgressive force of such self-reflection personified by 
Descartes's evil genius, his alter-ego in bad faith. The line of thinking that Derrida 
pursues is this type of "other"wordly world of "what is to come" (what is unknown or 
unintelligible) as opposed to the world of "what is" (what is, or rather appears to be, 
known or intelligible). In this context-specific sense, Derrida's meta-reflective move 
is hyperbolic and hypothetical. Put the same point differently, the way Derrida's 
transgressive self-reflection unfolds6 resembles the way Descartes's evil genius is 
employed repeatedly in the inaugural parts of his meditations [Med I, AT VII 
23/CSM 11 15, and Med II, AT VII 25/CSM 11 17] in that both are self-reflexively 
creative; By self-reflexive creation in this context, I mean a kind of textual 
6Various examples of it will be introduced and analysed in Chapter 2 and 3. 
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fabrication or invention in which posited is the hypothesis of the radical other - the 
hypothesis of the other-worldly world or other possible words, for instance - which 
ends up reinforcing the epistemological centrality of such inventive, meta-reflective 
self. Both Descartes's hyper-reflective self-reflection and Derrida's are, in this sense, 
methodologically economised, in other words, calculated. What is to be read 
accordingly in the writings of both Descartes and Derrida is the "economy" of such 
self-reflexive performances of the philosophical intellect: the key question the thesis 
will pursue in a closely investigative manner is how such a staging of philosophical 
reflections effects the centralisation of the discursive locus of the cogitational subject. 
The economy of writing found in the texts of both writers shall be analysed from a 
rhetorical or tropological point of view. The rationale for such a reading is twofold: 
Although the element of self-reflexivity constituting the Cartesian form of the cogito 
has been well recognised and studied as such, 
7 a detailed analysis of the Cartesian 
self-reflexivity with a particular attention paid to its "performative" dimension and its 
consequential rhetorical effects, is still needed; Also, although the "performative" 
aspects of the writings of Derrida have been well discussed8, an immanent reading -a 
closely textual analysis - of their tropological effects is still in demand, let alone the 
close relevance of Derrida's textual performativity to methodological or rhetorical 
Cartesianism. 
At a more specific level, the thesis seeks to create a textual link between 
Descartes and Derrida by using, as a thread, the element of self-reflexivity commonly 
found in their writings: a link between Descartes's reflective ontology and Derrida's 
7 To name a few: Jaako Hmtikka [1962] on performativity in Descartes's reflexion; Dalia Judovitz 
[1989] on Descartes's reflexive self and its relation to the constitution of modern subjectivity, 
Genevieve Lloyd [1993: 43-61, `the self. unity and fragmentation'] on literary narrativity and its 
relevance to the constitution of philosophical discourse of the self, Jean-Luc Marion [ 1982,1985] on 
Descartes's reflective "onto-theology, " Jean-Luc Nancy [1979: 63-94, `Larvatus Pro Deo I on the 
theatrical aspects of Cartesian reflexivity, Barry Stroud [1984: 2-38, the problem of the external world]; 
Bernard Williams [1978: 72-101, 'Cogito and Sum' ] on the introspective-reflective dimension in the 
methodological scepticism of Descartes; also most recently, there is David Weissman's psychoanalytic 
analysis of the reflexive mind of Descartes [1996: 330-46, 'Psychoanalysis']. 
8see literature review in Chapter 3 [3.3] 
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reflexive hauntology. The rest of this current section [0.21, which concludes with an 
outline of the structure of the thesis, will be largely devoted to a sketchy explanation 
of what is meant by Descartes's reflective ontology, Derrida's reflexive hauntology 
and the thematic relationship between the two. 
By "reflective ontology [Marion 1982: 80]", what is meant is a kind of 
ontology that is constituted in the course of discursive reason's reflective endeavour; 
the sum of ego-sum appearing in the second Meditatione [see AT VII 25-29/CSM II 
17-19, in particular] is discovered after, and on the basis of the possibility of, in other 
words, via, the ego-cogito. Reflective ontology can be, accordingly, contrasted with a 
kind of ontology that renders possible, therefore, comes prior to, such reflective 
philosophical endeavour, i. e. a pre-reflective or non-reflective ontology. The point to 
be noted is that, in the case of Descartes, being is discovered not directly, but 
reflectively in the sense that he recognises his being or existence in the course of 
coming to identify himself with a thing, an entity, at least "something9" that can be 
identified as such, e. g. a thing that is deceived. A discursive function Descartes's 
hypothetical devil serves is to make Descartes see himself as an object, as a thing that 
exists, to be more specific, as the object of deception, which is a logical prerequisite 
for the very possibility of deception; subsequently, Descartes attempts to define, in a 
more constructive and concrete manner, what this "something, " definable as such, 
could be: "I know that I exist; the question is, what is this "I" that I know? [AT VII 
27/CSM 11 18]'% "a thing that thinks 10.22 
9If I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme 
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too 
undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never 
bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering 
everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. [AT VII 25/CSM 11 
171 - this passage will be introduced again and discussed in detail later in 1.3: Descartes's 
Self-re(lexion. 
10Thinking? At last I have discovered it - thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I 
exist - that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I 
totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting 
anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; 
that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason - words whose meaning I have been 
ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But 
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The question pertinent to our current concern, in the context of showing how 
reflective ontology is different from the non-reflective or pre-reflective kind, is not 
"what" Descartes defines himself as, i. e. what Descartes specifically means by "a 
thinking thing, " but how he comes to "know, " before setting out to define what the 
"r' is, that such I, thus definable, exists: the question that concerns us is, in other 
words, in what specific way Descartes introduces, in the first place, a reflective 
model of thinking to a thinking of being, which he then solidifies in the course of 
defining himself as a self-consciousl l thing. What is reflective about Descartes's 
hypothesis of evil genius - which he introduces before setting about to demarcate the 
specific mode of his being on the basis of the conclusion drawn from this 
thought-experiment - is that the hypothesis, conjectured as such, puts him in the 
position of both the deceiver and the deceived; to put it in more abstract terms, there 
occurs a reflective split of the thinking self into an "I" that reflects upon a possibility 
of global deception in a hyper-reflective, hyperbolic manner and an "r' that is thus 
reflected back as the object of deception, of inspection, trapped within the 
philosophical space of the possible world thus imagined. Accordingly, with this 
self-splitting, reflective move thus made, there comes to be established the 
subject-pole of self-reflection, on the one hand, and the corresponding object-pole, on 
the other. When Descartes says, "I am (nevertheless) something, even if the evil 
genius is deceiving me, " the "r' that appears in that sentence corresponds to the I 
located on the object-pole. The topological character of this move towards a 
"hyper"bolic hypothesis, i. e. the element of the "hyper" - the excessive or exceeding, 
above and beyond - suggests further that Descartes's mode of thinking is specifically 
meta-reflective or hyper-reflective in the sense that Descartes the reflective thinker 
places himself "above" the totality of objects thus put in doubt which includes 
what lind of a thing? As I have just said -a thinking thing. [AT VII 27/CSM II 18] 
1'But 
what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. [AT VII 
28/CSM 1119] 
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himself as an object of reflection. The very ability of the reflective self to objectify 
itself - to project itself into an object - reinforces the epistemological centrality of the 
subject-pole of self-reflection. When Jean-Luc Marion says, regarding Descartes's 
reflective ontology, and specifically regarding the Descartes of the first and second 
Meditatione, that "ontology envisages being as such qua cogitata, curvature of 
thought [1982: 80], " the image Marion uses here, quite effectively, is bending or 
folding, the act of bending back ("re-flecting"); Hence, a reflected being as 
"curvature of thought". 
Marion's point, put simply, is that reflective ontology sees being as an object 
of inspection, a thing upon which the cogitation subject reflects. Then, the way in 
which such object becomes visible to the reflective subject, I emphasise, is reflexive: 
Descartes thinks of himself as that which thinks, envisages himself as a thing that 
reflects - the instances of such self-reflection include doubting and imagining; 
Is it not one and the same "I" who is now doubting almost everything, who 
nonetheless understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is 
true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be 
deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and is aware of many 
things which apparently come from the senses? [... ] The fact that it is I who 
am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of 
making it any clearer. [... j (T)he `I' who imagines is the same `I'. [AT VII 
28-9/CSM 11 191 
What I would like to highlight here is the reflexive subjectivity of Descartes' I: the I, 
"the" I that, if not necessarily definable in any clear-cut, categorical manner, can 
"nevertheless" be referred to as "something" in a certain indexical manner, the I that 
remains "the same, " i. e. self-identical, in the course of various attempts at 
self-differentiation, is the reflexive I, i. e. the I that returns to itself. That is to say, the 
mode in which all different aspects of the reflective I are gathered into one "I" - into 
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a definable, phenomenological object of self-inspection - is reflexive. The minimal 
idea of identity Descartes thus proposes after conducting his thought-experiment, 
referred to in the passage quoted above again12 as "some things" that cannot be 
negated further even in the most radical case of self-doubt, I suggest in this regard, is 
a reflexive thought of I or, put more precisely, an effect of the reflective subject's 
reflexive fixation on itself. It is on the basis of the possibility of the reflexive 
identification of the I that Descartes's reflective ontology unfolds. 
The framework of reference thus given, the thesis explores the possibility to 
read Derrida's reflexive "hauntology" as a hyperbolic appropriation of Descartes's 
reflexive I. To show here, only very quickly, a way in which Derrida's reflexive 
hauntology can be related to, and contrasted with, the aforementioned reflective 
ontology, reflexive hauntology is that which haunts a reflective thinker, 
meta-reflexively, who, on the one hand, desires to grasp or reach a certain 
pre-reflective level of ontology, and on the other hand, recognises or acknowledges 
the impossibility to break out of the reflexive mould of thinking. Accordingly, 
"reflexivity" here, meta-reflexivity, to be more specific, characterises the way in 
which such recognition of logical impossibility returns to the reflective subject. And 
such meta-reflexivity is "haunting" in the sense that the desire to transcend the order 
of reflection or reflexion conflicts constantly -recursively - with the need to stay on 
the logical line of successive reflections, with the philosophical need to make sense 
of such desire itself. The conflict at issue is that between an impossibility and a 
necessity, an impossible dream of non-reflexion and a necessary reality of reflexion. 
In this regard, one can say that reflexive hauntology lies in between pre-reflective 
ontology and reflexive epistemology; the regressive movement of the "pre-" signifies 
that which "haunts" the reflective subject caught up between the impossibility of 
non-reflective and by implication non-reflexive ontology, and the inevitability of 
12Recall the following sentence from a passage quoted earlier: "[... ] let him (the evil genius) deceive me 
as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. 
[AT VII 25/CSM u 171" 
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reflective and by implication reflexive epistemology. Derrida's milieu of thinking is 
thereby a priori constrained by such constitutive "double bind" that imposes a 
structure of dilemma on it. Such kind of apriorism in which pre-reflective ontology is 
deemed a priori impossible (albeit desirable), and similarly, reflective epistemology, 
a priori necessary (albeit inadequate), underlies the process of the unfolding of 
Derrida's aporetic, philosophical reflections. The epistemological origin of such 
philosophical predicament is locatable, the thesis argues, in the kind of 
self-reflexivity systematically built in the cogitational model of thinking. The source 
of Derrida's aporia, the thesis seeks to show further, lies in the fact that he takes for 
granted, i. e. implicitly presupposes, a reflective model of philosophising as not only 
one possible mode of philosophical thinking amongst many others, but the condition 
of thinking under which his philosophy unfolds. 
In order to explore such epistemological or logical link between Descartes's 
reflective ontology and Derrida's reflexively hauntology, this study, when analysing 
Descartes, focuses on the strategic, methodological, and technical aspects of his 
cogito argument to the exclusion of the ontological side of the argument. The key 
concern here, restricted in such a way, is neither to offer a closely textual and 
comprehensive reading of how Descartes reaches the thought of sum nor to ask 
whether he succeeded in proving the sum, let alone the existence of God; It is to see 
in what specific and strategic way the constitutive reflexivity of the cogito can be, 
and in fact has been by Descartes himself, used as a means to gain access to ontology 
-a reflective ontology, in this case. The object of analysis here, in other words, is 
what may be isolated methodologically as a technique of reflexive thinking which, as 
I shall seek to show, Derrida adopts in his deconstructive reflection problematically. 
To articulate the focus of the thesis more conclusively and polemically, what I 
aim to problematise in this study, by way of explication, is Derrida's implicit 
philosophical commitment to the reflexive form of cogitation, which Descartes the 
self-doubter or auto-critic also used in early stages of Meditations. The central 
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concern of the thesis is to show that the "preferential 13" structure of Derrida's 
economy of thinking is Cartesian in its methodological orientation. I will therefore 
demonstrate that the Cartesian norms of self-reflexive thinking are not only operative 
in the self-referential scenes of Derrida's deconstruction, but, more significantly, vital 
to the very viability of his economy of writing. In pursuing a reading of Derrida in 
light of Descartes, I will therefore highlight the reflexive framework of thinking as a 
given "preference" in Derrida's deconstructive trajectory, "in the milieu of which" he 
seems to desire, whether consciously or unconsciously, to be caught up rather than 
not to. The internal administration operative in the Derridian economy of reflexion, I 
will argue, is deeply and structurally Cartesian. The critical point this study raises 
against Derrida, in pursuing an epistemological or methodological reading of his 
deconstructive trajectory, is that the logical structure of his hyper-reflection is 
originarily Cartesian in view of its internal and irreducible duality - the irrecuperable 
gap between a self that reflects on itself in a hyper-active mode and the self thus 
reflected back passively, i. e. consequently; his hyper-reflective move, seen from its 
methodological orientation, is thereby "always already" constrained to such an 
extent. Insofar as the philosophy of Derrida draws, albeit implicitly, on the 
self-centred mode of Cartesian cogitation that tightly dualises the self-other 
relationship at the deepest structural and constitutive level, his putatively 
"de-constructive" move to articulate the irreducible locus of the other within the 
cogitational self is considered to be rather deceptive than effective, or at best, only 
gestural. 
13I 
prefer to speak of experience, this word that means at the same time traversal, voyage, ordeal, 
both mediated [... ] and singular [... ]. It is not a preference that I prefer but the preference fri. 
which I find myself inscribed [... ]I was ¢ [... ] in the European pre erence in the preference 
of the French language, nation, citizenship [... ]. [Poi 373/362-31 
Everything is "drawn" for me from the (living, daily, naive or reflective, always thrown against the 
impossible) experience pjthis "preference" that I have at the same time to of rm and sacrifice. 
[Poi 374/3631. 
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Part I, which focuses mostly on Derrida, aims to show that Derrida can be 
read as a radical Cartesian, which is the key contention of the thesis as a whole. And 
this case will be argued from a methodological or epistemological, and not from an 
ontological or theological, point of view; the key point of contention I will highlight 
in the course of argument is that the element of self-reflexivity systematically built in 
the texts of Derrida is indicative of his implicit, philosophical commitment to 
methodological Cartesianism, i. e. the method of self-doubt, which Descartes uses for 
his cogito argument. To this end, an immanent, textual reading of Derrida will be 
offered, in which I seek to disclose a hidden - hidden, in the sense of not being 
explicitly articulated or acknowledged - presence of Descartes, the sceptical 
Descartes to be more specific, in the texts of Derrida. Part II aims to strengthen the 
case that part I argues by analysing more closely selected texts of Descartes and 
Derrida, directly relevant to the key contention of the thesis. Chapter 4, which 
focuses exclusively on Descartes, will offer a detailed account of the reflexive 
dimension of Descartes's epistemology, i. e. the inaugural inwardness of his turn to 
the cogitational mode of thinking. Chapter 5 then traces closely the process in which 
the reflexive inwardness of methodological Cartesianism becomes reinforced by 
Denrida's meta-reflective (as opposed to un-reflective), sceptical move, by using, as a 
telling example, Derrida's argument against Foucault regarding the philosophical 
status of Descartes's madmen. For this, analysed will be some part of Derrida's essay, 
`Cogito et histoire de lafolie [ED 51-97/31-63], ' in which he disputes Foucault's 
contention that Descartes's system of thinking, narrowly rationalistic in itself, has 
generic inability to understand madness per se; Derrida problematises Foucault's 
narrow understanding of the Cartesian rationality by proposing an alternative and 
wider framework of reading Descartes, in which Descartes's hyperbolic, 
meta-reflective move made in his cogito argument is seen as a manifestation of the 
generic madness of metaphysical thinking. Derrida's positive evaluation of what he 
perceives as a "philosophical" kind of madness, i. e. an element of hyperbolism 
internal to metaphysical thought, as I will go on to show, reinforces the case of 
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Derrida as a Cartesian thinker, who believes in the philosophical value of 
meta-reflection, and as a radical Cartesian, whose commitment to methodological 
Cartesianism is exclusive. Derrida's philosophical loyalty to Descartes, the 
hyperbolic sceptic, is exclusive to such an extent that, in the essay at issue, he makes 
a properly Cartesian move by rationalising madness, i. e. by locating the moment of 
madness in the meta-reflective structure of Cartesian cogitation, in the name of 
methodological self-doubt; in his other writings, he stages his inability to extricate 
himself from the maddening - maddening, in the sense that he himself describes in 
terms of hyper-reflection - force of internalised Cartesianism. 
Insufficient study, to the best of my knowledge, has been made of Derrida as a 
Cartesian14. If there does occur a study on Descartes and Derrida, a discussion of the 
latter in light of the former, as can be found in such a typical article by Susan Bordo 
and Mario Moussa [1993], Derrida tends to be categorised as an anti-Cartesian 
thinker whose force of thinking drives the Cartesian cogitational subjectivity to 
"disappear amid the corridors of language [117]. " The question I am led to raise 
again is this: Has the Cartesian figure of a thinker "disappeared amid the corridors of 
language?, " and similarly, amid the corridors of Derrida's language which he brings 
to the forefront of philosophical thinking? I think not; I would rather argue that it is 
precisely Derrida's inability to operate except in the corridors of Cartesianism, in 
other words, his failure to eradicate the image of a Cartesian thinker out of his mind 
that makes him a contemporary neo-Cartesian. The point to note, again, is that 
Derrida thinks like and with Descartes, even when doing so against him. 
0.3 Preliminary Considerations: Notes on Some Central Terms 
This final section of the introductory part of the thesis will provide some 
minimal definitions of the following set of central terms that will recur throughout 
14Refer to Literature Review [3.3] 
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the text: "self-reflexivity, " "logocentrism, " and "economy (of reflexion). " In addition, 
the centrality of these notions to the proposed Cartesian reading of Derrida will be 
briefly discussed. 
By self-reflexivity or reflexivity, and the Cartesian kind, in particular, I mean 
a dual turn of the mind that simultaneously engenders heterogeneous orders within a 
given thought, the first order and the second; When in reflexion, the mind "grasps" 
these two orders at once; Hence, in this sense, the self "returns" to itself when in 
self-reflexion. When I write "(self-)reflexion" in the following pages, instead of 
"(self-)reflection, " my intention is to stress the metal-level reflexivity operative in the 
completion of an act of judgement; Which is to imply, when I write "reflection, " I 
intend to highlight the open-ended movement of a thought towards a higher order, 
which remains to be captured by a subsequent movement of reflexion. Tyler Burge's 
description of the reflexive movement of judgement in the Cartesian "individuation" 
of self-knowledge [1988: 72fi] is useful in this context; 
[... ] knowledge of one's own mental event, particularly knowledge of the sort 
which interested Descartes. Such knowledge consists in a reflexive judgement 
which involves thinking a first-order thought that the judgement itself is about. 
The reflexive judgement simply inherits the content of the first-order thought. 
[... ] One knows one's thought to be what it is simply by thinking it while 
exercising second-order, self-ascriptive powers. One has no `criterion, ' or test, 
or procedure for identifying the thought, and one need not exercise comparisons 
between it and other thoughts in order to know it as the thought one is thinking. 
Getting the `right' one is simply a matter of thinking the thought in the relevant 
reflexive way. [72] 
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This passage is a lucid account of the atomistically15 individuated, Cartesian 
rationality that is concerned with getting a thought "right" by simply "relating" it to 
itself, that is, by "thinking the thought in the relevant reflexive way. " Burge's 
description of the Cartesian reflexivity also shows why, for Descartes, self-knowledge 
is the most reliable source of knowledge. The key point to note is that a thought one 
has about oneself, namely, a self-referential thought, gains its automatic infallibility 
by virtue of being irrelevant to the other; here, the "other" refers to both a totality of 
other things that the first order thought is not about and a totality of other thoughts 
which therefore "don't inherit the content of the first-order thought. " 
In exploring the Cartesian world of self-reflexivity, I am going to look closely 
at the discursive functions of reflexivity. Specifically, I will focus on "the 
self-ascriptive powers" of the first-person reflexive judgement, in other words, the 
"self-supporting character [Bartlett 1987: 11]" of reflexively deductive arguments, 
taking it as a key element that renders the writings of both Derrida and Descartes 
strategically philosophical as opposed to merely literary. My reading seeks to 
explicate the ways in which both Descartes and Derrida rely on the epistemological 
resources of reflexive thinking for the construction of their arguments. 
Logocentrism: The way in which Descartes draws on the epistemological 
resources of reflexion for his cogito argument, and, similarly, the way Derrida does 
15 When one characterises the Cartesian self as being "atomistic", the range of reference to which the 
term is applicable is to be restricted to the discursive and theoretical, i. e. rationalistic, side of it; at a 
practical and ethical level, Descartes does not subscribe to the atomistic view of the self. See, for 
instance, the following excerpt from the letter dated 15 September 1645 addressed to Princess 
Elizabeth: 
After acknowledging the goodness of God, the immortality of souls and the immensity of the 
universe, there is yet another truth that is, in my opinion, most useful to know. That is, that 
though each of us is a person distinct from others whose interests are accordingly in some way 
different from those of the rest of the world, we must still think that none of us could subsist 
alone and each one of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, and more particularly a 
part of the earth, the State, the society, the family to which we belong by our domicile, our oath 
of allegiance and our birth. [AT IV 293/CSM 1112661 
Accordingly, when the words "atomistic" or "atomism" are used hereafter in any context in which 
Descartes's method of self-reflection is discussed or alluded to, they are meant to be read as terms 
describing his methodological, i. e. deliberate and experimental, isolation of the reflectively cogitational 
dimension of the self which is, acknowledgedly, only part of his more holistic concept of the self. 
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so in order to keep viable the economy of his deconstructive trajectory, these two 
seemingly different ways of relying on the reflexive self are commonly and 
fundamentally "logocentric" in the following Derridian sense: With this move of 
self-appropriative reflexion, the thinking self that pays phenomenological attention to 
itself by responding to the reflexive call of self-consciousness is bound to "subject 
everything to the authority of the logos or the word [Mortley, interview with Derrida, 
1991: 104]. " 
What I problematise in this study is Derrida's reflexive formalism - the 
"subjection" or submission of a thought to a higher order of the same thought by 
means of the reflexive doubling of it - taken as a "symptom" of "logocentric" 
"syndrome". This particular case of logocentrism found in the writings of Derrida, 
which I intend to highlight in the thesis, suggests that his discourse is subject to the 
philosophical authority of the "I, " and to the Cartesian law of reflexive cogitation, to 
be specific. My claim with this, put more strongly, is that Derrida's discourse is a 
logocentrically oriented system of thoughts the textual economy of which is 
self-closedly self-serving rather than radically open to its "other. " This view on the 
deconstructive economy of the same therefore underplays, to a significant extent, the 
"heterological" force of deconstruction, deconstruction typically portrayed as a 
discourse sensitive to its own constitutive, and therefore irreducible, heterogeneity. 
Against this standard view, my reading of Derrida's deconstruction seeks to unravel 
its intricately logocentric and irreducibly egological level. The argument I put 
forward is that the force of Derridian reflexion originates from that of 
Cartesian-Husserlian first-person cogitation. To generalise this point, the Derridian 
deconstruction is, and is ultimately, a discourse of "subjection" rather than 
transgression. 
Lastly, some words on "economy"; In response to the following question, 
Cartesian Deconstruction 22 Introduction 
RM: "durance with an "a" seems to take us in the direction of the same, in 
contrast with difference with an "e. " The separateness of things seems somewhat 
mitigated. [Mortley, Interview with Derrida, 1991: 99] 
Derrida says, 
JD: I think you're right to say that d ferance, with an "a, " veers towards 
sameness. [... ] This is what I call the economy: economy is in a way an idea 
based on sameness, the oikos, that which remains within the "home" of the 
same. [99] 
My reading of Derrida contends that insofar as he remains within the 
Cartesian terrain of thought, his deconstructive strategy is not only inextricably, but, 
excessively, bound up with the economy of the same, precisely with the kind that 
Derrida aptly described in the passage above - the kind of thought that "veers towards 
sameness" by subjecting itself to the reflection's self-referential force of reflexive 
doubling. An example of the reflexive doubling of a thought onto a higher level of 
reflection can be found in the famous opening line of Derrida's essay on d ferance, 
which reads: 
The verb "to differ" seems to differ from itself. [... ] "°To differ" signifies 
nonidentity; [... ] it (also) signifies the order of the same. We provisionally 
give the name durance to this sameness which is not identical. [VP/SP 
129(trans. ) ]. 
The economy of the same operative in this case is the recursive doubling of a given 
thought: "The verb "to differ" seems to differ from itself'. Without fully explicating 
what Derrida means by the sentence at issue, to give only an example of the case he 
makes here: "A thought that a differs from ß" (the thought as a whole, as such), 
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which the verb "to differ" conveys, differs from itself. Note that a conventional 
thought of difference -a thought that a differs from ß- is reflexively doubled into a 
meta-thought on difference, i. e. "a thought that a differs from ß" (as a whole, as 
such) differs from itself. Although our immediate concern is with the recurrence of 
the phrase, "to differ from, " it would be necessary to understand, first, what Derrida 
means by the "itself' in this case. The common-sensical notion of difference Derrida 
purports to problematise with his talk of diffirance presupposes an idea of 
self-identity: the concept of difference itself, in light of which a can be perceived to 
be different from ß, has to be self-identical to itself as a given conceptual apparatus. 
Derrida's diffirance is then, as he argues, that which problematises such order of 
identity-thinking, and accordingly, somehow "differs from" the notion of a 
difference, an identifiable difference. With a thought of diffirance that automatically 
differs from any intelligible - intelligible in the sense of being identifiable or 
recognisable as such - thought of a difference, what Derrida points to, in an indexical 
manner, is the kind of self-referential paradox inherent in the notion of "a" 
difference: A thought of difference cannot be really or radically "different" in the 
sense that the thought itself has to remain self-identical in order to be rendered 
intelligible as such as a thought. Hence, a thought that remains "different from" itself, 
i. e. drfferance, which therefore "is neither a word nor a concept [VP/SP 130 
(trans. )]. " Now, the point of contention with which we are concerned is that, in view 
of Derrida's reflexive doubling of the conventional notions of difference, one can 
claim that his talk of d ferance "remains within the `home' of the same. " A 
specification of the self-reflexive movement of diffirance - e. g. the characterisation 
of dif Trance as a meta-thought that makes "a thought that a dyers from ß" differ 
from itself - shows that diffirance is "un-identical" with, i. e. different from, the 
conventional thought of difference not in its contents, but only in its discursive order: 
The reflective level of the former is higher than that of the latter. The point I am 
highlighting here is that, insofar as the way in which the idea of diffirance is 
formulated is meta-reflective, that is to say, insofar as an inextricable link between 
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the first-order reflection on difference and its corresponding second order is thus 
logocentrically maintained, Derrida is to be viewed as a thinker of the same, in other 
words, a thinker of restricted economy. 
However, immediately after the remark quoted above (from the interview 
article), Derrida goes on to refute the line of reading I have just offered: 
But, I would stress another dimension of differance, which is, by contrast, that of 
absolute heterogeneity, and therefore of otherness, radical otherness. The term 
"differance" can't be stabilised within a polarisation of the same and the 
different. It's at once and the same time an idea rooted in sameness, and radical 
otherness, an otherness which is absolutely radical. [99] 
However, I think otherwise: Insofar as the thought of differance is the kind 
that grasps one "and" the other "at the same time, " insofar as this thought results 
from a certain reflexive labour of thinking, I am again led to the view that 
deconstruction is a highly economised, meta-level reflexion. One way to establish 
this view would be to show that as long as Derrida's thought around d ferance is 
thought in a meta-reflexive manner, it necessarily ends up obliterating its "another 
dimension, " its "absolute heterogeneity, " i. e. the level that escapes such discursive 
trap of meta-thought. My analysis of reflexive "automaticity" in the cogito argument 
[1.31] paves the way for this line of argument posed against Derrida. 
The distinction the metaphysicians of economy customarily make between the 
"intrasubjective" economy and the "intersubjective" economy is useful in this 
context. As Edward Fullbrook [1997] notes, there are two distinctively different 
schools of thought in the metaphysics of homo economicus. One defends modem 
views of the atomic and individual self, which gives rise to the modern 
Cartesian-Lockean-Newtonian mechanistic doctrines of soul atomism and 
methodological individualism; The other, by contrast, holds a relational view of the 
Cartesian Deconstruction 25 Introduction 
self, offering a model of "desire according to an other, 16" a model of the world as 
ll "the mimetic universe, " for example. Accordingly, the former is an intrasubjective 
model of economy, atomistic in its methodological orientation, and modernist in its 
ethos, and the latter, intersubjective, therefore, holistic in its approach, and 
postmodern in its ethos. Now, when I suggest that the economy of self-same reflexion 
is operative in the Derridian discourse, my suggestion, in other words, is that the 
Derridian model of economy is closer to the intrasubjective one than to the 
intersubjective one, insofar as deconstruction is, as he says, "auto-deconstruction. " 
Derrida's repetitive reliance on the word "auto" as in the "auto-deconstruction" of the 
self can be read as an indication that a governing principle of the reflexive autonomy 
of self-differential thinking underlies the Derridian economy of thinking, which is 
therefore fundamentally self-same. 
Interestingly, Jean-Pierre Dupuy [1990 and 1994], a major contemporary 
theorist in the school of intersubjective economy, touched precisely upon this issue. 
In exploring the relationship between the "literary" strategies of violation or 
transgression and the Derridian "self-deconstruction of convention, " both of which, 
as he points out, draw on the paradox of self-refutation [1990,1994: 89-91], he makes 
the following important point, which I endorse entirely: the Derridian system of 
self-deconstruction in which "the working of a conventional order contains18 the 
principle of its own decomposition [1994: 94]" is fundamentally "autonomous [1994: 
91ff]. " Seen from this point of view, Derrida's "logic of supplement, " for instance, 
can be read as a meta-level abstraction of the automaticised self-refuting process that 
takes place within a system of thought; In a deconstructive system of thought, as (if) 
in a well-made fictive narrative, "convention violates itself within itself [1994: 89]"; 
differance "differs from itself'. 
16 an example from Ren6 Girard [Fullbrook 1997: 86], a major proponent of the intersubjective 
economy. 
17 John Mayard Keynes's key concepts [Fullbrook 1997: 82] 
18 "The verb "contains" should be construed in its two-fold meaning: "to have within oneself, " but also 
"to keep in check" [Dupuy 1994: 93]. " 
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Derrida's conclusion, however, not only differs from ours, but contradicts it, 
as he immediately goes on to say: 
So, I'd say that differance can't be enclosed either within the same, or the idea of 
the radically other, about which nothing could be said. It is an enigmatic 
relation of the same to the other. [99] 
Clear again is the subtle, and yet crucial, disagreement between Derrida and 
me on the evaluative interpretation of the mode of his economy of thinking. I view 
his deconstructive project as a fundamentally logocentric, and ultimately 
intrametaphysical, philosophical lie, in which a highly sophisticated economy of 
self-same reflexion pretends to liberate "the radical other" from its snare of 
self-reflexive interiorisation. Derrida's deconstruction of the self is, ultimately, a 
self-expansive project of the self in the sense that his ceaseless, reflexive doubling of 
his reflective self, which results in the textual presentation of the hyper-reflective self 
engaging in auto-self-deconstruction, ultimately leads to the reinforcement of the 
discursive centrality of such auto-deconstructive subject; This way, the self in 
auto-self-deconstruction ends up affirming its authorial territory (in the form of 
self-referential writings) and expanding it (in the form of textual expositions of the 
self in self-reflexion). However, by contrast, Derrida considers his 
auto-deconstructive move as a self-transcending "response" - as opposed to a 
self-reflexive reaction - to the most enigmatic and yet rigorous "call" of reason: a call 
for absolute self-criticism. A deconstructive response to the call of reason result, 
therefore, Derrida argues, in a move towards self-effacement as opposed to 
self-expansion. 
The way in which such self-effacement takes place is however, my 
counter-argument emphasises, is self-centredly self-expansive in the senses described 
above. The "enigmatic" "call" of reason that Derrida privileges and follows, my 
reading suggests, is a call for a metaphysical self- violation, which, in this sense, 
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remains self-referential. According to this rule of thinking, the thinking self must 
bring a rupture to the internal order of identity-thinking, and it must carry out its 
de-constructive self-analysis to the effect that the very rupture within the self, the 
very failure of the self to retain its self-same identity simultaneously marks the 
tenacious presence of "the other" within the unitary system of "the self-same self. " It 
is in view of this systematic failure 19 in the economy of self-same reflexion that 
Derrida is led to observe the "enigmatic relation of the same to the other. " 
My exposition of Derrida in light of Descartes in what follows is an attempt to 
reduce the size of Derrida's "enigma" as much as possible. I will advance my 
argument to such an extent that an articulation of the mode of Derrida's alliance with 
traditional philosophies, and with the Cartesian, in particular, can demystify some 
aspects of Derrida's (non-)thoughts strategically obfuscated by him which therefore 
remains unnecessarily obscure in his texts. My intention here is neither to reduce 
Derrida's deconstructive project to "a" kind of Cartesian phenomenology of the self 
nor to obliterate the proper and singular name, Jacques Derrida, by simply 
historicising or formalising it in a schematic manner. Put the scope and object of the 
study in more positive terms, a reading of Derrida as a Cartesian is not to be 
considered as a hostile countermove against him, but, rather as an endeavour to bring 
into light the critical aspects of his philosophical adventure. The ultimate aim of this 
undertaking is therefore twofold: it is to evaluate the philosophical significance of 
Derrida's deconstructive trajectory, and at the same time, to expose the constitutive 
limits of his philosophical endeavour. The following, in other words, is a small and 
19 Kevin Hart [1989] argues [173ff] that the Derridian deconstruction is neither a "collection of 
first-order positions about knowledge" nor "just" "a second-order discourse on epistemology and 
ontology [... ] that traces the effects of their will to totalise. " I am, in overall, sympathetic to this view 
that is rightly sensitive to the aporetic undecidability of the discursive status of Derrida's theoretical 
assertions. However, my reading, seen from a more specific point of view, differs from Hart's in the 
following sense. My contention, to use Hart's framework, is that it is possible, to a significant extent, to 
give a positive account of the second-order dimension of deconstruction; this is possible insofar as 
deconstruction "traces the effects" of its passion for the impossible, in other words, the effects of its 
failure to totalise, if not its "will" to totalise. 
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yet sustained attempt to figure out the aura of Derrida's rather "enigmatic, " but 
certainly not mysterious or even mystic, thoughts. 
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1. Derrida in Relation to Descartes: Self-reflexion 
I have never known how to tell a storyl. Why didn't I receive this gift from Mnemosyne? 
From this complaint, and probably to protect myself before it, a suspicion continually 
steals into my thinking2: who can really tell a story? [MPM 33/101 
I write without seeing. - Diderot, Letter to Sophie Volland, June 10,1759. 
- Do you believe (this) [Vous croyez]? You'll observe that from the very beginning of this 
interview I've had a problem following you. I remain sceptical ... 
[MA 9/13] 
Vous Croyez?: "a suspicion continually steals into my thinking. " 
Let me begin by reading a sentence from the writings of Jacques Derrida. 
1.1 First Exposition: A Suspicion and A Reading 
"A suspicion continually steals into my thinking, " says Derrida. From the 
beginning, I have a problem following him. I remain sceptical; I remain sceptical of 
what he says, i. e. that he suspects he cannot tell a story. Staged here is merely a 
self-effacing, authorial gesture, one might say; I, however, remain sceptical of such 
lenient reading, particularly when it is Derrida the strategically self-effacing writer 
that one is reading. The thesis as a whole is a resistant reading of Derrida, a close 
reading of and behind the sceptical facade of Derrida. It proposes to look at the other 
side of Derrida's uncertainty, a kind of meta-certainty: he seems to be sure that his 
thinking will have failed in the end. We the readers, including Derrida the reader, 
1 "Je n ai jamais su raconter une histoire": this is also the first sentence [MPM 27/3] with which 
Jacques Derrida begins his text on blindness, Mnemosyne, and Paul de Man [MPM]. 
2 "Un souppon s insinue toujours. " 
3 This is the first sentence with which Derrida begins his text on blindness and self-portraiture in 
Memoires d'avegule [MA]. 
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must remain alert to the infinite possibilities of deception. We ought to see, following 
Derrida in suspicion, what lies on the other side of his sceptical move; we ought to 
see further what lies in between what he says and what he does not say; thereby, a 
sceptic's vigil is called for. In this section [L 1], I will show two other ways in which 
the central concern of the thesis can be articulated, each time differently, and yet all 
in reference to the single sentence at stake: "A suspicion continually steals into my 
thinking. " 
Again, "a suspicion constantly steals into my thinking, " so goes Derrida's 
self-observation. "Constant" vigilance, therefore, is the name of the game. The one 
who remains suspicious is the one who, as he puts it, "protects" oneself from the 
threat of the other, from the manipulation by the other. Derrida resembles the 
Descartes of the first and second Meditationes who faces, and faces alone, the 
hypothetical attack of the evil genius. Derrida is, as he says about himself, like a 
"hunted animal, searching in darkness for a way out where none is found. 
4 Every exit 
is blocked [PR 467/5, translation revised]. " In order to survive this trial of thought, 
our Cartesian meditator must remain insomniac, figuratively speaking; he must, at 
least, resist falling asleep, the sleep being analogous, in this case, to the absolute 
vulnerability of the self to the other. This type of methodological insomnia is what, to 
follow Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger, the "principle of reason" calls for [PR 
497-498/19-20]: the principle calls for "the time for reflection [497/19]" "in the 
twilight of an eye [497/20], " which is also "an other (autre) time [... ] heterogeneous 
with what it reflects and perhaps gives time (donne peut-eire le temps) for what calls 
for and is called thought [497/19]. " 
A mode of "giving time for what calls for thought, and for what is called 
thought" is, in Derrida's case, already a complicated one: it is always already 
embedded in another mode in which a thought has, in advance, been "given time, 
5" 
i. e. given a chance to be thought. At stake here is the undecidability or ambivalence 
4 -un animal traque cherche dons 1 obscurite une issue introuable" 
5 Donner le temps [Derrida 1991] 
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of the mode of reflection: philosophical reflection is active in the sense that it "gives" 
time to think, and passive, at the same time, in that it takes place in a "given" time, 
i. e. in a pre-determined set of conditions, whether it be historical or logical. The 
thesis sets out to explicate the structural aspects and limits of this kind of double 
thought of Derrida, this "abyssal thought of inheritance [FM 191]. " Broadly speaking, 
the twofold mode of com-pli-cation in which Derrida's reflections on presence take 
place, presence taken, for example, as "the present of tradition [Caygill 19956: 
293-9], " shall be the broad concern of my analysis. 
Caygill's characterisation of the "double" mode in which Derrida relates 
himself to the philosophical tradition [293] is highly pertinent to our context: 
"Derrida [... ] remains implicated within the oppositions of the modem thought of 
tradition. " One example of "the oppositions, " which Caygill discusses in his essay, 
and which concerns us here in this thesis, is the opposition between "donation, " i. e. 
the act of "giving time, " and "appropriation, " i. e. the act of receiving "given time. " 
An aporetic site held between these two opposing terms, that is, a space of thinking 
that lies both within the traditional line of thinking and without - this is where 
Derrida's philosophical reflection takes place. Such irreducibly twofold aspect of 
Derrida's mode of thinking is often described as de-constructive: deconstruction is 
both destructive in that it attempts to transcend the traditional order of discursive 
rationality and constructive in that it seeks to create a new vantage-point of view 
from which tradition as a whole can be critically investigated. Derrida's aporia here, 
however, is that the epistemological or logical resources necessary for such 
transgressive and yet "donative, " deconstructive endeavour cannot but be borrowed, 
i. e. "appropriated, " from the traditional metaphysical resources. Hence, 
[... ] between appropriation and donation [... ) there is a complex and knotted 
tangle of routes, paths, and journeys which are remembered, undergone, feared, 
6 In this short and illuminating essay, Howard Caygill explores a theme that underlies both the poetry of 
Guiseppe Ungaretti and the writings of Jacques Derrida: tradition as a "present of time, " a "given" time. 
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hoped for, and which have to be understood in their historical specificity 
[Caygill 1995: 293-4J. 
Specifically in this study, we will investigate the extent to which one can define 
Derrida as a thinker who follows the Cartesian "path" of thinking, namely, Derrida as 
a Cartesian thinker. Not unlike Caygill, who immediately acknowledges that he 
"must play the traitor [... ] to Derrida [294], " we will also see to what extent one can 
be justified in underplaying Derrida's radicalism, his path-breaking pathos. We will 
explore the other, secure, and programmatic itinerary of Derrida's philosophical 
trajectory, which appears to underlie, and underlie tenaciously, his 
transgression-driven, "risky" thinking. It is on the conservative "logic" of Derrida's 
deconstruction as opposed to its adventurous spirit that the focus of my reading lies. 
In the course of pursuing a reading of Derrida as a Cartesian, we will be looking at 
the figure of an old Descartes in Derrida, that is, the figure of a traditional young 
radical; we will give a reading of this Derrida, this dimension of Derridian discourse, 
which, I believe, has yet to be exposed. 
Has there been such a thing as "an other time" in Derrida's discourse?: "an 
other time [... ] heterogeneous with what it reflects and perhaps gives time for what 
calls for and is called thought. " This, however, is a naively phrased question, given 
that, as Derrida says, there is no "exit" at all in deconstructive scenes of thinking; 
Derrida's point, in other words, is that an attempt to pursue an other path of reflection 
must be made, whether or not such an attempt can actually succeed. Conceding this 
point, let us then rephrase our question: does not the Derridian time of reflection bear 
affinity with the Cartesian night of epistemic abyss rather than with the dawn of a 
new radical thought? That is to ask, is not Derrida "constantly" preoccupied with the 
Cartesian aporias of self-reflexion arising from within the Cartesian framework of 
egological thinking? The thought behind this question is that, although the Derridian 
vigil sustains the survivability of Cartesian rationality, yet, by doing so, it already 
appears to preclude the possibility of a radical awakening, i. e. an "other" possibility 
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of a thought to become awakened to a radically new, "heterogeneous" epoch of 
metaphysics. In so far as Derrida refuses to extricate his discourse from the 
self-implicative force of Cartesian reflexion, this refusal limits the ambience of his 
reflections, accordingly; he cannot think other-wise. That is to say, the Derridian 
gesture to welcome "an other time of reflection, " already excludes the radical 
presence of the other, i. e. "an other time for an other reflection. " In what follows, I 
am going to examine the extent to which one can portray Derrida the thinker as a 
thinking "animal [PR 467/5]" trapped in the Cartesian snare of reflexion, in the 
aporetic formalism of Cartesian self-reflexivity. With this direction in mind, I am 
going to undertake an analysis of the Cartesian mode of reflexive thinking, in which, 
as I will demonstrate, Derrida allows his thought to be embedded. 
Again, "a suspicion constantly steals into my thinking, " says Derrida, a 
self-doubter. His self-doubts are rigorous, in other words, consistent, to such an 
extent that, for example, he is forced, by necessity, to renounce the intellectual 
proprietorship of the Derridian enterprise, namely, "deconstruction (deconstruction). " 
He must, by force of self-effacing thinking, ask who can dare claim the ownership of 
an intellectual trajectory; he must therefore voice this concern in a manner similar to 
that in which he says he doubts he can tell a story. 
Q: Does the term "deconstruction" designate your fundamental project? 
J. D: I have never had a "fundamental project". And "deconstructions, " which I 
prefer to say in the plural, has doubtless never named a project, method, or 
system, especially not a philosophical system. [Poi 367/356] 
And again, 
Q: [... ] Is there a philosophy of Jacques Derrida? 
J. D.: No. 
Q: There is thus no message. 
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J. D.: No. 
Q: Is there anything normative? 
J. D.: Of course there is, there is nothing but that. But if you are asking me 
implicitly whether what I am saying there is normative in the ordinary 
sense of the term, I would have more trouble answering you. [... ] [Poi 
372-3/361] 
Suspicion, then, is the norm, if nothing else. What the "norm" of 
deconstruction is, Derrida, being rather "troubled, " refuses to spell out; "troubled, " 
because this norm, supposedly, only "steals into" his thinking. Therefore, he does not 
know what it is; he can only "suspect" what it could be. Then, can he not just state 
what it is that he suspects? No, he cannot; or rather, he must choose not to reveal the 
secrets, to disclose that of which he remains suspicious. Firstly, he must not, as he 
himself is not "rigorously sure" what it is; secondly, he must not, as any definitive 
remark will put an end to the interminable drama of self-doubts, which does not 
contribute to his economy of writing. Regarding the second reason, which is less 
straightforward and more interesting than the first, we will examine later in detail 
why this is the case. At this stage, let it suffice to note that, despite all these 
suspicions and self-doubts, what remains beyond suspicion in the Derridian discourse 
are the epistemic values of "rigour" and "vigil. " The "normative" level of Derrida's 
deconstructive reflection, I will show, originates from this irreducible "preference to 
experience, or experience of the preference? for [see Poi 373-4/362-3]" the vigil of 
thinking; it also, I will show further, leads to his textual production of reflexive 
writings. 
7See 
my Introduction [0.2] for the full passage from which this phrase is being quoted. 
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1.2 Intermission: 
Against Gasche on Deconstructive Reflexivity 
According to Rodolphe Gasch6 [1986], Derrida's deconstructive endeavour is 
to be viewed as a rigorous self-inscription of "heterology [88f], " and not as a 
philosophy of the same. What Gasche's reading highlights is the "Heideggerian" 
Derrida, 8 in other words, "the radicality of (Derrida's) heterology [88, (my 
insertion)]"; mine, against his, asks how "radical" the Derridian heterology, in fact, 
is. My analysis, to anticipate the later findings, will suggest further that "Derrida's 
heterological venture [94]" can be, to a significant extent, viewed as a withdrawal 
into the Cartesian-Husserlian transcendental solipsism, a retreat into the Cartesian 
world of "hauntological" self-affliction. "Derrida's other is irretrievably plural, 
cannot be assimilated, digested, represented, or thought as such [103], " therefore in 
this sense, it is, Gasche argues, the "difference itself [87]. " In response to this line of 
reading Derrida, the key question I will pose to Derrida as well as to Gasche9 is the 
following: to what extent can Derrida think the "difference itself" without falling into 
the Cartesian trap of self-reflexive thinking? Textual reflexivity is most characteristic 
of the writings of Derrida, and a systematic problem engendered by such a style of 
8 Whether my reading of Derrida as a Cartesian would therefore automatically lead to the view of 
Heidegger as a Cartesian, this issue requires another space for discussion, which would also involve a 
critical appraisal of Derrida's relationship to Heidegger; and here I do not intend to deal with this large 
issue, nor do I wish to endorse any quick move. Let me, however, only note that it would be indeed 
worthwhile to explore a reading of Heidegger as a Cartesian, which will clash inevitably with the 
mainstream interpretations of him. If Gaschd's reading of Derrida represents, and also hinges upon, the 
standard view of Heidegger as a non-representational thinker who problematises Cartesian subjectivism, 
a counter-reading is not absent. For example, see Timothy Clark's remark on the intimate philosophical 
ties remaining amongst Descartes, Heidegger, and Derrida [1992: 26-27]: 
Derrida is emulating something like Heidegger's practice of a "step back" out of representation 
thinking [... ] Yet despite its radical force, such a philosophy is not as much a break from Cartesian 
subjectivism as it may at first appear. Dasein's pre-reflexive understanding remains part of a 
subject-centred metaphysics. [26-27] 
9 However, this does not imply that to argue with Gaschd will be a main concern of this thesis. In fact, 
after this section, Gasche's argument will not be examined anymore; it is because the main interest of 
my study lies in making a textual and conceptual link between Derrida and Descartes, and not between 
Derrida and the German Idealists, which Gaschd has already explored thoroughly. 
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textual practice is that the stylised reflexivity of Derrida's texts invites idealist or 
phenomenological readings of them, such as mine and similarly David Wood's 
[198010], which would be apparently disadvantageous to the thinker who likes to 
think that he attempts to think in a non-idealistic and non-phenomenological way. 
Why, I should like to ask, does then Derrida insist on taking this risk, amongst other 
possible ones, the risk of being misunderstood this way?: this is the question that will 
guide my investigation. 
Gasche's defence of Derrida on this point [80-87] is highly instructive, 
although not entirely persuasive. His key contention is that the Derridian reflection, 
the kind that is oriented towards "heterology, " lies "beyond" the self-same reflection 
of the German idealist kind. His point is that the Derridian kind of reflection on a 
radically different order of the self, namely, on a "heterological" self, is not to be 
identified with, or treated as part of, the speculative kind of reflections on the 
"reflexive aporias" of the infinite regress of the self, which originated from 
Descartes's system of reflexion and German idealism attempts to tackle. 
(1) By freeing the structural articulation of Being, Heidegger paved the way for 
Derrida's even more effective accounting, beyond traditional aporetics and 
speculation, for the problem of self-reflexivity. (2) Concerned both with 
demonstrating the possibility and essential limits - that is, ultimate impossibility 
of self-reflection [... ] like Heidegger, he (Derrida) focuses on an entirely new 
set of issues on the margin of the philosophical path that leads from aporias to 
their harmonious unity. (3) The manner in which he tackles the problem of 
reflexivity thus takes the form of an investigation into the "pre-suppositions, " 
"pre-positions, " or "structures" to which the exposition of this problem, as well 
10 "The use of [... ] strategies of textual reflexivity [... ] seems at least to realign Derrida finally within 
the logocentric tradition he is criticising, and moreover [... ] they do this in ways that he did not 
anticipate, and cannot find acceptable [1980: 226]. " 
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as its eventual speculative solution, must necessarily yield. [86, numbers added 
(1-3)] 
Points about Heidegger aside, Gasche's views on Derrida are clear, and 
clearly mislead. As a way of recapitulating what I have been suggesting so far, and 
establishing a framework for the subsequent discussion, here I will only indicate very 
briefly why, and in what sense, I disagree with Gasche on those three points I have 
itemised. Against the first point (1), I will advance the argument that Derrida's 
reflection does not "venture" "beyond" the traditional terrain of Cartesian aporetics. 
The thought is that Derrida's move towards "heterology" cannot but remain gestural 
as opposed to adventurous; hence, the double "gesture" of Derrida. Gasche's second 
point (2) can be problematised in the same vein. I will highlight the anachronistic 
aspects of Derrida's philosophical trajectory as opposed to its radical "new" light. I 
am going to bring into light the conservative Derrida. Final point (3): in examining 
the "manner in which Derrida tackles the problem of self-reflexivity, " that is, in 
giving a critical appraisal of the manner in which he forces his deconstructive 
thinking to take place within the "Heideggerian" pre-reflexive grounds of 
philosophical reflection, I will point to the structural problems in interpreting 
Derrida's attempt to deconstruct the self-same identity of the self as a "break" with, 
and a "displacement" of, the traditional Cartesian paradigm of reflexive cogitation. 
Furthermore, I will offer a reading of Derrida as a willing victim of his own 
logocentric, formalistic tendency: a tendency to absolutise the force of meta-level 
reflexivity. The point is that Derrida is always already forced to play the Cartesian 
game of reflexive vigil. The "force" at stake, as we shall see in what follows, closely 
resembles the methodological demand of Cartesianism. 
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1.3 Second Exposition: Methodological Self-reflexion 
This section sets out to elaborate the first contention of the thesis: Derrida's 
methodological orientation is Cartesian. The second point of contention, namely, that 
Derrida can be read as a radical Cartesian, will be discussed later in Chapter 2, which 
offers an analysis of Derrida's reflexive hauntology in light of Descartes's reflective 
ontology. The thesis as a whole is an elaboration of these two propositions, and the 
aim of this expository section [1.3] is to establish a "clear and distinct" framework in 
which this set of key ideas can be further developed later in the subsequent chapters 
[2 - 5]. 
In providing a reading of Derrida in light of Descartes, I focus on some 
significant structural similarities found in the mode of their arguments. My initial 
observation is that the element of textual reflexivity, explicable in terms of the 
phenomenological adherence of the self to itself, is found commonly in the writings 
of both Descartes and Derrida; I read their texts as phenomenological dramas of 
self-conflicts and self-doubts, narrated by the first person singular. I take up this clue 
as a guiding thread with which I interweave their seemingly heterogeneous texts. 
Given that Derrida himself acknowledges his philosophical debts to Edmund Husserl 
for his "methodological" orientation [Kearney, interview with Derrida, 1984: 109], 
and given that Husserl, notably and particularly the Husserl of Cartesian Meditations 
is a self-identified pro(to)-Cartesian, any attempt to bring into light a certain 
homological link between Descartes and Derrida, hitherto relatively undisclosed, 
would be worth its endeavour. 
With this framework in mind, I will set about analysing ways in which the 
phenomenological unfolding of the self takes place in the writings of Descartes and 
Derrida. I locate the philosophical affinity between the two in the way in which both 
the methodologically sceptical Descartes and the self-deconstructive Derrida draw on 
the recursivity of the phenomenological act of self-introspection. Accordingly, my 
focus of analysis is the inaugural centrality of the thinking ego: the initial primacy of 
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the category of the epistemological over that of the ontological or the theological, 
found in the texts of Descartes and Derrida. 
In the course of reading Descartes, the focus will be laid, accordingly, on the 
point of departure in Descartes's reflection, i. e. the thinking self, and not on the 
resultant thought of his meditations which effects a dislocation of the thinking ego's 
subject position, i. e. the proof of the existence of God (who therefore becomes more 
central than the thinking ego). The analysis in the following [1.31], the scope of 
which thus restricted, aims to elucidate the formative aspects of Descartes's cogito 
argument, i. e. the inaugural, epistemological turn in the thinking of being. 
I will begin [1.31] by singling out two epistemological aspects of Descartes's 
cogito argumentl 1: performative automatism and recursive reiterability. At the 
second stage of exposition [1.32], I will then show how it is possible to map out the 
Derridian labyrinth of thoughts by using these working concepts as a set of clues. In 
other words, the concern of the subsequent analysis is to look at the specific ways in 
which Derrida appropriates or even exploits such epistemological resources in 
constructing his self-referential texts; the manner in which Derrida relies on 
cogitational self-reflexivity, as we shall see in detail, is strategically self-serving, 
hence, in this sense, economised. The scope of the following analysis of Descartes's 
cogito argument is therefore limited to such an extent: it is to facilitate our 
understanding of the performative art of self-parasitism staged in Derrida's text in our 
attempt to locate the origin of his deconstructive techniques in methodological 
Cartesianism. Towards the end of this chapter, the methodological affinity between 
Descartes and Derrida will be shown more clearly, e. g. that between the 
self-reflexivity of Descartes's "Je pense" (on which the next section [1.31] focuses) 
and the self-reflexivity of Derrida's "Je - marque12" (on which a sub-section [1.323] 
of the subsequent section [1.32] focuses); with a juxtaposition of these two different 
11 A full discussion of its structural dimension will be undertaken in chapter 4: Self-reflexive economy 
of Descartes's Cogito. 
121t means, simultaneously, both "I mark" and "I marks. " 
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cases of self-reflection, the point of contention to be established is that the latter can 
be viewed as a derivative from the former, seen from a technical or rhetorical point of 
view. 
1.31 Descartes's Self-reflexion: 
Performative Automatism and Recursivity in the Cogito Argument 
By "performative automatism" I mean a logical mechanism constitutive of a 
performative kind of reductio ad absurdum, in which an argument is rendered 
automatically valid when the utterance of the counter-argument is deemed absurd or 
impossible. At stake is a specific kind of reasoning by reductio ad absurdum, a 
"performative" one, by virtue of which, not only there is the impossibility of allowing 
the contrary proposition, but, more significantly, is there the impossibility to utter the 
contrary13. Therefore, the most important words here are "to utter. " Before 
discussing the significance of "utterance" in the cogito argument, I will make some 
preliminary remarks regarding the two notions introduced here: "automatic" and 
"performative. " 
First, why "automatic? " The truth or conclusion of the ego-cogito, i. e. sum, 
according to Descartes, is an automatically valid one; it is self-evident in the sense 
13It is to be noted that the method of argument by reductio ad absurdum derives from Aristotle's law 
of non-contradiction, according to which, when the utterance of the contrary of a given statement leads 
to a self-contradiction, the given sentence is to be deemed true by virtue of the impossibility of asserting 
otherwise. The point I am seeking to highlight here, however, is not that Descartes's method is 
therefore originally Aristotelian, but that, first, his methodological reliance on such Aristotelian 
syllogistic reasoning has a certain strategic value, and second, what Descartes uses strategically in 
presenting his argument is the automaticity (or at-once-ness) of the way in which the impossibility at 
issue is recognised by the cogitational subject; it is with the in-built logical apparatus of the cogito 
argument, and not with the historical origin of the method adopted in the argument, that I am 
concerned. The point of contention pursued this way will, I believe, shed light on the logical side of 
Derrida's form of thinking, which I shall go on to characterise as performatively self-contradictory and 
in this sense meta-cogitational - put the same point more straightforwardly, Derrida the logical thinker 
knows that he is self-contradictory and it is the very meta-awareness of logical self-contradiction that 
his "auto='deconstructive texts stage in a playful manner. This point regarding the syllogistic rationality 
of deconstructive mind, namely, the point that Derrida implicitly adopts, and further plays on, the 
"Aristotelian" rule of non-contradiction, has already been put forward by a commentator [White 1992], 
and I will address this issue again, without going into the historical detail, in my literature review [3.3]. 
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that the negation of it necessarily, that is, automatically, leads to impossibility or 
absurdity. Note that, curiously enough, in order to validate his move from the cogito 
to the sum, Descartes uses an indirect and negative method of proof as opposed to a 
direct and positive one. A good example illustrating this point is the move Descartes 
makes from "I am not nothing" to "I am something, " which takes place in the second 
Meditatione [AT VII 25/CSM II 17]: 
[... ] Let him (a deceiver of supreme power and cunning) deceive me as much as 
he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am 
something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally 
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put 
forward by me or conceived in my mind. 
Note that, here, the truth of ego-sum is established indirectly via a series of two 
negations; the truth of sum is automatically verified by virtue of the ego's Inability to 
negate it at the time of the cogito. A certain automatic convertibility of logical values 
is a condition of the possibility of the cogito argument: The double negation as in "I 
am unable to negate that I think" is converted into a single affirmation as in "I 
thereby affirm that I think": What takes place in the logical transition from the 
inability to negate sum ("never... nothing") to the establishment of the truth of sum 
("something") is a conversion from a double negation to a single affirmation. This 
type of conversion of a unit of mental contents from a negative one to a positive one, 
analogous to what is technically called, "obversion, " is precisely what renders valid 
arguments by reductio ad absurdum. What interests us here is the automaticity of this 
transition, of this (value) conversion, of this obversion. Note that, by logical 
necessity, this conversion takes place automatically. It is in this sense that one can say 
that the cogito argument is characterised by an inevitable "automatism, " peculiar to 
that particular economy of thought. The ego of the ego cogito, when running the risk 
of self-annihilation by attempting to negate itself, by volunteering to invite the evil 
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genius to the trial of thought, in turn, insulates itself against the threats of the evil by 
converting the logical value of the same thought from a double negation to a single 
affirmation, in other words, by re-vert-ing to the simpler origin of the same thought, 
to its originary logos. Hence, Descartes's recuperation of the good sense against the 
challenge of non-sense. In this way, the ego of ego-cogito drives the evil genius 
away; in the end, it reverts to itself; finally, it restores itself, its innate good; it returns 
to itself. In this regard, the risk at stake, to use a Derridian term, is highly 
"calculated": it is, to use Descartes's word, a "methodological" risk. That is why the 
automatism of the cogito is a highly "economised" epistemic value, an "economised" 
self-reflexivity. Operative in this logic of automatism is a restitutive economy of 
dialecticised retrospection; dialectic in the sense that the antithetical threat of 
nothingness as in "I may be nothing" resulting from a negative and hypothetical 
meta-reflection is overcome by the meta-reflexion upon the very thought, which leads 
to a thesis, "I cannot be nothing as long as I am thinking"; and retrospective in the 
sense that the first thought of negation (I may be nothing) precedes, both logically 
and temporally, the second thought of double negation (The "I" that entertains the 
idea that "I may be nothing" cannot be nothing"). 
The next question is: why "performative" automatism? Descartes's reason is 
not merely self-reflexive, but performatively so. Performance here can be understood 
simply as an action: the automatic conversion takes place in an "active" manner 
rather than in a neutral or passive manner. Only through the act of reflexion, that is, 
through the re-cognition of the impossibility to think otherwise, the ego of the 
ego-cogito can locate its indubitable and immovable site of thinking, i. e. sum. Such 
performance has to be also repeatable in order to be identified as such: The self-same 
identity of the cogitational self lies in the reiterative sameness of the word, cogito. 
The restitutive re-institution of sum takes place not only in a reflexively automatic 
manner, but through the repeated performances or eventuations of the reflexive 
cogito; hence, Descartes says, "whenever I think I am not nothing, I must be 
something. " Note that, first, the terrain of the sum is delimited by a reflexive 
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movement of thought (when I think I may be nothing, I must be, on the contrary, 
something, because I must be the very being or thing that entertains such a negative 
thought), and second, the same movement is to occur recursively ("whenever I think I 
am not nothing, I must be something"). As Descartes himself repeatedly emphasises, 
the self-same recursivity of this performance, i. e. the reiterability of the cogilo, now 
secures the automatic operation of this thought-conversion, "as long as [Med II, AT 
VII 27/CSM 11181, " "while [Pri 7,49, AT IXB 6,24/CSM 1194,209], " "whenever 
[Med, AT VII 25/CSM 11 17]" the event of the cogito takes place. In this regard, the 
logic of the cogito is characterised by its recursivity, hence, mechanical or formalistic 
in loosely defined senses of these words. 
In order to have an instance of cogito work as an argument, firstly, it has to be 
uttered by the first person, not by the second or third person, and secondly, it has to 
be addressed to the same person who utters the sentence, not to another party. The 
first person reflexive utterance of the cogito is the necessary and sufficient condition 
of the possibility of the cogito argument, under which condition alone the automatic 
operation of its performative logic can be guaranteed. Why this is the case, and why 
this is an important point to bear in mind in our context, I will seek to explicate in the 
following few pages. 
Firstly, the cogito has to be uttered by the first person. To introduce Jaako 
Hintikka's illuminating analysis of the performative dimension of the first-person 
cogitation: 
The inconsistency (absurdity) of an existentially inconsistent statement14 can in 
a sense be said to be of peCCormatorv (performative) character. It depends on an 
act or "performance, " namely on a certain person's act of uttering a sentence (or 
of otherwise making a statement). [1962: 58] 
14 A statement made or uttered by a person in which the same person negates his or her existence at the 
time of the utterance; for example, the sentence "Descartes does not exist" is an existentially 
inconsistent sentence, if and only if stated or conceived by Descartes himself [see Hintikka 1962: 
56-59]. 
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To perform the cogito means to utter the sentence, I think, and, in this case, the object 
of thinking includes "I" as the existential marker. Thus, for example, the utterance "I 
don't exist" made by myself, i. e. "I think (that) I don't exist" is an instance of the 
performance of the cogito, the "existential inconsistency" of which, in turn, 
demonstrates, in an indirect manner, that the contrary is true. Therefore, what the 
cogito argument demonstrates and, demonstrates performatively, is that the "P' in "I 
think I don't exist, " in fact, exists, regardless, "as long as, " and at the very time when, 
the same "I" attempts to make this utterance. The cogito argument here is such that 
the absurdity of the sentence, "I think I don't exist, " leads or rather forces the same 
"I" to accept the contrary proposition, "(I think) I exist, " as valid: put otherwise, this 
absurdity, in turn, invalidates the original proposition, "I don't exist. " The force of 
Descartes's argument, seen from this perspective, seems to be this: the logical force 
at stake is such that the "I" of "I think" cannot but accept the proposition, "I exist, " 
even when it attempts to utter the contrary, "I don't exist. " 
It is in view of this peculiar force of ineluctable self-reflexivity at work in the 
cogito argument that Hector-neri Castaneda [1969: 160ff] attributes the property of 
"ontological priority" to the first-person pronoun. As he rightly points it out, the force 
of the "unfailing" logic of self-attribution of the existential marker is such that, the 
category of existence, when referred to by being "picked up" by the self that 
self-refers, is bound to be automatically attributed to the first-person pronoun, 
namely, to the "I" that thinks reflexively. He says: 
The first-person pronoun has [... ] an ontological priority over all names, 
contingent descriptions of objects, and all other indicators: a correct use of 'P' 
cannotfail to refer to the entity to which it purports to refer; moreover, a correct 
use of "I" cannot jai[ to pick up the category of the entity to which it refers. The 
first-person pronoun, without predicating selfhood, purports to pick out a self 
qua self, and what it is correctly tendered it invariably succeeds. All other 
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mechanisms of singular reference [... ] may be correctly used and yet jail to pick 
out a referent or to pick up the intended category. Thus, my statement "I don't 
exist now" is self-contradictory, internally inconsistent [... ]. [160-161] 
To contrast the case in point with a misleading example, the sentence, "I think (that) 
Descartes does not exist, " is neither an instance of the cogilo nor an existentially 
inconsistent utterance. 
What this example illustrates is that, secondly and more importantly, to 
perform the cogito means to utter cogito-involving sentences to "myself. " In the case 
of the cogito, the utterance is to be addressed to the very same "P" that utters the 
sentence. Put differently, with the operation of the cogito, the "I, " the subject of 
thinking, is put in relation to "me", in front of "me. " With the (reflective) turn to the 
cogito, the "I" becomes "me, " the object of my thought; with the (reflexive) return of 
the "P' to the cogito, the "P' becomes "my-self, " the object of "my" own thought. The 
reflexive relation that the "r' bears to "myself"comes to be established, once the "I" 
of the cogito has gone through these two steps of thinking, a "turn" that opens up the 
site of self-reflection by way of inaugural reflection and a "return" that closes off the 
round of thinking by means of reflexive self-limitation; and, as I have been 
emphasising, this movement of reflection-reflexion takes place automatically, in 
other words, implicitly, or as Castarleda puts it, "internally". This internal movement 
is structurally dualised in the sense that it is reflectively open, on the one hand, and 
reflexively closed, on the other. 
The recognition of this element of automaticity, inherent in the self-reflective 
and self-reflexive operation of the cogito argument, leads us to see further that the 
"utterance" here is not to be taken in the literal sense of the word. That is to say, one 
does not need to pronounce the sentence, "I don't exist, " aloud in order to verify the 
incorrigibility of the cogito; rather, it suffices to entertain the sentence in mind, that is 
to say, to witness its happening in the self-reflexively delimited interiority of 
self-consciousness. When the cogito argument is at work in my consciousness, I 
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become self-conscious of its happening, in other words, alert to its call, as I "hear" 
myself saying it to myself. As Hintikka goes on to say, immediately after the passage 
quoted earlier, 
It (the existentially inconsistent sentence) does not depend solely on the means 
used for the purpose, that is, on the sentence which is being uttered. The 
sentence is perfectly correct as a sentence, but the attempt of a certain man to 
utter it assertively is curiously pointless. [... ] The pointlessness of existentially 
inconsistent statement is therefore due to the fact that they automatically destroy 
one of the major purposes which the act of uttering a declarative sentence 
normally has. ("Automatically" means here something like `for merely logical 
reasons") [... ] In a special case a self-defeating attempt of this kind can be 
made without saying or writing anything or doing anything comparable. In 
trying to make others believe something, I must normally do something which 
can be heard or seen or felt. But, in trying to make myself bel ieve something 
there is no need to say anything aloud or to write anything on paper. The 
performance through which existential inconsistency arises can in this case be 
merely an attempt to think - more accurately, an attempt to make oneself believe 
- that one does not exist. [1962: 58-59] 
Any attempt to "make myself believe" that I don't exist at the time of the cogito is 
bound to fail. Why is it so? Why is it bound to fail? 
When I think, according to Descartes and Hintikka, I hear myself utter 
(s'entendre parier [MP xii/xix]) the sentence, "I think. " First turn: the cogito is a 
"phonocentric" phenomenon that privileges the internal voice in the mind that is in 
an dialogue with itself over other media, for example, the voice of the other person or 
the visual representations. The cogito argument would not work, in this sense, 
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without some "phonocentric [VP] [MP I-vvx/x-xxix, `tympan 15']" assumptions 
having already been made regarding the way in which self-consciousness arises. In 
other words, the argument operates on a model of self-consciousness where phonic or 
acoustic elements in self-representation are privileged and appropriated 16. Second 
turn: When I think, I hear myself utter the sentence, "I think"; The cogito is a 
self-reflexive act, self-involving and self-referential. Third turn: when I think, I hear 
myself utter the sentence, "I think"; The cogito is a performative event. Fourth turn: 
When I think, I hear myself utter the sentence, "I think"; The cogito is a linguistic 
experience. To sum it up: the cogito is a self-referentially performative act, which 
appropriates its own linguistic phonocentrism as its discursive resources. The 
"pointlessness" in negating the sum at the time of the cogito, this "curious" 
phenomenon, as Hintikka observes it, can be explained in this set of terms. 
What Descartes's cogito argument effects in the end is therefore a sense of 
ineluctability. What Descartes shows is that the ego of the ego-cogito cannot but 
believe that it exists at the time of cogito, and that it is the case even at the time of 
the thinking ego's active negation of its existence. He draws his attention, and directs 
ours, to the fact that something like a logical force is at work in the cogito argument. 
The self-referential force is at work; and this force remains invincible, he emphasises, 
"as long as" the cogito is at work, in other words, insofar as the thinking ego is in 
performance. Another dimension he discovers is that this force remains the same 
insofar as the cogito is a reiterative linguistic act. The cogito argument is, in this 
sense, a performatively self-validating one, and the (self-) validation of the truth of 
the cogito occurs in a systematically and endlessly self-recuperative manner. It is in 
this sense one can say that the ego of the cogito rebounds; The cogito is shaped like 
15 the right column, in particular. 
16 "[... ] a durable structure is thus formed between the throat and the tympanum, which [... ] are 
subject to a fear of being injured, besides both belonging to the some cavernous domain [MP 
xii-xiii/xix]. " Derrida is right in pointing out that the kind of self that engages with nothing but itself, 
exemplified in the classical cogilo argument, is the phonocentrically insulated, self-same self. It seems to 
be in this regard that Derrida is led to claim further that this type of self "repercusses (repercule) its 
absolute limit only in sonorous representation [MP xiii/xix]. " 
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Derrida's "tympan [NT xiv/xx]"; it "circumscribes" itself, "envelopes" itself; it is 
endlessly self-reflexive, closing and folding upon itself 
This peculiar self-reflexive movement of thinking - Descartes's turn and 
return to the cogito - gives rise to the event of the cogito: It is a turn that the thinking 
subject takes towards its own world of interiority away from the world of the exterior, 
away from the world of the Other, the Other taken as the master signifier for a totality 
of that which transcends the epistemological order of intelligibility or 
self-understanding, e. g., other persons' mind or God. With the utterance of the cogito, 
articulated is an inward turn of philosophy to itself. To use Derrida's diction, the 
cogito argument is an example of the logic of "auto-affection" in operation; with the 
cogito argument, the thinker is inevitably "affected" by him/herself in such a way that 
(s)he cannot but be persuaded by him/herself into believing that (s)he exists as long 
as (s)he utters the cogito to him/herself in the consciousness of his/her own, namely, 
in his/her self-consciousness. With Descartes, the thought of self-infliction, of 
self-reflexion, both auto-affecting and auto-affected at the same time, has become 
formalised, thereby, normalised. One of the effects of this philosophical 
normalisation of the Cartesian form of reflexion can be found in the following 
symptom: every time one attempts to transgress the self-reflexively formulated 
boundary of one's own reflective territory, (s)he is bound to turn to him/herself, to 
turn back upon him/herself This, I identify as the mechanical law of Cartesian 
reflection, under which modern philosophies of consciousness are bound to be 
subsumed; this law is forceful to such an extent that, as I will argue by pointing to 
Derrida as a telling example, even when a radical move beyond this terrain of 
reflection is made, the transgressive gesture cannot be made without itself being 
"always already" subject to this force. 
The working belief of this study is that, when the reflexive tendency of 
methodological Cartesianism itself remains unchallenged even in any "radical" 
transgressive endeavour, the Cartesian tradition of philosophy cannot be effectively 
overturned in the way it is meant to be. The reason why Derrida is opted, to the 
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exclusion of other "post-Cartesian" thinkers such as Nietzsche or Heidegger, as a 
"telling" example, where the Cartesian legacy of thinking is persistently inscribed, is 
not so much because Derrida is the best example of all other possible ones (although 
he is an extremely good example) as because the standard interpretation of Derrida 
tends to treat - or even laud - him as a thinker who successfully problematises, if not 
absolutely "overcoming, " the philosophical subjectivism of Cartesian tradition. In 
this regard, the aim of the current project in which proposed is a Cartesian reading of 
Derrida can be recast in the following broader terms: on the one hand, it aims to 
explicate the methodological rigour of Cartesian reflection by locating its epistemic 
resource in modem reflexive reason; on the other, equally, it aims to expose the 
generic or logical limits of such a reflexive model of thinking that is initially and 
fundamentally premised upon the cogitational centrality of the thinking subject. The 
driving force of Cartesian reflection lies in its performative recursivity, and for this 
reason, it is robust, relentless, and restless: it is an inexhaustible source of 
philosophical trauma; and in Derrida's text, this trauma is constantly staged and 
exploited, i. e. economised, in a performative manner which the next section will see 
in detail. 
1.32 Derrida's Self-reflexion: 
Performative Self-contradictions in Deconstructive Arguments 
The working hypothesis of the argument that follows is that, when read in line 
with the Cartesian logic of reflexion, the mode of Derridian self-reflexivity becomes 
more or less comprehensible. This final section of chapter 1 [1.32] initiates a reading 
of performative self-contradictions found in Derrida's text. And the aim of the 
reading is to show that Derrida's deconstructive argument, which seeks to establish a 
thesis not by means of the constructive articulation and solution of a problem but by 
means of "a textual staging" of an issue at hand, is self-referential and self-serving; 
Derrida's deconstructive argument is self-referential and self-serving in the sense that 
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its aporetics thus staged are reducible, to a certain extent, to a cogitational play, a 
reflexive game that the reflexive reason plays with and against itself. To put the same 
point more strongly, what is explored in the following is the possibility to read 
Derrida's aporetics as a set of fabricated problems designed to defy any logical 
solution. The focus of reading is therefore mainly the "strategic" or narrative aspects 
of Derridian deconstruction. With this, the general point the reading aims to establish 
is the following: What one finds in Derrida, as in a sceptical Descartes in the 
self-critical phase of cogitation, is the primacy of the category of the epistemological 
over that of the ontological. The first two sub-sections [1.321-2] set out to articulate, 
in general terms, what is self-reflexive about Derrida's texts; and the subsequent, 
third sub-section [1.323] will offer a close reading of a case in point: "Je - marque. " 
Developing this line of reading, the final part of this chapter [1.324] then initiates a 
juxtaposition of Descartes and Derrida, of reflective ontology and reflexive °` 0; 
ýy 
Chapter 2, which presents a reading of Derrida's reflexive hauntology as a derivative 
from Descartes's reflective ontology, expands on, and thereby solidifies the grounds 
of, the main contention thus established in chapter 1, by looking at more examples 
from Derrida in a more detailed manner. 
1.321 Self-reflexivity and The Aporia of Reading Derrida 
That Derrida's text is self-reflexive, this observation itself is hardly anything 
new. Quite expectedly, a number of Derrida commentators have already touched 
upon this issue. Gasch6 [1986], for example, contends that the "infrastructure" of 
deconstruction, which "appears" to generate self-reflexively "literary" text, is not, in 
fact, self-reflexive, inasmuch as deconstruction's "serious" concern lies in pointing to 
the limits of reflexive thoughts. However, textual evidence, in my reading, 
contradicts this view: Gasch6's reading, whilst doing justice to the "philosophical" 
Derrida, as he emphasises, seems to be, however, blind to the staged nature of the 
Derridian discourse, i. e. the level of textual fabrication. Apart from Gasch6, there is 
Cartesian Deconstruction 51 Chapter 1: Derrida in Relation to Descartes 
also a vaguely identifiable community of commentators whose studies are, in one 
way or another, thematic analyses of certain forms of Derridian reflection [Apel, 
Bowie, Critchley, Dews, Frank, Gasche, Harvey, Norris, Priest, White, Wood]. 1 7 The 
element of "performative self-reflexivity [Wood 1990: 134fß'], " in particular, has 
been well pointed out by them as a trait pervasive in the writings of Derrida [Apel, 
Critchley, Frank, Priest, and Wood]. The ceaseless textual mobilisation of 
performative self-reflexivity which tends to result in an implicit meta-thematisation 
of the very "paradoxes of self-reflection [Critchley 1992], " this, as they say in 
common in various ways, is what makes Derrida's text uniquely "Derridian. " 
Surveying the exegetical works on Derrida's self-reflexivity, those mentioned 
above, one will come across the following curious phenomena: most of Derrida 
theorists not only attempt to explicate the Derridian "trait" of reflections by relating it 
to the self-reflexive style of his writing, but rightly suggest that this Derridian trait of 
thinking, self-reflexivity, is something that Derrida has appropriated, whether 
acknowledgedly or not, from some fundamentally "classical norms" of doing 
philosophy. As has been indicated earlier, my study is broadly concerned with 
developing this line of reading Derrida; my aim is only to add a more specific and 
relatively new case - Derrida in light of Descartes - to this general thesis thus 
well-established. A "curious" phenomenon, as I said, is the comparative shortage of 
detailed studies that can support this large claim. Although there is an extensive range 
of discussions on the peculiar ways in which Derrida positions himself "in" and "out" 
of the metaphysical tradition of the West, 18 perhaps still rare and certainly needed is 
a close analysis of the specific ways in which the Derridian "appropriation" or 
"expropriation" of traditional metaphysical resources takes place, i. e. the ways in 
which Derrida "economises" on metaphysical resources in order to create his own 
ambience of thinking. 
17 A short survey of the relevant literature will be undertaken in 3.4. 
1 See literature review [3.4] for details. 
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The difficulty in formulating specific theses on issues to do with the 
traditional sides of Derrida's deconstructive trajectory is apparently structural: the 
difficulty, the aporia, is that of a dilemma, of Derrida's double bind: Involved here is 
a kind of constitutive dilemma in trying to make sense of a non-sense. When Derrida 
attempts to make sense of the strange kind of "difference that differs from itself, " for 
instance, he has already set a foot in the land of non-sense, ""beyond" any absolute 
knowledge (au-deli du savoir absolu) [VP 115/102, "parenthesis in original"], " 
where only "unheard-of thoughts (pensees inouies) [VP 115/102]" seem to reside. In 
order to let such "unheard-of thoughts" be heard, i. e. to make it intelligible and make 
sense of it, one needs to rely, as Derrida himself points out, on the existing order of 
knowledge and representation; and yet, in order to allow such non-sensical thoughts 
to challenge the existing order and boundaries of thought, one needs, at the same 
time, to be prepared to welcome "the other" of identity-based thoughts, non-sensical 
thoughts, for example. Accordingly, Derrida finds himself caught up in the double 
bind of sense and non-sense. It is with such in-between-ness of the discursive position 
of Derrida that we will be concerned in the next following pages. 
Perhaps, at this point, it would be necessary as well as helpful to look at the 
Derridian aporia of double thinking from a reader's point of view, not from Derrida's 
point of view. A benefit of posing the question of what it means to read Derrida 
correctly or faithfully, is in that such an approach can explicate effectively the 
dimension of self-corrosive self-reflexivity pervasive in deconstructive scenes of 
thinking. To look, closely, at the risks or aporias involved in the task of reading 
Derrida "correctly" is another way to understand the deeply-rooted element of 
sceptical self-reflexivity in Derrida's texts. The crux of the matter here, upon which 
we need to focus, is a strategically contagious force of Derridian self-reflexivity to 
which Derrida does not allow his readers to become immune; in this way, the 
constitutive reflexivity of Derrida's text becomes reflected in, and transformed into, a 
receptive reader's reflective alertness - what this means will become clearer, as we go 
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on to unravel the intricately reflexive dimension of the relationship held between 
Derrida the author and us his readers. 
Any reader bent on highlighting some traditional aspects of Derrida's mode of 
thinking, such as myself, is bound not to see the subversive side of his philosophy. 
Pursuing a conservative line of reading Derrida, one is likely to risk making, at least, 
three mistakes. First and foremost, one risks not being radical enough; one risks 
underplaying the "radical" spirit of Derrida's philosophy in which "rigorously and 
adequately thought about from another topos or space [Kearney, interview with 
Derrida, 1984: 112]" is a site-cum-non-site, 19 "where our problematic rapport with 
the boundary of metaphysics can be seen in a more radical light [112]. " The second 
risk is that of not being a subtle reader; it involves doing injustice to the "subtlety" of 
deconstruction manifest in Derrida's endeavour to delineate the delicate modality of 
deconstruction, i. e. its dual mode of "subtle belonging [DG 24/12]" to philosophical 
discourse - its simultaneous belonging and non-belonging to the order of discursive 
knowledge. The Derridian move of deconstruction is "subtle" is the sense that it is 
not definitive: its attempt to delimit its own ambience of thinking is structurally 
ambiguous. The deconstructive attempt at stake involves both an intra-metaphysical 
move and a trans-metaphysical gesture: on the one hand, it is an intra-philosophical 
move to stay within the logically safe area of "traditional metaphysics", and on the 
other, a transgressive gesture to go beyond the domain of traditional logic and 
metaphysics into a realm of the "unheard-of'. Perhaps the worst risk a conservative 
reader of Derrida may take, the third, is to ignore, totally, this "subtly" double gesture 
of deconstruction, thereby, to refuse to participate in the deconstructive 
thought-experiment. By pursuing a logocentric line of reading deconstruction, three 
examples of which have been described above, one risks betraying the true 
"between-ism, " as it were, of Derrida's ethos of thinking; the cost of such betrayal is 
19 My central question is : from what site or non-site (non-lieu) can philosophy as such appear to 
itself as other than itself so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an originary manner? 
[Kearney, interview with Derrida, 1984: 108] 
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not to get "it" (the "it" refers to the correct understanding of Derrida), to be "out of it 
[Putnam 1992: 109, the "it" refers to the Derridian milieu of thinking]", therefore, to 
"a priori miss the point [LJ 392/4]" of deconstruction. As soon as one then attempts 
to make "sense" of Derrida's philosophical position that, allegedly, lies in "between" 
position and non-position, "between" sense and non-sense, (s)he is bound to miss "a 
priori", viz. always and already, something essential about deconstruction, the 
non-sensical side of it. The burden on the reader's part is therefore the necessity to 
keep undoing his or her own understanding of deconstruction, in the same way 
Derrida is supposed to do. Hence, the aporia of reading Derrida: How can one 
possibly "get there [Wood 1990: 133, See footnote 14]?, " to the promised land of 
deconstruction, where the true meaning of deconstruction is supposed to lie? - how is 
this possible at all, given that "deconstruction deconstructs it-self [LJ 392/4]" "always 
already" before the thinking subject attempts to get an grip on it? 
As a conservative reader of Derrida, as a reader who takes a "risk" of being 
"naive" in demanding an "objective" or formal knowledge of the ways in which 
deconstruction works, I also acknowledge and recognise the necessity to reflect, in 
my exposition of Derrida, the difficult position in which Derrida, the thinker of 
irreducible aporia, finds himself situated. The aim of investigating some 
formal-logical aspects of deconstructive techniques of thinking is therefore 
diagnostic, although not necessarily therapeutic: it is to expose the recursive patterns, 
identifiable as such, in various instances of deconstruction, in other words, to 
explicate the discursive limits of Derrida's deconstructive endeavour, which 
nevertheless, desires to go beyond the limits of discursive reason. 
This way of reading Derrida's deconstruction is not only diagnostic but 
heuristic: it is also a means by which one can gain an experiential or procedural 
understanding of what the "auto" of "auto-"deconstruction would mean: 
"deconstruction deconstructs it-self [U 392/4]. " A rather reductive reading of Derrida 
that I have been pursuing so far may seem to be misled, seen from a faithfully 
"Derridian" point of view which "a priori" registers the logical impossibility to 
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locate the discursive position of Derrida, the strategically auto-deconstructive, elusive 
thinker. The "auto-" of "auto-deconstruction" seems to indicate, however, that the 
deconstructive mode of thinking is reflexively self-referential: one can take the word, 
the "auto, " as a marker for the minimal rule of deconstructive thinking, the operative 
rule being something like an "auto"-splitting that leads, for example, to the automatic 
splitting of the deconstructive self into a self that deconstructs and a self 
deconstructed. This point of contention on the irreducible duality of the 
deconstructive self will be articulated in the following couple of pages on Derrida's 
"strategy" of thinking, and developed further later [1.323]. 
Derrida himself talks about a "strategy" adopted in his deconstructive 
manoeuvre of thinking: the strategy of deliberate or "apparent" self-contradictions. 
He says 
[.. ] Strategy is a word that I have perhaps abused in the past, especially as it has 
been always to specify [in the end], in an apparently self-contradictory manner 
and at the risk of cutting the ground from under my feet - something I almost 
never fail to do - that this strategy is a strategy without any finality. [TT 
458-9/50] 
Elsewhere Derrida states, in a similar vein, that the strategic "form" of 
deconstruction "remains necessarily limited, determined by, a set of open contextual 
traits [Poi 368/357]; " then, he explains what he means by the "open contextual 
traits": they consist of "the language, the history, the European scene in which I am 
writing or in which I am inscribed with all manner of more or less aleatory givens 
[Poi 369/357]. " Now, of particular interest to us is the word "aleatory"; For Derrida, 
the "givens" in which he finds himself "inscribed" are characterised as "aleatory, " i. e. 
random and yet rule-governed. Like a player in a dice game, Derrida finds the 
conditions of his thinking always already restricted by the pre-existing contextual 
constraints of some governing rules of thinking, e. g. the exclusionary logic of 
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either-or and the inherited language of western philosophy; At the same time, 
however, he views such formal and historical conditions of thinking as "open" to the 
future - as "open traits" - in the sense that, again as in a dice game, what is to unfold 
in the course of acting upon such conditions by reflecting upon them is unpredictable. 
His "aleatory" strategy, accordingly, is to attempt to calculate the incalculable. To put 
the same thought in a less paradoxical way, Derrida's deconstructive strategy is to 
stay vigilant in the face of the unknown, in an anxious anticipation of what is to 
come: it is, as if in a dice game, to play on both necessity and contingency. Hence, an 
aleatory strategy for an aleatory situation: This characterises the Derridian "milieu" 
of thinking. 
Descartes's altercation with the evil genius in the second Meditation is a 
relevant case in point. If what Descartes does, and does finally, is to overcome the 
unknown, and potentially global, threats of the evil genius by making them 
intelligible, which is to say, to weaken the corrosive force of self-criticism by taking a 
self-reflexively protective measure (by returning to the very self that undertakes the 
self-critique), what Derrida does, and does deliberately, is only to restore and 
sharpen, without resolving, the tension lying in the twofold force of such an 
ambivalent cogitation; the tension between the reductively reflexive force of 
self-criticism on the one hand, and the irreducibly corrosive force of self-criticism on 
the other; the aleatory tension between the reflexive security of the self-critical self 
and the unpredictability of the way in which the hyper-critical force of cogitation 
comes to disrupt the reflexive equilibrium of the cogitational self. 
Self-criticism, taken as a self-corrosive act of the mind, is an instance of 
meta-self-reflection; the moment when the self remains critical of itself is the 
moment when the thinking self - the self-critical self - submits itself, reflexively and 
recursively, to the inexhaustibly hyper-reflective force of cogitation. In this regard, a 
Derridian thinker, closely resembling a Cartesian meditator in the sceptical phase, is 
describable as a philosophical personae who is ceaselessly at war with himself, 
critical of himself. Both Descartes and Derrida struggle and juggle with the 
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fundamental structural ambivalence of modem rationality, where the principle of 
critical reason demands that reason be self-critical; self-critical on the one hand, to 
the point of self-destruction, and self-critical on the other, to the effect of 
self-recuperation; "this tension between disruption, on the one hand, and 
attentiveness, on the other, " Derrida says, "is characteristic of everything I try to do 
[Caputo 19g6: 8,8-11]. " 
What Derrida does, staying in the Cartesian framework of self-critical 
thinking, is to create, within the cogitational self, this "double" bind of self-criticism 
and self-criticism, which, in turn, generates the meta-level "tension": a contention 
between the self of self-criticism and the self of self-criticism: a conflict between two 
different forces of reflexive cogitation, one, the force of reflexive self-recuperation, 
and the other, that of reflexive self-destruction. What Derrida does, following a 
Cartesian sceptic in self-criticism, is to take one step further than a Cartesian 
self-critic; he unfolds the aleatory scene of self-reflection once more by mobilising 
the self-corrosive force of reflexive self-destruction that the self of self-criticism 
harbours. In Derrida's case, self-criticism amounts to interminable self-distancing or 
self-doubling, in other words, the infinite splitting of the self; The self, Derrida says, 
"must therefore, split and redouble itself at the same time, at once leave free and take 
hostage; double act (coup double), redouble act (coup redouble) [Pass 36/14]. " The 
meta-critical force of self-disruption which Derrida's philosophical reflection 
harbours can therefore be used against Descartes in the sense that it weakens the 
reflexive force of self-recuperation; it is, however, originarily and ultimately, 
Cartesian, hence, constrained and tamed to that extent. The deconstructive force of 
thinking, in other words, is "always already" locked in the reflexive structure of the 
double. Hence, Derrida's fixation upon the double, the other of the same (as opposed 
to the multiple, for instance); "the same, " exemplified in this case, is the self of 
self-critique. 
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1.322 Linguistic Self-reflexivity and the Strategy of Writing in Derrida 
What brings together the awareness of the double, that is to say, what "binds" 
these heterogeneous forces of doubling, according to Derrida, is the force of 
language. He gives a linguistic configuration to the structural tension between the 
reflexive self (self-critical self) and the hyper-reflective self (self-critical self), which 
is immanent in Cartesian self-consciousness. If, for Descartes, the evil genius is the 
alter-ego, for Derrida, it is language. A paradigm shift from that of self-consciousness 
to that of linguistic consciousness has taken place here, and yet, the structure of 
allegory itself remains intact. In the following, we will see why this is the case. 
Apparently, Derrida is more sensitive than Descartes to the linguistically 
structural dimension of the cogito, i. e. the impersonal reiterability of the phrase, "I 
think"; and also, he is more interested than Descartes in explicating the intransitive 
performativity of cogitational act. 
First, to explain the impersonal aspect of the performance of "I think": The 
thought here is that the discursive position of Descartes 'r' cannot be located outside 
the linguistic structure that enables the articulation of "I think"; which is to imply, to 
put it by using the structuralist grammar, what speaks is not Descartes, the 
self-conscious subject, but rather, the word, I. Hence, the impersonality of the 
reiterability of the cogito. What Descartes the linguistic subject does, when referring 
to himself, is to fill out the discursive position of the I by providing an empirical 
content to it. The point Derrida highlights is that, when Descartes says "I think, " the I 
that pronounces that phrase is not so much the extra-linguistic, cognitively supreme, 
subject occupying the "Archemedian view point, " whose discursive locus can be 
found outside the grammatical or semantic network of language thus used, as the 
intra-linguistic subject who must participate in the language game - and, in this sense, 
has no choice but to "subject" himself to the force of language - in order to have its 
discursive locus represented in that linguistic framework. Derrida's concern here is 
not merely to point to the verbal aspects of cogitational self-consciousness, which 
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Descartes himself recognises and stresses; see, for instance, Discours [AT VI 
57/CSM 1140] where Descartes highlights the uniquely human ability to use 
language, which his letter to More dated 5 February 1649 [AT V 278/CSM 11366] 
later characterises as "a sure sign" of the rational soul. What Derrida does, more 
significantly, is to extremise the inscriptive or structuralising force of the language of 
self-consciousness by replacing the actively self-conscious subject (Descartes's image 
of the reflective self) with the explicitly linguistic, self-conscious subject (Derrida's), 
i. e. by having the former be displaced by the latter: what Derrida does is to narrow his 
thematic focus down from the self-conscious dimension of the self to the 
linguistically formulated, self-conscious dimension of the self - an example of this 
move will be shown in next section [1.323]. 
Second, the intransitive aspects of the performance of "I think": At a thematic 
level, Derrida is interested in the hyper-reflective, rather than reflexive, dimension of 
the cogito; at a performative level, accordingly, he exploits the infinite reiterability of 
the "I think. " In this regard, one can say that hyper-reflexivity is the driving force 
behind his gesture towards hyper-reflection. Consequently, what one sees in the 
Derridian scene of self-effacing self-reflections is an irreducible "gesture" of 
reflective thought that has "always already" lost its object; His reflections are gestural 
as opposed to determinate in the sense that it remains intransitive, lacking its object. 
To think, for Descartes, is to let the object of thought appear to the one who thinks, 
whereas, it is, for Derrida, to let the object of thought obliterate itself in front of the 
one who thinks; Hence, the difference between thinking of "an object" and thinking 
with "traces. " Wood [1992: 3] makes the same point in the following way: the 
Derridian force of reflection manifests "a desire of philosophy" in that "it articulates" 
its desire to hold itself in its gaze "when it is lost sight of. Derrida is engaged in a 
theatrical re-animation of the textual space of philosophy's passion. " 
The Derridian "desire" for origin is, my reading suggests, originarily 
Cartesian; this can be argued in the sense that the ceaseless acts of object-tracing, 
which Derrida allows his text to perform, mark the centrality of the subject that 
Cartesian Deconstruction 60 Chapter 1: Derrida in Relation to Descartes 
desires the origin of the lost object. The issue here is the irreducible locus of the 
cogitational self in Derrida, effectuated, paradoxically, by the very phenomenological 
act of self-effacement; the focus on the self remains intact, if only replaced by an 
empty gaze. If the Cartesian "P"represents the centrality of self-presence, the 
Derridian "I" marks the centrality of the experience of absence or loss. 
In the absence of an unmediated access to the "pure" interiority of Cartesian 
self, what makes possible this "marking" or "inscription" of the intransitive event of 
reflection, according to Derrida, is language; language provides an access to 
self-consciousness in the Derridian model of self-reflection. An interesting parallel 
can be drawn here between Descartes's evil genius and Derrida's language. There is a 
structural similarity between the way the hypothesis of an evil genius provides an 
access to the discovery of the true self (in Descartes's case) and the way the attention 
to the language of the self leads to reflexive self-awareness (in Derrida's case): in the 
case of the former, it is the evil genius that is used as a medium through which the 
locus of the cogitational self can be marked, retrospectively (it was, after all, "me", 
the thinking I, who created such a fictive destroyer of the world), and in the case of 
the latter, the language of the self (it is by means of using the word 'r', by means of 
seeing myself "being written" in the text, that I am led to double myself, again and 
again)20. The point to be noted is that both Descartes and Derrida, in this way, 
economise on the discursive force of doubling. 
Consequently, Derrida is, as he says about himself, "armoured" in a "tunic of 
writing [MA 44/39], " the "nets of which language" protects, and at the same time, 
threatens him. To explain what this means by introducing the language of the self as 
an example of Derrida's "tunic of writing": The linguistic network of egological 
words protects Derrida in the sense that it allows him to point to, if not occupying, 
the locus of his self-consciousness - without which the very act of designating the 
space of the cogitational self would be impossible; and yet, it also threatens him in 
20 The next section [1.323] on Derrida's "Je - marque" elaborates this point. 
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the sense that the language of the self, which is public (e. g. everyone uses the same 
word "I" in order to self-refer), leaves him alienated, i. e. split, from a private realm of 
his own self-consciousness. Two points can be extrapolated from this observation on 
the constitutive ambivalence of the role language plays - the language of the self, in 
particular - in the formation of the Derridian self. 
First, the textuality of the cogitational self: text as a medium of self-relation: 
According to Derrida, when it comes to the dialectic of self-interrogation, what 
comes into play is the language of the self in self-dialogue, and not the 
extra-linguistic self in unmediated self-introspection. In the Derridian scene of 
self-reflection, language takes precedence over, and gives a configuration to, 
self-consciousness. What controls a scene of self-reflection, Derrida points out, is not 
a kind of "pure" and un-mediated, transcendental subject, which he describes as the 
"autistic[MP 162/135]" self, i. e. the Cartesian self in self-criticism; rather, it is the 
linguistic force of signification, which he calls "ecriture (writing), " material rather 
than ideal, and contaminated rather than pure, the structure of which resembles that 
of a complicated "fabric" or "spider's web" [Diss 49/42] rather than that of a building 
with a hierarchically-organised, "clear and distinct" directory. This force of 
self-reflection, therefore, Derrida argues, does not originate from a kind of pure, 
self-transparent self that is in dialogue with itself in a clearly self-conscious manner; 
rather, it is the "hors livre (outwork) [Diss 7-67/1-60]" of some linguistic resources 
that ceaselessly force such an autistically pure self to externalise itself - 
"externalisation" in this case means the materialisation of the non-linguistic, ideal 
self, or the contamination of the non-linguistic, pure self, namely, the linguisticisation 
or, to use Derrida's preferred diction, textualisation of the self. 
Second, an aporetic status of the hyper-reflective movement in cogitation: 
hyper-reflection as both an intra-textual (linguistic) and an extra-textual 
(non-linguistic) event: the irreducible desire of self-critical reason for unmediated, 
pure self-presence: the hyper-critical force of philosophical self-reflection lies in the 
recursive desire for cogitation, which manifests itself in the form of the recursive 
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applicability of the cogitational phrases such as "I think" or "I doubt" to an act of 
self-introspection. What such hyper-reflection desires is an object of its discursive 
engagement; At stake here is the cogitational desire of reflective mind that arises due 
to the very absence of its object of cogitation. This type of obsessively recursive force 
of self-critical cogitation, the fixating force of self-criticisntrospection, effects 
what Derrida describes as an "extra, " "faint" "turn" [Diss 48/4121] of self-reflection, 
which is both intra-textual and extra-textual; infra-textual, insofar as it is tied in a 
linguistic (textual) structure, and extra-textual, insofar as its vectorial tendency or 
irreducible desire to go beyond a given order of thinking is uncontrollable by any 
rational means and inexplicable in any textual terms. This hyper-reflective dimension 
of the cogitative mind, Derrida calls "restance22 [Diss 13/8]". With this word, what 
Derrida attempts to highlight is the irreducible force of intransitive reflection 
generative of reflexive texts. This transgressive force of linguistically-mediated 
self-reflection is that which "remains" inexhaustible in the textual scene of 
self-reflection; it remains there as a "remainder which is added to the subsequent text 
and which cannot be completely summed up within it [Diss 14/9]". Such a 
"remaining" force of philosophical self-reflection is both excessive and 
supplementary, hence, ambiguous; excessive in the sense that it overflows the 
self-same economy of reflexion (it cannot be "summed up within the text") ; 
supplementary in the sense that it leads to another instance of self-reflexion that takes 
place within the reflexively generated text taken as a whole (it is "added to the 
subsequent text") ; hence, ambiguous in the sense that such a transgressive force of 
reflection is both excluded from the textual order of intelligibility (i. e. extra-textual) 
and necessary for the further unfolding of the text (i. e. intra-textual). In this way, 
what Derrida calls the "structure of the feint [Diss 48/41]" - the meaning of the feint 
taken as the ambiguous turn of hyper-reflection, i. e. a reflective "gesture" of 
cogitation - produces a "web" of textuality at a micro-level, and a spectacle of 
21 "la feint [... ], un tour de plus, [... I- 
22 coined from rester, Barbara Johnson translated it into "left-overness [Diss 48/44]. " 
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meta-reflection at a macro-level. Here, what remains irreducible is the desire of 
reflective reason for self-mastery. 
Demonstrated by Derrida's "turn" to linguistic or textual self-reflexivity is not 
how the structural limits of Cartesian reflection can be overcome, i. e. how the 
cogitational subject can be de-centralised and displaced; What Derrida's linguistic 
turn shows, I have been arguing, is rather how the Cartesian model of self-reflexive 
introspection can be sharpened and reconfigured in a new vocabulary, the old 
vocabulary being that of self-consciousness, and the new, that of linguistic 
self-consciousness. The point of contention here is that the Derridian model of 
self-consciousness, which merely privileges the linguistic self-referentiality of the 
reiterative "r' over the phenomenological self-referentiality of the extra-linguistic 
"I" without overturning the self-referential structure of the Cartesian model of 
self-consciousness, can only replace the old model rather than displace it. The point, 
to put it more strongly, is that despite his reconfiguration of the Cartesian paradigm 
of thinking, Derrida's linguistic paradigm of cogitation still repeats or even reinforces 
the reflexive tendency of the Cartesian mind; Derrida repeats the reflexive Descartes 
in the sense that his self-reflexive texts draw on - as the first two Meditationes do - 
the hyperbolic force of cogitation, traceable in the infinite regressiveness of the "I"; 
The reflexive tendency of the Cartesian mind is reinforced by Derrida in the sense 
that Derrida is closer to a sceptical Descartes - suffering from "the malady [Hume, 
1888: 218]" of "profound and intense reflection, " who will "never be radically cur'd " 
- than to a positive Descartes who overcomes such corrosive self-doubts and finds 
faith in reflective ontology constructed on the very possibility of self-reflexion. If 
Descartes in good faith uses reflexive scepticism methodically, Derrida uses it 
stylistically; methodical in the sense that the unfolding of the sceptical self is 
telos-oriented, and stylistic in the sense that a certain over-used or aestheticised 
mannerism, namely, a "style" of thinking, if nothing else, constrains the way in which 
the sceptical self stages itself. 
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Derrida's rhetoric of impasse or blindness is pertinent here. The discursive 
strategy Derrida often adopts, when producing his texts (which are characteristically 
self-reflexive, as I have been pointing out in this study), is to acknowledge in advance 
that, as Wood put it, "there is no other place to go [1988: 69], " i. e. there is no other 
alternative ways of doing philosophy; Then, the one and only method Derrida seems 
to privilege over other possible ones, I have been arguing, is that of self-reflexion. 
Hence, Derrida's philosophical preoccupation with the theme of "living on the limits 
and boundaries" of discursive reason. Derrida's philosophical fixation on the sense of 
the limits manifest itself, often in his texts, in the form of him repeatedly 
acknowledging the restrictive preconditions under which his deconstructive project 
becomes a necessity as well as a possibility. Within the large category of "the 
metaphysical tradition of the European West" that Derrida tends to evoke as the 
master signifier for the aforementioned "preconditions, " a more specific context the 
current study highlights, in and out of which Derrida's deconstruction is operative, is 
a sub-category designatable as the "epoch" of philosophical modernity, the starting 
point of which Derrida himself locates in Descartes, the philosopher of 
self-consciousness23. To combine, in light of my line of argument pursued so far, 
Derrida's impossibility thesis - there is no other place to go - with his epochal 
designation of Descartes as the starting point of methodological self-reflection, the 
resultant thought gives us a more concrete picture of Derrida's strategy of 
acknowledgement: what Den-ida acknowledges, by implication, if not by means of 
explicit articulation, is that he cannot think without relying on the Cartesian mode of 
self-reflection. This tactical move that Demda seems to make implicitly is 
problematic on the following two accounts. First, it is unjustifiably presumptuous: 
Derrida presupposes, in the name of tradition (the Cartesian tradition of philosophical 
modernism, in particular), the impossibility to think in a non-reflexive, 
23Derrida [ED 294/198] locates the opening of "the epoch of self-presence [... ] and its central support" 
in Descartes who finds "presence in consciousness"; Derrida sees Descartes as the initiator of the 
modem, epistemological paradigm of thinking being, in which a reflective consciousness of being - 
rather than being itself - becomes a starting point of philosophical inquiry into the truth of being. 
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un-self-conscious way; Accordingly, he excludes a priori other possible models of 
thinking, in which philosophical concepts such as being or the self can be thought out 
and formulated, for example, from a multiple or non-restrictive, 24 non-logocentric 
point of view (rather than in the course of a philosopher's solitary pursuit of his own 
dialectically-constrained or limit-driven self-consciousness). Second, Derrida's tactic 
of acknowledgement is self-appropriative and self-referential, therefore, part of his 
restricted economy of writing: he converts his philosophical shortcoming or habits, 
i. e. his inability to think otherwise or his penchant for a reflective mode of thinking, 
into a certain "blind, " i. e. exclusive and irreducible, "passion" of not only his 
philosophy, but of philosophy in general. Derrida's "passion" expressed in his 
philosophical writings is "the passion for the impossible [Caputo 1997: xvii-xxvi], " 
for impasse, for the "the experience of the impossible [Derrida 1990: 15]. " 
However, to a certain extent, the "passion" for aporias, which Derrida 
glamorises into a spectacle of aporetic, philosophical meta-self-reflection, is a 
self-reflexive fabrication, i. e. a creation of his own, hence, in this sense, even a 
pseudo-passion. To what extent are then the writings of Derrida reducible to the 
reflexive games a reflective mind plays with and against itself? The next section 
explores this question. 
1.323 An Example of Linguistic Self-reflexivity: The Case of "Je - marque" 
This section sets out to explicates some strategic aspects of Derrida's 
discourse. The purpose of exposing the reflexive economy of his writing is to show a 
certain degree of banality and deceptiveness in his textual staging of the 
"undecidability" thesis. With this, what is to be explicated is the irreducible centrality 
of the reflexive subject exemplified in his text. Accordingly, a reading of Derrida as a 
24Deleuze's notion of philosophy [1991: 21-37/16-34], for example, in which to do philosophy is 
characterised as an act of "creating" concepts as opposed to an act of "reflecting" upon them may count 
as a good contemporary case of non-reflective philosophies. 
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guardedly self-reflexive, crafty writer, as opposed to a thinker of "the impossible 
Other, " will be explored. Closely analysed in the following is an example of such 
reflexive playfulness: the case of "Je - marque". 
I- marks(s) first of all a division in what will have been able to appear 
in the beginning. [MP 327/275]25 
But -I mark(s) the division - [... ] [MP 327/275] 
But - again, I mark(s) and multiply/multiples (mulliplie) the division - [... ] 
[MP 328/276] 
For Derrida, [... ] reflexivity points to [.. ] the medium and practice of 
writing itself. [Wood 1990: 145] 
The problem we are to raise is in the very mode of beginning, in the very 
contrived way in which Derrida's text unfolds, in the very staging of a reflexive play 
on the word "I": the insertion of 'V' between "Je" and "marque". His essay on Paul 
Valery's "I" ["Qual Quelle", MP 327-358/273-3061 begins with an equivocation, 
with a performative "marking" of the linguistic force of equivocation; The textual 
function of ` -" thus marked repeatedly is the sustained production of a 
self-differential tension between the "Je" of "Je marque (I mark)" and that of "Je, ce 
marque (I, it marks ... 
)". This way, "Je - marque" signifies both "I mark" and "I, it 
marks": It stages these two different meanings simultaneously. 
This particular way of beginning is self-reflexive, and performatively so, in 
the following threefold sense. First, the "I" of "I mark" is performative in the sense 
that it is that which carries out the marking in the text; It refers to Derrida the writer 
25 "Je - marque d'abord une division dons ce qui aura pu paraitre au commencement. " 
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who writes the sentence. Second, the "I" of "I, it marks" is reflexive in the sense that 
it is that which forces Derrida the writer to reflect back upon the first "I" ( The "I" of 
"I mark") and to ask whether the (first) "I" that marks is the same as the (second) "I" 
that makes him mark the word "I". The first "I" is pre-reflexive, pre-critical, and 
un-sceptical; The second, by contrast, is reflexive, critical, and sceptical. Noted so far 
is the mechanism of the double in which the word "I" operates: the "I" can be 
employed both pre-reflexively and reflexively; both referentially when used as a 
marker of the grammatical subject, and self-referentially (indexically) when 
mentioned as an object of phenomenological introspection. Third, the "I" of "I - 
mark" is performatively meta-reflexive in the sense that it presents, simultaneously, 
the first, pre-reflexive 'r' and the second, reflexive one; hence, the third dimension of 
the "I" is not merely performative in the pre-critical self (as in the first case), but 
self-implicative so in the sense it includes both the pre-critical natural self and the 
critical phenomenological self. The simultaneity of the staging of the two "I"s, which 
the marking of "2' effects, renders Derrida's way of beginning performatively 
meta-reflexive and, in this sense, economised. 
If the writing of "Je - marque" stages ambiguation, i. e. equivocation, an 
interpretative, threefold translation of this single sentence effects a certain degree of 
dis-ambiguation. What the foregoing analysis aims to show is the following: the 
whole problem of textual self-differentiation of the self Derrida pursues in the rest of 
his essay can be read as a self-reflexive construct, therefore, in this specific regard, as 
a kind of pseudo-problem that knows, in advance, that a solution is impossible. 
Derrida's linguistic fixation on the elusive "I" and his reflexive frustration with it, the 
philosophical gravity of which he justifies in the name of Cartesian tradition (Valery 
is an example of Cartesian writer Derrida discusses in this essay), manifest 
themselves in the recurrence of the problem of self-differentiation in his writings. 
And the issue here is not the recursivity per se; it is rather the self-serving way in 
which the necessity to chase after the elusive "I" is justified and reinforced, that is, 
"inscribed, " in Derrida's text - such direction and force of thinking is self-inscribed 
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from the beginning, in other words, reflexively indexicalised. His opening move, "Je 
- marque", is deceptively adventurous in the following sense. Derrida begins an essay 
by staging, i. e. creating performatively, an immediate splitting of the self, and then 
purports to convince the readers, as well as himself, that the rest of his essay is "the 
experience of the impossible", a manifestation of his "passion for the impossible". 
What is impossible, in this case, is the union of the selves thus split, which he has 
already made impossible from the beginning. The problem I am highlighting is that 
the possibility of the unification of the divided selves was already, i. e. a priori, 
precluded by Derrida's opening move; so, what is the point of staging such 
impossibility further on? 
The first sentence of Derrida's essay, in a way, is illustrative of both the 
whole point of Derrida's impassioned essay and that of my unsympathetic reading: "I 
- marks(s) first of all a division in what will have been able to appear in the beginning 
[MP 327/275]". Derrida's point is that the mastery of the self, i. e. the undivided 
attention to, and the unmediated apprehension of, the "I, " is an impossibility insofar 
as the self is always already in self-relation and the mode of its relationality is not 
only dialectically reciprocal, but on top of that, linguistically so; Hence, the 
simultaneous splitting of the "I" into the "I who marks the word, r', and the "I that is 
thus marked" by the word, I. And this line of thinking leads to the following thesis 
that the quoted sentence stages in a cryptic manner: The perfect beginning of the 
pure, immediate self that may lie in the future - "the beginning that will have been" - 
is, nevertheless, always already unlocatable, due to the originary "division" of the self 
caused by the force of language, i. e. by the inscriptive force of the word, I; the aporia 
at stake is that the pre-linguistic 'r' must use the word 'r' in order to identify itself as 
such, and yet as soon as it locates itself in, or "inscribes" or "marks" itself on, the 
linguistic map, the pure origin of the I- "the beginning" of the I- becomes 
obliterated; Hence, (from Derrida's point of view), the impossible dream of locating 
the exact or pure "source of the I"; (from our point of view), Derrida's a priori 
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preclusion of the possibility of a radically new beginning, of a radically new mode in 
which the self can be conceived in a different manner. 
The point of contention one can raise against Derrida, in this regard, is 
regarding the twofold movement of his self-reflection: the movement of reflective 
opening and reflexive self-closure: one, the movement of self-splitting ( "I - marks: Je 
- marque" ), and the other, the trans-temporal fixing of the division through a 
meta-reflexive doubling of the very ruptured state of the self ( "a division in what 
will have been able to appear in the beginning: une division dans ce qui aurapu 
paraltre au commencement" ); the latter, reflexively closed, movement of thinking is 
describable as trans-temporal in the sense that his strategic use of the future perfect 
tense - "will have been" - reveals that the kind of future Derrida envisages is not the 
one that is radically open to temporality and, therefore in this sense, un-fixable and 
unpredictable, but the one projected a priori from the point of view established in the 
present tense, which dictates what X is and what X will be, and accordingly, which 
sees what X "will have been" as a completion or structural solidification of (as 
opposed to a separation from or interruption of) the project of X. Derrida's 
meta-reflexive fixing or control of a scene of disruptive self-reflection, viewed as the 
opening move in his essay, is a good strategic decision, because it illustrates, 
performatively, the argument of the essay as a whole: the impossibility of 
self-mastery, i. e. the inexhaustibility of the linguistic source of the "I". This strategy 
is, however, too good in the sense that the self-closed tightness of his, what I 
previously called, "tactic of acknowledgement" contradicts his overt argument for the 
impossibility of exhaustive self-knowledge. With the inscription - marking - of the 
single sentence that announces, in advance, the impossibility of "the beginning", 
what Derrida does is to create a loop of self-reflexivity, to which "the subsequent text 
is added"; The rest of his sentences in the essay, in this sense, is the fortification of 
such self-closed loop of self-referential thinking. 
Put the same point differently, Derrida's compositional mastery over his text 
pre-determines self-reflexively, therefore, restricts a priori, the range of his "passion 
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for the unknown, for the impossible, for the aporetic"; restrictive in this case is his 
projected, "perfect-futural" notion of the beginning, as it were, i. e. the beginning 
"that will have been. " This move is self-contradictory in the sense that it is precisely 
the illusion of subjectivity, of self-mastery, of the projective capacity of the self that 
Derrida purports to highlight and problematise. Insofar as his text remains 
auto-generative of a loop of self-reflexivity, and insofar as he is implicitly committed 
to such a methodologised or stylised self-reflexion, his thinking cannot, due to its 
structural limits, reach out for his "other" to which his deconstructive strategy of 
thinking purports to point. 
What remains to be questioned accordingly, in this investigative line of 
reading Derrida, is the centrality of the narrative subject in his text: Namely, the 
question is, who marks "Je - marque"?, if not Derrida himself? In raising this 
question, one will have to be ready for at least two types of resistance from Derrida, 
one, immediate, and the other, reflective. 
Derrida's immediate answer would be: That which marks "Je - marque", if an 
answer need be given, is the word I thus employed, and not the precritical, 
extra-linguistic I. Therefore, to extrapolate this point, Derrida's answer is language, 
language taken as "the other" of the narrative subject, or the other that comes prior 
to, and thus constitutes, such subject: "Je - marque" is, in this sense, the work of 
language, not that of the writing subject. In order to register this point, one only needs 
to be reminded of the demonstrative aim of Derrida's self-implicative, textual 
performance exemplified in "Je - marque": His rhetorical purpose is to show that the 
uncontrollable textuality - elusiveness - of the language of the self manifests itself 
through the auto-representation of its mysterious capacity of equivocation. What 
remains beyond authorial control, i. e. un-masterable, demonstrated as such, is the 
disruptive force of self-division the word "I" possesses. Derrida's aim is to show, in 
other words, that Derrida the writing subject is struggling not to be "fooled" or 
"manipulated" by such monstrously disruptive force of language. What he 
demonstrates performatively to his readers, as well as to himself, is that he, as a 
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rigorously self-conscious writer, is beware of such "double bind" into which 
language, particularly the language of the self, puts him. 
Before introducing Derrida's more "reflective" resistance to our question, i. e. 
"who marks "Je - marque"?, it would be helpful to note briefly, this time in more 
generalised terms, what it is that Derrida aims to achieve by producing such 
self-reflexive texts, in other words, why such style of writing needs to be adopted: 
this is to ask what kind of strategic values self-reflexivity has for Derrida the writer. 
At least two elements in Derrida's style of textual practice, related to each other, can 
be noted in this context that focuses on the strategic aspects of his writing. 
First is an element of monstrosity. Derrida the writing subject "re-monstrates 
[Mulhall 1995]" the world through his practice of writing. 
The future can anticipate itself (s'anticipier) in the form of an absolute 
danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with constituted normality and can 
only proclaim itself (s'annoncer) and present itself(se presenter), as a sort of 
monstrosity. [DG 14/5, translation revised]" 
If my style marks itself, it is only on a surface which remains invisible and 
illegible for me. Point of speculum: here I am blind to my style, deaf to what 
is most spontaneous in my voice. [... ] to make it ("it" referring to the thought 
of "point ofspeculum") deviate toward a lexicographical monstrosity, [... ] 
[MP 345/296, (my insertion)] 
The "future" of writing, the future of his textual world, Derrida says, is in "an 
absolute danger", because the direction of its unfolding is not only unforeseeable, but, 
more significantly, threatening; threatening in the sense that, firstly, it is 
pre-determined by a certain, un-masterable and unknown, governing logic of writing 
to which his text cannot but subscribe, and secondly, this underlying logic has a 
"deviatory" potential for having not yet been known as such to his writing self. 
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However, as the passage quoted above says, is it not Derrida himself who "makes" a 
given thought "deviate towards a lexicographical monstrosity"?; Similarly, and in 
more general terms, is it not, after all, Derrida himself who, in the first place, puts the 
"I" into the monstrous game of double bind? According to Derrida, the discursive 
philosopher, and not the crafty writer, it is the inscriptive force of language and not 
the writer that plays this monstrous game of double bind; and yet, the opening move 
of "Je - marque" which demonstrates his thesis too perfectly and effectively in a 
"monstrous" manner, can invite his readers to resist this claim of authorial 
self-effacement Derrida makes. 
Second is an element of theatrical exemplarity. 
26 If one of the points Derrida 
aims to illustrate in his deconstructive texts is the monstrosity of the world of 
textuality, his text itself is presented as an example of such monstrosity. This 
Derridian world of monstrosity that defies de-monstration, according to Derrida, is 
not the intelligible world consisting of "clear and distinct" ideas and theses; it is, to 
adopt Kantian vocabulary, real and noumenal as opposed to ideal and phenomenal, in 
the sense that it is that which lies beyond the world of subject-oriented 
representations. For this reason, Derrida consistently relies on the technique of what 
Ulmer called "op-writing [1983], " where that which cannot be articulated in the form 
of a thesis is presented or demonstrated through the direct showing of it rather than 
through a discursive representation or exposition of it. Therefore, what remains to be 
seen in Derrida's text, in the absence of an articulated thesis in it, is a kind of 
rhetorical and demonstrative effects that the intra-textual movements of thinking - the 
subsequent movements of thinking induced by the first marking of "Je - marque", for 
26 Hillis Miller [1991] emphasises that we come to an understanding of deconstruction only by looking 
at different "examples, " rather than by gaining a definitive, propositional knowledge of it. He argues 
that this inability of deconstruction to define itself is structurally necessary insofar as the "indefinabilty" 
of a concept is precisely what deconstruction purports to show; 
[... ] Sentences of the form "Deconstruction is so and so" arc a contradiction in terms. 
Deconstruction cannot by definition be defined, since it presupposes the indefinability or, more 
precisely, "undccidability" of all conceptual or generalising terms. Deconstruction [... ] can only be 
eremplifred, and the examples will of coarse all differ. [ 1991: 231 J 
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instance - produce performatively and recursively. What is being problematised here, 
regarding the Derridian style of auto-representative writing, can be summarised into 
the following two points: the contrivedness (first point) and staged nature (second 
point) of his discourse, of which the case of "Je - marque" is a perfect example. 
Then, our previous question that problematised the textual centrality of the 
narrative subject in Derrida's text returns, although in a revised form: Who is it that 
attempts to stages this monstrous world of double bind? Who is it that "sees, " in other 
words, has insight into, such constitutive predicaments of the human linguistic self? 
What has been referred to as Derrida's other possible answer addresses our 
revised question: Derrida would answer our question by problematising the 
inadequacy or inappropriateness of it, in other words, by reflecting upon the question 
itself. Derrida's questions posed against himself in the middle of the exposition of 
d ferance reflect our concern: "What differs? Who differs? What is d ferance? [MP 
15/14]"; and his subsequent problematisation of this type of questions, exemplifies 
Derrida's hyper-reflective move: "With this question, we reach another level (un 
autre lieu) and another resource of problematic [MP 15/14]. " Interestingly enough, 
Derrida then goes on to stress that, by asking this type of question, we take a greatest 
risk of "falling back into what we have just disengaged ourselves from [15/14]. " The 
risk is to commit ourselves to the assumption that "prior to the sign and outside it 
[... ] something like consciousness is possible [17/16]. " By asking the kind of 
questions headed by "who" or "what, " we run, again and "incessantly [17/16], " the 
risk of privileging the power of metaphysics of "synthesising traces [17/16], " in other 
words, the risk of "reassembling [17/16]" such "traces" into a unity of single thought. 
When privileging the "speaking subject27 [16/15]" this way, the "I" in "Je marque", 
namely, "the speaking subject", inevitably neglects or forgets the "I" in "Je - 
marque, " the writing subject, the "I" thus "inscribed in the language [16/15], " the "I" 
27By "the speaking subject, " Derrida does not mean someone who makes noise phonetically, but an 
authorial "r' with a definite authorial intent who "intends to say (vouloir dire)" something in the text, 
believing in some kind of "pure intention" that lies outside the structure of signification. 
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"functioning [16/15]" only within the pre-existing system of the language. Derrida's 
point here is twofold: Firstly, our revised question itself, which implicitly privileges 
the extra-linguistic kind of "F', the speaking subject, by demanding an unequivocal 
answer to the question of "who" or "what, " a priori suppress the intra-linguistic kind 
of "I", the writing subject; In this way, secondly, such a logocentrically formulated 
question a priori blocks a path of reflection that opens itself up to the "equivocal 
passage of one different thing to another [18/17], " to the very equivocity resonant in 
the inaugural passage that the "I" mark(s). 
Derrida suggests that, therefore, one ought to pay extra attention to the very 
"moving discord of different forces, and of difference of forces [MP 19/18], " 
operative in any text that assumes unity in and of itself. These forces of "detour, 
relay, reserve [19/18]", according to Derrida, remain "active [19/18]" inexhaustibly 
in any given text. To explain why, and in what sense, this is the case: Firstly, the 
"forces" of self-disruption immanent in the self, as Derrida argues, are entrenched in 
an invisible "chain" of linguistic signification rather than in an objectifiable system 
of nomination; And, for this reason, what becomes impossible for the self in 
self-reflection, thus mediated by the language of the self, is to position or occupy its 
own place within such chain of self-differentiation that constantly "moves" on; 
Hence, the forces of "detour and relay, " ceaselessly distractive and disruptive. 
Secondly, the reason why the chain of linguistic signification keeps on moving and 
expanding is because the elusive force of the self cannot be tamed or mastered by any 
means, and can only be expressed by another set of terms; Hence, the forces of 
"reserve" that resist exhaustive explication. And thirdly, Derrida wants to interpret 
the manifestation of these forces in his text as an act of language rather than as an act 
of his own; Hence, the forces that remain "active" in their own way, regardless of 
Derrida's authorial desire or commands. Following this line of argument, what 
Derrida intends to highlight is a governing force of language that lies "beyond" his 
empirical control over the text he produces. It is much anticipated, in this regard, that 
Derrida would rely on a diction of vertical imposition in order to refer to this 
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"higher" textual dimension which lies "beyond" his reach of philosophical cognition, 
and which, nevertheless remains operative in his text as the unstoppable force of 
narration: the forces of "super-mark (super-marquer) [D 18/22]" or "superimprinting 
[Sur 146/100]". 
Here, still, remains a question: who or what then sees the very movement of 
such "super"- forces of deconstruction? Who or what sees the "active" "detour" that 
happens in the text, namely, the arche-trace of "margin-mark-march (1a 
marge-marque-marche) [MP 13/12]"? Who or what sees this arche-trace of 
deconstruction, by virtue of which one is led to "suspect the very form [MP 15/14]" 
of the un-subtle and naive questions - such as mine - that ask "who" or "what" marks 
"Je - marque"? In what way can one see the very higher level of textual disruption at 
all, if the seer is supposed to have "always already" been conditioned by such textual 
force in such a way that he remains blind to its governing logic? How can Derrida 
justify the validity of his residual insights into the "remainders" of deconstruction, i. e. 
that which remains to be deconstructed over and over again, without relying on a 
certain supreme or superior level of philosophical eidos necessary for the 
metaphysical envisioning of them? How can one see the deconstructive event of 
thinking, without, in a certain way, relying on a certain philosophical vision, by 
means of which the very event of deconstruction is observable? The issue here, raised 
again in different terms, is whether any immanent and not some transcendental, 
enabling condition of deconstructive "suspicion" can be sought after in a coherent, 
non-self-contradictory manner, and my analysis so far has been suggesting that the 
answer is negative. The underlying point of contention behind the foregoing series of 
questions is that the force of deconstruction is formalisable as a form of metaphysical 
meta-reflection, to the extent that a certain kind of upward mobility, i. e. a 
quasi-transcendental reflective move, characterises the direction and manner in which 
it manifests itself in Derrida's text. 
Irene Harvey characterises the transgressive, and yet, aporetic mode of 
deconstruction in the following way: "the transgression of form by force and the 
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transgression of force by form [1986a: 135]". The internal symmetricalness of her 
phrase reflects the problematically reciprocal relationship between the deconstructing 
"force" of thought and the "form" of deconstructive thought that is further subject to 
the transgressive force of deconstruction: form, as in the logocentric "form" of an 
ultimate metaphysical question (e. g. what is? ), and force, as in a transgressive "force" 
of questioning that questions the very validity of such a logocentric question. And the 
irresolvable aporia here, which Harvey's phrase stages effectively, is that the mode of 
meta-metaphysical questioning, e. g. what is "what is?, " cannot but resemble the 
"form" of the original metaphysical question, namely, what is?. The problem I am 
highlighting here is twofold: first, what Derrida means and understands by a 
deconstructive "force" of thinking is indistinguishable from a reflexive doubling of 
the ultra-logocentric form of thinking, and second, the indistinguishability at issue is 
a problem that Derrida's deconstructive model of thinking cannot tackle or even 
acknowledge for a structural reason, i. e. for his model is always already embedded in 
a reflexive mode of thinking. The reciprocally dual mode of auto-deconstruction in 
which deconstruction, taken as a meta-philosophical endeavour, attempts to transcend 
or transgress its discursive limits by questioning its own form of questioning, 
engenders, as Derrida puts it, "the narrative of the narrative, the narrative-Qf 
deconstruction k deconstruction28 [Sur 146/100]"; Note here the recurrence of the 
first instance of deconstruction (the narrative of deconstruction) at a higher level of 
inquisition (the narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction). The reflexively 
automatic doubling of the force of deconstruction, exemplified in "the narrative of 
deconstruction in deconstruction, " leads to the meta-reflexive formalisation, or put 
more loosely, fixing, of such force. This way, the transgressive force of 
deconstruction becomes highly formalised; by implication, one can argue further that 
what prevails in the end in the "moving discord of force and form, " generative of 
deconstructive scenes of thinking, is a certain ultra-formality, i. e. a "form" of 
28 Le recit de la deconstructionm deconstruction. 
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deconstructive thinking thus reducible into a sort of meta-form, and not the putatively 
irreducible tension between a deconstructing "force" of thinking and a deconstructed 
"form" of thinking. 
The reason why the underlying formality of Derrida's deconstructive mode of 
inquisition becomes an issue in our context - the context of discussing the 
deconstructive strategy of writing exemplified in "Je - marque" - is the following: 
The formality of deconstructive movement of thinking entails the centrality or 
primacy of the deconstructive subject thus privileged in a textual scene of 
questioning, rather than the dissolution or displacement of such cognitive 
subjectivity: In other words, insofar as what remains to be seen, i. e. intelligible, in a 
deconstructive scene of thinking is a form of self-distancing, exemplified in the 
marking of "2' in between "Je" and "marque, " what remains operative, by 
implication, is Derrida the discursive subject, i. e. the "Je" of "Je - marque" who thus 
distances himself by "marking" the space of recursive self-spacing, namely, the space 
of ...... The simple fact that Derrida renders auto-self-deconstructive an otherwise 
plain sentence (Je marque) by simply inserting "-" in between two words (Je - 
marque) can therefore be more telling than trivial, seen from such a strategic point of 
view. 
Bearing in mind such an inextricable, logocentric link between the formality 
of deconstructive thinking and the centrality of the authorial subject who organises a 
deconstructive scene of thinking in a tightly self-reflexive manner, I read, with some 
readerly resistance, the following remark Derrida makes regarding the ordeals of 
writing: 
[... ] Writing is inaugural, in the fresh sense of the word, that it is dangerous and 
anguishing. It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can keep it from 
the essential precipitation towards the meaning that it constitutes and that is, 
primarily, its future. [... ] There is thus no insurance against the risk of writing. 
Writing is an initial and graceless recourse for the writer. [MP 22/11] 
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Portrayed here is Derrida the writing subject, who is falling into an abyss of 
non-knowledge, into the chasm that opens itself up to "non-anticipatible events (of 
writing) that lie ahead [Mortley 1990: 106]. " How genuine, one may ask at this point 
rather sceptically, is Derrida's anxiety about writing in general, and about the 
invisible force of, and temporal openness of, deconstructive writing, in particular? 
With this question, we are, again, led back to our initial concern: the reflexively 
strategic aspects of deconstructive writings of Derrida. The following several pages, 
where a couple of other relevant examples from Derrida are introduced and 
discussed, will pursue this question, again; and the next section [1.324], with which 
the chapter 1 concludes, will provide some notes of comparison between Descartes in 
a sceptical phase and Derrida in deconstruction, presenting Derrida as a Cartesian 
thinker of "vigil". 
Back to the question: How, in the writings of Derrida, does the writing subject 
deal with its "inaugural" anxiety, i. e. the anxiety of blindness (blindness taken as a 
metaphor for non-knowledge)? What does Derrida do when he is unable to see where 
his writing is heading? What he does is to lay a textual trap in which he then becomes 
caught. What this signifies, in more general terms, is that the absence of a foreseeable 
telos to which writing unfolds is marked by the presence of the writing subject, 
Derrida the writer: Put differently, what Derrida ends up doing here is to replace - 
rather than to displace - "the speaking subject" by the writing subject, an old model 
of extra-linguistic subjectivity by his new model of intra-linguistic meta-subjectivity. 
This way, the subject position of Derrida in his texts becomes more strongly 
pronounced. 
The self-reflexive construction of the space of self-inscription as in "Je - 
marque", in the face of the threats of the unknown, is a protective measure the 
writing subject takes. What the Derridian self does is to "mark" a textual space in 
which it effaces itself. What it does, to put it simply, is to territorialise itself by 
marking its own space of self-spacing. That is to imply, to stay with the metaphor of 
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territorial spacing, Derrida merely reconstructs, rather than "deconstructs", his own 
house of metaphysics, willingly and "actively" "sinking into the autism of closure 
[MP 162/135]"; and yet, this house, as Derrida claims, problematically again, is 
supposed to be full of "surprises": 
There is always a surprise in store for the anatomy or physiology of any 
criticism that might think it had mastered the game, surveyed all the threads at 
once, deluding itself; too, in wanting to look at the text without touching it, 
without laying a hand on the "object, " without risking - which is the only chance 
of entering into the game, by getting a few forgers caught - the addition of 
some thread. Adding, here is nothing other than giving to read (donner a lire). 
One must manage to think this out: that it is not a question of embroidering upon 
a text, unless one considers that to know how to embroider still means to have 
the ability to follow the given thread. That is, if you follow me, the hidden 
thread. [Diss 71-2/63] 
It is the "between (entre), " whether it names (con)fusion (confusion) or 
separation (intervalle entre), that [... ] carries all the force of the operation. [Disc 
250/220, (con) added] 
A question can be raised regarding the authorial ownership of those "fingers" 
Derrida refers to in the passage above: A question can be raised regarding the 
organiser or weaver of those "hidden threads" in Derrida's texts. There are, however, 
several pre-conditions under which this question can be rightly asked. Before raising 
the question again, let us enumerate these conditions one by one and confirm that 
they have been fulfilled in Derrida's text. 
Firstly, there is a "finger, " in the Derridian text, which "touches" the text 
before an eye can see it; What this marks out is authorial presence. Secondly, 
Derrida's "fingers, " when initiating a game of textual production and explication, 
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"mark the spots of what can never be mediated, mastered [Diss 250/221]"; What this 
signifies is authorial control and self-awareness. Thirdly, the writing subject, as 
opposed to the speculative subject (the subject who "sees", i. e. "knows"), experiences 
an irreducible experience of getting "caught" and "surprised" by the rule of the game, 
the game of the "already-caught-and-always-surprised"; What this illustrates is the 
narrative centrality of authorial experience, the discursive centrality of an author who 
economises on his experience of a failure and inadequacy by taking it, i. e. describing 
it, as a chance to increase textual productivity; To put the same point in words less 
abstract and more figurative, what becomes conspicuous in this picture, to which the 
attention of both the writer and the readers is drawn, is the figure of an author who 
struggles to work himself out of the intricate traps and loopholes of the game, and not 
"the rule of the game" that generates such trouble. Fourthly, the textual "entrance 
(entre) [250/220], " according to Derrida, is locatable in "between" the visible and the 
invisible of the text, in the very "confusion" of the two dimensions; What this implies 
is the performative mode of narrative opening - the starting point of a narrative is not 
something the author knows in advance, but something that he designates 
performatively in the absence of the knowledge of it. Fifthly, therefore, "it is 
possible" for the writing subject "to recognise a serial law in these points of 
indefinite pivoting [250/221], " which renders the invisible visible in every turn of 
textual movement; What this means, put simply, is that to write is to render visible 
the narrative self that would be otherwise invisible. To elaborate this point, in 
conjunction with the aforementioned fourth point about the originary performativity 
of the narrative beginning: What can be achieved through such performative 
beginning is textual self-production, and the textual production of the self takes place 
in the process of self-inscription or self-visualisation. What the author of the "r' does 
in this case is not to write about himself, about the self that exists prior to the event 
of writing, but to write himself, the self that is produced and invented in the very 
"serialised" process or chain of (self-inscriptive) writing, which is therefore open to 
the "indefinite pivoting" of the futural self. Finally, to conclude, this chain of 
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reflections do happen in Derrida's text in the form of "spinning out the text"; In other 
words, there is in Derrida's text the textual presence of a controlling author who 
economises on his own authorial inadequacy by producing - or to put it more 
strongly, fabricating -a ceaselessly self-referential text that has "indefinite" endings 
and the acknowledgements of a failed beginning. Therefore, in Derrida's text, there is 
no "end" or "beginning" in the conventional senses of the words; what is there, 
however, I emphasise, is Derrida the author, who actively prevents such definite 
opening or closing - beginning or ending - of a book from taking place, who only 
"spins out the text" from the epistemological or methodological resources of 
self-reflexivity without stopping, and with care. 
Now, given such textual evidence that reveals the logocentric dimension of 
authorial control embedded in the texts of Derrida, are we still to be deprived of the 
right to enquire into the ownership or subjectivity of Derrida's "fingers, " the afflicted 
fingers of deconstruction caught up in the double bind of neither-the 
beginning-nor-the end? A thought behind this question is that, again, the dextrous 
hand of Derrida seems to fabricate, and therefore, ensure, the very possibility of a 
"surprise"; for instance, what he calls the "semantic void [Diss 251/222], " a kind of 
irreducible gap between two opposing concepts that opens up a productive textual 
space of deconstruction, which the "2' of "Je - marque" marks out29, for instance, 
seems to be, in fact, constitutive part of his textual fabrication30, i. e. a creation of his 
29An irreducible "gap" in this case would be that between the concept of activity and the concept of 
passivity: "Je" of "Je - marque" is neither active nor passive in a mutually exclusive manner, for it is 
both active and passive at the same time; active in the sense that it is "Je", the author of the sentence in 
question, that marks "Je - marque"; passive in the sense that "l', the signifier for the author at work, is 
also "marked" by the force of signification, i. e. situated intra-linguistically at a particular point that the 
structure of signification designates, regardless of its extra-linguistic, "pure" intention. Ilene, Derrida's 
putative de-constitution of authorial subjectivity by means of de-stabilising its unitary conceptual basis 
such as the notion of self-knowing, authorial self, putative, because what Derrida does here, as I have 
been arguing against him, is only to replace an old model of extra-linguistic subjectivity by his new 
model of intra-linguistic meta-subjectivity. 30Miller raises a similar question about the structuralised formality of this Derridian void. However, his 
tone, unlike mine, is more respectful than suspicious: "The uncanny moment in Derrida's criticism, the 
vacant place around which all his work is organised, is the formulation and reformulation of the 
ground out of which the whole textual structure seems to rise [... ] [1991: 126]. " 
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own. A Derridian mode of such global fabrication, I identified earlier in this section 
as a strategy of "ambiguation" or "equivocation". 
The persistence with which this line of distrustful reading is pursued is, in 
fact, Derridian in its ethos. The task of the readers, as Derrida says, is to decode the 
"syntactical" rule of the game, to which a given text is subject; 
[... ]A reading [... ] should no longer be carried out as a simple table of concepts 
or words, as a static or statistical sort of punctuation. One must reconstitute a 
chain in motion, the effects of a network and the play of a syntax. [Diss 
221/194] 
The syntax of "Je - marque" is, again, a telling example. There remains in Derrida's 
texts a dual and self-splitting experience of "following" a certain "serial law" of 
self-inscription. Derrida's marking of "Je - marque" auto-represents such 
experiential event of self-inscription. Now, one's proper response to that staged 
space, to that Derridian move of self-spacing, as a faithful reader of Derrida who 
follows him by resisting him31 as well as "attending to or awaiting32" him, would be 
31 This point may perhaps require a clarification. The necessity to "resist" Derrida when reading him is 
not to be equated with an inevitability to betray Derrida at the time of talking "about" Derrida. With 
regard to the question of what it means to be a "faithful" Derridian reader, I am not concerned with the 
constitutive aporia of "running the risk" of misrepresenting, "misunderstanding" or "mistranslating" 
Derrida by imitating or, equally, not imitating him, as Wolfrey [1998: 29] puts it, so much as with the 
problem of how one can maintain a critical distance from his text while, at the same time, participating 
in his textual game. Something like a reader's hermeneutic struggle with the author, taking place not in 
the form of an ultimate betrayal, but in the form of an endless juggling, this form of reading Derrida is 
what interests us here. Here Wolfrey makes an interesting and insightful point, regarding the 
constitutive problems in establishing the faithful readership of deconstruction, which we are also 
addressing at this point; he argues that one's text on Derrida can "behave internally in a self-referential 
and reflexive manner, a manner which wishes to acknowledge the problem of being faithful to Derrida's 
text" and yet, at the same time, it "can only be faithful by being unfaithful in a somewhat knowing 
fashion. " However, at a more specific level, his commentary deals with a problem in which I am not 
interested any longer. His concern is to point to an inevitable irony of representing Derrida whose work, 
by definition, resists representation or objectification; in contrast to this, my concern, to stay with this 
formula, lies rather in examining the possibility of representing the un-ironised Derrida, in other words, 
the Derrida that remains still underrepresented. 
32 I often talk about spacing, but this is not simply space as opposed to time, but a mode of producing 
space by temporalising it. Temporisation [... ] means waiting or expecting (attendre), postponing 
or delaying. Temporising is spacing. [Mortlcy 1991: 100, interview with Derrida] 
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to distance oneself from it, which amounts to, as he says, "nothing other than giving 
to read": In short, the space of reading Derrida, the space where Derrida the author 
lies, is the "2' of "Je - marque. " 
1.324 Descartes in Doubt and Derrida in Deconstruction 
Again, as Derrida emphasises, 
The reading must always rigorously aim at a certain relationship, unperceived 
by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of 
the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not a certain 
quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a 
signing structure that the critical reading should produce. [DG 227/158, 
"rigorously" missing in the translation] 
To remain distant, that is, spaced, from the object of engagement, the object that 
"gives33" a signifying structure - this is the rule of the game. The rule of critical 
reading Derrida articulates here is distancing or spacing, these words taken as spatial 
metaphors for suspicion; A distancing reader is the one who does not really believe in 
authorial intention; A reader that "spaces" himself or herself from the author is the 
one who see34 in "between" what the author says and what he does not, in order to 
33 Elisabeth Weber, whilst discussing the theme of sexual difference pervasive in Derrida's texts, 
describes in the following way what it means for Derrida to engage, to engage with the text: "[... ] to 
engage the discussion: to apostrophise, resonate, argue, respond, correspond, contest, provoke, affirm, 
give - to give one to think or to give, period (donner ä penser ou dormer tout court) [Poi 10/3]. " 4Commenting upon the passage quoted above, Barbara Johnson stresses, rightly, that the role of 
deconstructive readers lies in discovering the constitutive or necessary blindness of a given text; "in 
other words, the deconstructive reading does not point out the flaws or weakness or stupidity of an 
author, but the necessity with which what he does see is systematically related to what he does not see 
[Diss, xv, translator's introduction]. " 
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reach a deeper, impersonal, and linguistic level of "signifying structure" to which the 
given text is perceived to be subject. 
When Christopher Norris characterised Derrida as "one of those undeceived 
modem thinkers [1987: 150], " what is celebrated is Derrida's "rigorous" rationality, 
his circumspection, his "vigilant35" attitude, his refusal to be manipulated. As Norris 
goes on to point it out, rightly, the following appears to be one of Derrida's most 
deeply rooted, working beliefs: 
The process of "performative" or "pragmatic" self-differentiation of modern 
Western rationality - for all its random, "aleatory" character - still has to be 
reckoned with on terms that derive what critical force they possess from the 
principle of reason [ 1987: 161]. 
"We must always recall the other hand, or the hand of the other36 [MA 16/9], " says 
Derrida. A Derridian thinker is the one who maintains a critical distance against 
himself as well as against the other. He is the one who fears not seeing what he is 
doing to himself as well as what the other is doing to him. He guards himself against 
blindness, in other words, against manipulation. The Derridian reason is, in this 
regard, a reason on the alert, on the look out, a willingly insomniac reason that 
refuses to sleep. 
35 A typical logocentric compliment that one would give to Derrida, again Norris's, for example, runs as 
follows: 
Deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those "aporias", blindspots or moments of 
self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between 
what it manifestly means to say and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean To "deconstruct" a 
piece of writing is therefore to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those 
unregarded details [... ) which are always, and necessarily, passed over by interpreters of more 
orthodox persuasion. [Norris 1987: 191 
3611 faut toujours se reppeler 1'=Ire main ou la main de I'autre. 
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There is a striking resemblance, in terms of philosophical ethos, between 
Descartes in malady of scepticism and Derrida in suspicion. Here is Descartes the 
rigorous sceptic: 
I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the source of 
truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has 
employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the 
air, the earth, [... ] all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he 
has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having 
hands or eyes, [... ]. I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation [... ] 
resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehood, so that the deceiver, 
however powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in 
the slightest degree. [Med II, AT VII 22-23/CSM 11 151 
Such similarity given, there is, however, a notable difference between Derrida 
and Descartes: The former wishes to remain vigilant all the time; The latter, however, 
somehow finds consolation in sleep, in the temporary abandonment of his sceptical 
self. Here is Descartes the moderate sceptic. 
But this is an arduous undertaking, and a kind of laziness brings me back to 
normal life. I am like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary freedom while 
asleep; as he begins to suspect that he is asleep, he dreads being woken up, and 
goes along with the pleasant illusion as long as he can. In the same way, I 
happily slide back into my old opinions and dread being shaken out of them for 
fear that my peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labour when I wake, and 
that I shall have to toil not in the light, but amid the inextricable darkness of the 
problems I have now raised. [Med 11, AT VII 23/CSM 1115] 
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If Derrida wishes to keep pushing his hyper-reflective, sceptical move, for the reasons 
of meta-logical "rigour, " Descartes, by contrast, wishes to keep his hypothetical 
scepticism restricted only to a certain extent, for the economy of psychical 
equilibrium37. The dissimilarity here reflects something like a difference between 
scepticism as an end itself and scepticism as a means to an end; a difference between 
an excessive use of sceptical rationality and a moderate use of it. 
Such dissimilarity noted, further notable in this context is the contrasting 
attitudes Descartes and Derrida adopt towards the notion, project. Descartes has a 
project in the ordinary sense of the word (a telos-oriented trajectory), which is to find 
the indestructible grounds of knowledge, whereas Derrida has no such thing. Derrida 
says, 
[... ] In the delineation of differance, everything is strategic and adventurous. 
Strategic because no transcendental truth present outside the field of writing can 
govern theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy 
is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a 
final goal, a telos or theme of domination, a mastery and development of the 
field. [... ] a strategy without finality, what might be called blind tactics, or 
empirical wandering. [MP 7/7] 
Elsewhere [ED 22/11], Derrida says, in a similar manner, that his deconstructive 
move is "dangerous" for "not knowing where it is going, " therefore in this sense, only 
"strategic" or "adventurous. " The "objectives" of the Derridian reflection, therefore, 
cannot but remain unclear and, more significantly, invisible. This also explains why 
Derrida cannot but rely on the "strategy without finality" that "admits (or 
acknowledges, in advance) that it does not know where is going [TT 45938/50, (my 
37Descartes the economic sceptic - economic in the sense of being moderate and teleological - 
"happily" and "lazily" "slides back into his old opinions, " when need be - here, the need is psychological 
rather than logical. 
38 "La strategie sans finalite, [... ] la strategie aleatoire de qui avoue ne pas savoir oü 11 va [... ]. " 
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addition)]. " His reflection, as he claims again [MP xxv/xxviiij, "remains entirely 
unforeseen, " "without anticipation, " "without measure. " It is, as he puts it, a 
reflection of "a hand"- not of an eye - "that is blind". A hand is blind, as a matter of 
course, by virtue of simply not being an eye with which one sees things, but when 
Derrida says his hand is "blind", by that he means more than the obvious: When in 
self-reflection, he cannot reach the self except through a linguistic mediation, and 
such language, taken as an enabling condition of self-reflection, manifests itself 
through his writing. In this sense, Derrida's "hand" of reflection signifies the invisible 
and transcendental locus where such condition resides. 
Descartes's reflection progresses towards a single end, whereas Derrida's 
remains "double-ended", as we will see shortly what that means. Descartes's 
objective, his aim, his goal, is unequivocal: it is to discover the secure grounds of 
science which, as he claims, can be found in the reflexive resiliency of the cogito. By 
contrast, the end of Derrida's reflection, as he envisages it, for example, in "The ends 
of man (Les fins de I'homme) [MP 129-164/109-136], " is a strange kind that is 
(n)either the termination of the Cartesian version of phenomenology (n)or the 
completion of its tradition [MP 161-2/134-5]: In other words, the aim of Derrida's 
reflection is (n)either a destruction of the Cartesian project (n)or a continuation of it. 
Rather, Derrida's project without "a" project (without a single definite aim), if 
locatable as such, lies in "between" these two options, "between two ends of man 
[MP 164/136]", between one end that leads to the termination of phenomenological 
self-reflection, and the other that leads to the completion of it. Here, Derrida plays on 
the semantic ambivalence of the word "end (fin). " This word that denotes finality can 
be conceived either constructively as in "the teleological end" or destructively as in 
"the end of the world"; it means, on the one hand, the purpose for which something is 
done or towards which one is working, and on the other, simply, the cessation or 
termination of a course of action or activity, which does not have any teleological 
connotation. Derrida uses the word "end" ambiguously, i. e. de-constructively, when 
talking about "the ends of man"; he points simultaneously to the twofold, equivocal 
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aspect of the concept of the "end". Derrida's notion of the end is constitutively 
complicated - explicitly inclusive of the twofold aspect of the notion - in such a way 
that it engenders double-ended reflection on the future of man. 
The Derridian man with, or rather torn between, the two ends, is therefore a 
man without a single aim: Such a man strives for an unforeseeable telos, and at the 
same time, marches towards death. This way, Derrida doubles the focus of his 
meta-reflection on himself - himself taken as an example of the philosophical man in 
the late 20th century. Such bi-focalised reflection, therefore, does not lead to a 
definite conclusion; It remains as it is; It only presents itself as an irreducible aporia. 
Even in a dream [MA 23/16] where Derrida is caught up in an altercation between 
two older men (the two old men here can be understood as representing the dialogic 
or dialectical tradition of European philosophy in which he finds himself working), 
he sees no conclusion in it, no end to it. He wakes up in the middle, interrupted. 
Derrida's man is haunted by, and attracted to, the "trembling (s'ebrancler) [MP 
161/133-4]" tune "the equivocality of the end" "plays" between "its telos and its 
death [MP 161/1341. " This man works like "an ant at work [Four 125]"; like "an 
insect" that "strangles, compresses, disciplines itself laboriously in the corset of 
annuli. 39" The labour of self-deconstruction takes place within the site of thinking 
structurally delimited by Derrida's "two" - and not multiple or plural - "ends" of 
meta-reflection; And, such tightly controlled ambience of reflection resembles 
something like a "corset of annuli". 
39 In his fascinatingly self-revelatory analysis of the image of ant, Derrida makes the following 
self-observation, intended to be contrasted with his observation of Helen Cixous: 
I will say how I see the difference of dream, between her and me, and why she writes to the dream 
[au revel, if you will, she strides to the dream when she writes, that is, [... ] she gives in writing, she 
gives to write, she advances to the dream, she advances on the dream, she nourishes herself with 
dream but also she strides on it, towards it, she goes to, gives herself up [se rend] to it, in advance, 
while as for me I stride to the interruption of the dream or rather to a certain 
separation/reparation of the dream: I strangle the dream, the dream strangles itself in me, tightens 
and compresses itself:, represses itself; prevails over itself also, like an ant at work, as an insect 
strangles, compresses, disciplines itself laboriously in the corset of its annuli. [Four 125] 
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The double structure of Derrida's deconstructive reflection, accordingly, 
engenders a "double" risk. Derrida's "strategy without finality [MP 7/7]" is to take a 
certain "risk [162-3/134-5], " the mode of which is structurally double: a risk, on the 
one hand, of "deciding to change terrain" of phenomenological reflection by 
"attempting to reinstate the new terrain on the oldest ground, " and a risk, on the 
other, of "sinking into the autism of closure" by "attempting an exit and a 
deconstruction without changing terrain" of the autistic self-reflection, in other 
words, "by repeating what is implicit in founding concepts and the original 
problematic. " In the case of the former, what one risks is naivete, in the latter, 
blindness: one risks either the naivete of the one who claims (s)he heralds a radical 
beginning beyond the tradition, or the blindness of the one who totally allows the 
tradition to determine what (s)he thinks. The twofold risk involved in deconstructive 
reflection, which Derrida describes here, is, in other words, "a risk of cutting the 
ground from under my (his) feet, 40" as he says. It is therefore a double-edged risk. 
What, then, remains in the end? In view of the "double-edged risk" of 
deconstruction, one may ask what such philosophical endeavour can achieve at a 
meta-logical level. A possible answer would be "the loss of security [Wood 1988: 
67]. " The loss of teleological grounds on which Derrida stands, seems to be the very 
end - the end as telos - to which his reflection unfolds: Put paradoxically, the loss of 
aim is what he aims at. What remains, therefore, in the end, is the meta-logical or 
para-logical effects of the discursive movements of self-effacement, i. e. the illusions 
of traces. 
40 This phrase has been quoted earlier in this chapter. The following account of "the deconstruction" 
Miller provided can be read as a faithful exegesis of the point Derrida is making here: 
The deconstruction [... I annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the 
text has already annihilated that ground, knowingly and unknowingly. Deconstruction is not a 
dismantling of the structure of the text but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself. Its 
apparently solid ground is no rock but thin air. [1991: 1261 
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By evoking images of irreducible duality such as "traces" or "trembling" of 
thoughts (as opposed to an image of single linearity such as a "line" of thinking, for 
instance), Derrida aestheticises the meta-logical or para-logical force of 
deconstructive reflection, identifiable as that which resembles (for being still logical), 
and at the same time disturbs (for being "meta"-logical), the self-same order of 
phenomenological self-reflection. What this indicates is that an aestheticisation of the 
infinite yearnings of meta-reflection leads to a textual construction of the 
aesthetically autonomous milieu of thinking; The aesthetic autonomy of a 
self-deconstructive text comes from the fundamental and systematic 
self-referentiality of the self in auto-self-deconstruction. To explain in what sense one 
can say deconstructive move is fundamentally and systematically self-referential as 
opposed to, say, irreducibly other-oriented: the regressive force of deconstructive 
reflection, manifest in the self-referential form of "cutting the ground from under 
one's feet, " is engendered from within the reflective self Derrida's philosophical 
reflection starts from the cogitational self and ends with the cogitational self. 
The key point to be noted, again, is this: In so far as Derrida's texts remain 
self-referential and self-destructively self-referential, i. e. self-corrosive, what they can 
achieve is limited to that extent; they remain aesthetically autonomous and 
epistemologically autistic, in other words, ontologically ungrounded. 
Descartes in a methodologically sceptical phase of thinking also plays this 
Derridian game of self-effacement in the sense that he sets out to reduce the grounds 
of his being, progressively, as it were, i. e. step by step; However, he does so in order 
to see at what point he can terminate this progressive regression. His reflection, albeit 
regressive, unfolds towards a future-oriented goal, a single "end, " which is to 
rediscover the axiomatically irreducible, Archemedian point of self-knowledge. 
Descartes's staging of the cleverest devil, a mirror image of himself in bad faith, is 
therefore a highly strategic tactic. The reason why he invites the evil genius to the 
scenes of self-reflection is to demonstrate that it can be expelled after all. In the end, 
his self-critical self wins over his other self, the self-critical self, the alter ego, the 
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shadow of self-certainty lurking in the abyss of self-doubts; the evil genius is 
therefore the name of the latter self, the self-critical self. After having summoned this 
figure onto the stage of reflection, Descartes then shows how this figure can be 
de-monstrated, that is to say, mastered, by the subsequent turn of the mind. The 
process of Descartes's reflection is that of moving away from monstration towards 
de-monstration. His reflection is therefore inherently a telos-oriented, progressive 
endeavour. In the end, "good, natural reason" prevails. His aim, seen from an 
epistemological point of view, is to achieve the ultimate, reflexive equilibrium of the 
ego of cogito: It is to grasp the moment when the two selves are united into one 
through their reciprocal collaboration. Descartes's reflection strives for, and strides 
towards, goodness, the nature of which is harmony and symmetry as opposed to 
disharmony and asymmetry4l 
The Derridian reflection, by contrast, strives for, and "strides towards42, " 
"interruption" or "disruption. " To use a Cartesian framework of reference, Derrida's 
"risk" can be read as a risk of remaining evil. The process in which Derrida's 
philosophical self-reflection unfolds can be characterised as that of re-monstration or 
ambiguation, as we noted this aspect earlier in this section. Derrida "unhinges43 [MP 
ix/xvii]" the progressive order of dialectical self-reflection by sharpening his 
meta-awareness of the paradoxical mode of Cartesian self-relation. Consequently, 
Derrida's meta-reflective move comes to bring "rupture" to the world of "One" the 
reflective self of Descartes discovers in the course of self-reflexion. Derrida plays this 
"monstrous" game of self-interruption and self-disruption, and does so endlessly; He 
41 Leszek Kolakowski's following remark is highly instructive in this regard: 
The idea of intrinsic goodness, [... ] may be made intelligible by its hypothetical mythological 
origin. The gods in various mythologies are not necessarily good either in the sense of being kind 
and helpful to people or that of providing us with models of moral conduct. [... ] But good in 
mythologies seems to be invariably linked with peace and harmony, evil with war, chaos and 
destruction. Once the myths are sublimated into metaphysical speculation, these elementary 
insights naturally tend to achieve a complete conceptual consistency: if good equals peace and 
harmony, perfect good equals perfect peace and harmony, and this means the perfect absence of 
tension, and thus ultimately, absolute undifferentiation and immobility, or One. [1988: 39] 
42See footnote no. 39 of this chapter. 
43 "de la faire sorlir [... ] coups de ses gonds" 
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endlessly and deliberately complicates, rather than clarifies, the peculiarly duplicitous 
mode of relationship that the self-critical self bears to the self-critical self. 
Derrida's sustained fascination with the image of "com pli-cation, " with the 
image of two different dimensions (e. g. two different orders of self-reflection) 
folded44 together, seems to limit, rather than expand, the scope of his philosophical 
imagination. To illustrate this point, the key issue Derrida raises, for instance, in his 
earliest text on the "dialectics" of Husserlian phenomenology, is not only the problem 
of the beginning, but, that of a particular form of the beginning: the problem of a 
"complicated" beginning: "How can everything begin by/with a complication (par 
une complication)? [Problem vi]. " For Derrida, the beginning is always already 
complicated in the sense that firstly, the starting point of reflections remains invisible 
and hidden to the one who reflects, and secondly, when it "unfolds" itself, it 
immediately dualises its mode of unfolding, hence, a further and systematic 
complication. 
Descartes in self-doubt can envisage the end of his self-reflection, whereas 
Derrida in self-deconstruction cannot. It is because Descartes is committed to 
ontology, whereas Derrida is interested in "hauntology45 (hantologie) [SpecM 
31ff/lOff]. " Descartes is interested in discovering the sum in the reflective "curvature 
of thought [Marion 1982: 80]", thereby, in constituting "reflective ontology46" on the 
basis of the very possibility of self-critique. Descartes in epistemological mode is 
interested in grasping the single moment when the reflexive reason returns to itself 
He attempts to seize upon that which remains unchanged in the dialectical process of 
self-transformation, namely, the self in self-criticism. As if in a countermove, as I 
have been arguing so far, Derrida pursues the line, or rather "traces", of 
self-criticism; He puts into play the haunting force of meta-reflexivity, i. e. the 
4The image of "fold" evoked here is that of -folding" as in the "unfolding" of the course of 
self-reflection, i. e. the exposition or explication of the source and telos of self-reflection. 
45 "Let us call it a hauntology. This logic of haunting [... ] would harbour with itself, but like 
circumscribed places (lieux) or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves. " 
46See introduction [0.2] for an explanation of the meaning of this phrase. 
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discursive force of hauntology. What Derrida does here is to shift the focus of 
self-analysis, to take just "one more step" from Descartes's destination, excessive and 
hyperbolic, to the effect that the Cartesian self of self-criticism comes to be, in turn, 
"haunted" by the "critical" force of meta-reflexive reason at work, which therefore 
comes to disrupt the reflexive equilibrium of Descartes's "good" sense. Like 
Descartes, Derrida stages, in his philosophical texts, the intricate problems involved 
in locating "the self' that can be reduced to, and identified as, an autonomous entity, 
i. e. "the One"; and yet, unlike Descartes, he does not (attempt to) resolve the aporia 
of undecidability. Put the same point in more positive terms, Derrida illustrates, 
rather than articulates, his "undecidability" thesis regarding the location of the self by 
means of a textual staging of the two contending selves in mutual self-destruction, i. e. 
in auto-deconstruction. For Descartes, there is a single self that remains unchanged in 
the course of self-reflection, the ego of ego-cogito. By contrast, for Derrida, such a 
self remains irreducibly and structurally twofold, that is, double; such a binary 
structure of the self then generates the force of reflexive doubling; and such a force of 
reflexive doubling creates a scene of the self in infinite self-reflections. It is this 
structural irreducibility of the force of doubling that haunts Derrida's scenes of 
interminable self-reflection. 
To summarise my arguments so far, the main concern of this chapter was to 
provide an analytic framework in which the following thesis can be further 
articulated: Derrida can be read as a Cartesian thinker. For this, I pointed to some 
methodological similarities between the way in which Descartes's cogito argument 
unfolds and the way in which Derrida's deconstruction stages its self-referential 
movements. Specifically, I focused on the ways in which Derrida appropriates the 
formal-epistemological resources of Cartesian reflexivity, i. e. automaticity and 
recursivity. 
The aim of the chapter, to put it in descriptive terms, was to argue a case that 
Derridian self-reflexivity is derivative from the kind of self-reflexivity constitutive of 
Descartes's cogito argument. The key contention here is that, at a fundamental level, 
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the Cartesian mode of constructive self-reflection which gives rise to the reflective 
ontology, and the Derridian mode of de-constructive self-reflection which produces 
theatrical scenes of reflexive hauntology, these two modes of self-reflection are more 
similar than contrary to each other. They are similar in the sense that the Cartesian 
model of the binarised self in self-reflection determines the formal structure in which 
the Derridian mode of self-reflection unfolds; None the less, they are different in that 
Derrida, unlike Descartes, is without an explicit ontological project. Chapter 3 on 
Derrida's hauntological reflexivity, which will follow shortly, seeks to explicate 
further, by discussing some other examples, such embedded dual structure of 
self-reflection found in the writings of Derrida 
The aim of chapter 1, put polemically, was to show that, first, the reflexive 
style of writing Derrida adopts is not merely a contingent "style, " but a necessary 
"strategy, " and second, such strategy, somewhat over-used, limits or pre-determines 
the ambit of his philosophical trajectory. Derrida's strategy of "ambiguation" consists 
of mobilising and exploiting the mutually cancelling, paradoxical tension arising 
from within the systematically dualised self in self-refutation, i. e. between the self in 
self-criticism and self-criticism. The reflexive complexity in Derrida's mode of 
writing, which I attempted to unravel by using an example of "Je - marque, " invites 
as well as demands closely textual readings of it; The strategic functions of textual 
reflexivity become conspicuous, when one follows through his "web" of thinking 
which, in the end, typically refers back, in a tightly controlled and yet deceptive 
manner, to the starting point of its weaving, namely, Derrida, the writer, the weaver 
of the Derridian text. Pursuing such rhetorical and intra-textual reading, I proposed a 
case of Derrida's deconstructive writing as an aesthetically or epistemologically 
fabricated, intratextual "play" rather than as some mysterious and uncontrollable, 
ontological "event" of writing, which, as he insists, always "surprises" a clever and 
impatient "player who assumes that he has mastered the game"; the "ontological" in 
this context can be understood simply as the marker of un-masterable negativity as in 
the un-known, the in-visible, the un-thinkable, etc. i. e. that which lies beyond the 
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epistemological order of intelligibility and similarly the aesthetic range of creation. In 
the course of arguing for this case, the critical point I raised against Derrida, put 
rather schematically, was that when the way in which a surprise takes place becomes 
predictable, the game is less surprising than it is supposed to be. This degree of 
banality or mannerism evidenced by Derrida's recursively adopted, reflexive strategy 
of writing, I sought to show further, reflects the constitutive limits of his 
deconstructive rationality, i. e. the logocentric limits of hyper-reflexivity. 
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2. Derrida after Descartes: 
Reflexive Hauntology After Reflective Ontology 
Chapter 1 presented a case of Derrida as a Cartesian thinker. Developing this 
line of investigation, Chapter 2 argues a case of Derrida as a radical Cartesian, 
providing a reading of his reflexive hauntology as a radicalised form of Cartesian 
scepticism, that is to say, as a Cartesian epistemology without ontology. The key 
point of contention to be established in this chapter is the following: if Derrida 
remains resistant to ontological Cartesianism, this is because he remains committed, 
instead, to epistemological or methodological Cartesianism, i. e. the reflective mode 
of cogitation. To this end, the chapter seeks to show, in the course of analysing some 
of the hauntological concepts or images that Derrida uses frequently, viz. fold, 
interest, and law, some structural limits and strategic aspects of his reflexive 
hauntology; it presents a reading of the reflexive hauntology as a form of 
meta-reflection, to be more specific, as a performative staging of meta-reflection. 
Highlighted in the course of argument will be the point that the reflexive hauntology 
both thematises (in a theoretical manner) and exposes (in a performative manner) the 
structural dualism inherent in the reflective mode of thinking. The critical point of 
contention this chapter aims to establish, to put it in more general terms by relating it 
to the broader concerns of the thesis, is that, insofar as Derrida promotes his 
hauntologically meta-reflective, philosophical endeavour as not merely one possible 
mode of doing philosophy, but as the only remaining option to take, the scope of his 
philosophical trajectory, thus reflexively inscribed and prescribed, cannot but remain 
necessarily limited to such an extent. 
Anticipating the aforementioned line of argument, this chapter first sets out to 
examine a way in which Derrida thematises the impossibility of reflective ontology, 
i. e. the impossibility to achieve ontology through a reflection on being. The first 
section [2.1], which describes the image of Derrida's "fold" and some others (the 
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image of a block, marks, and traces) in a more discursive set of terms, undertakes this 
task. 
The subsequent section [2.2] aims to expose the constitutive limits of such 
sceptical line of Derrida's meta-reflection, in other words, the extent to which 
Derrida's sceptical move remains ineffectual - ineffectual in the sense that what it 
engenders is only the infinite regress of meta-reflection towards its envisaged impasse 
as opposed to an opening-up of a thought onto an ontological horizon. Highlighted, 
accordingly, will be the structural constraints of meta-reflection: first, the reciprocal 
duality between that which reflects and that which is reflected, and second, the 
epistemological primacy of the former (the reflective subject) over the latter (the 
object thus reflected). To this end, an analysis of Derrida's notion of "interest" and 
his textual use of it will be undertaken. The aim of the analysis is to show that 
Derrida's philosophical reflection on this word "interest" exemplifies a case in which 
an ultra-reflective, i. e. meta-reflective, discursive subject produces or projects the 
"inexhaustible" object of reflection by positing it in advance as its unobtainable telos; 
And to argue this case in Derrida is to contradict his claim that what he intends to 
show in his discourse on "interest" is how the ontology of a thing that "interests" a 
reflective subject in the end resists an epistemological "exhaustion" of it, i. e. a 
discursive mastery over it. The problem my analysis shall seek to point out is that 
Derrida's text on the non-discursive kind of "ontological" interest that escapes and 
transcends the subject-oriented order of reflection ends up affirming, at a 
performative or pragmatic level, the epistemological or discursive centrality of the 
reflective subject. In this sense, what remains irreducible and central in a Derridian 
scene of thinking is the discursive subject in reflection. The key contention here, put 
more polemically, is that the extent to which Derrida's reflection on interest is 
"self-interested" (in the negative, egological sense of the word) is indicative of that to 
which the constitutive reflexivity of his style of thinking lacks an ontological 
dimension. 
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The first section is on Derrida's thematisation of the impossibility of 
reflective ontology, the second, on his reflexive appropriation of his own 
impossibility thesis, and the third, final section [2.3], on his legitimisation of the 
impossibility thesis into a "law" of thinking, the law of "acknowledgement, " as I 
would characterise it, borrowing the word from Derrida himself. To explain here, 
only briefly, what kind of law of thinking it is and what significance the word "law" 
carries in this context, Derrida's law of acknowledgement is a reflexive 
reinforcement of his impossibility thesis; reinforcement in the sense that he 
generalises his thesis on the limits of reflective knowledge into a thesis on the 
constitutive or necessary limits of discursive reason in general; reflexive in the sense 
that such generalising move is self-implicatively totalising so that a move towards the 
acknowledgement of the limited conditions of knowledge becomes integral part of 
his deconstructive strategies that attribute its own discursive shortcomings and limits 
to such universalised predicament of thinking. Accordingly, when Derrida fails to 
achieve the positive effect - if not the "goal" - of deconstruction, i. e. the overcoming 
of the limits of discursive reason, the ultimately disabling condition of 
deconstruction, i. e. the universal limits of discursive reason, which he projects and 
envisages in advance, can justify such failure. When subscribing to such generalised 
and absolutised law of acknowledgement, what one comes to acknowledge, following 
Derrida, is not a local problem in philosophy, but the global "aporia" of philosophical 
reason, in other words, the inevitable and universal limits of philosophical reason in 
general. By making such a totalising move, Derrida's system of deconstruction 
exposes its constitutive limits: In such tightly regulated law of acknowledgement, any 
creative formation of all other possible kinds of philosophical reason that are open to, 
and inclusive of, non-reflective rationality, is a priori disallowed or, put less strongly, 
discouraged. And Derrida makes such prohibitive move, as we will see later, in the 
name of Descartes, "the master [MP 351/295]". 
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2.1 Fold 
Before entering into an analysis of Derrida on "fold, " it would be necessary to 
makes some preliminary remarks on Derrida's hauntology by way of delineating a 
discursive context in which the image of fold becomes central to hauntological 
scenes of Derrida's meta-reflection. The following few pages on Derrida's 
"revenant" aim to provide such framework. 
Cogito, sum: Descartes's sum designates the moment when a self in 
self-reflection returns to itself by way of self-reflexion. It is in this regard that his 
ontology can be characterised as reflective as opposed to pre-reflective or 
non-reflective. Derrida, however, problematises such kind of ontology that is 
constituted on the epistemological basis of reflective reason: any attempt made by 
self-consciousness to gain its self-same identity through self-reflection, he argues, is 
bound to fail. 
The reasons for this failure can be summarised in the following way. Two 
points are to be noted. The first concerns the discursive limits of reflective reason. 
The thought here is that the origin or source of self-reflection cannot be reached via 
reflection, insofar as it is an enabling ground of self-reflection. The principle behind 
this thought is rather simple: the discursive order of cause and effect cannot be 
reversed. The second reason, an intriguing implication of the first, concerns the 
originary duplicity of reflection; "du-pli-city" here signifies two-fold-ness as well as 
deceptiveness. The thought here is that what one designates as the origin of 
self-reflection, the ego of ego-cogito and ego-dubito, for example, is illusions of the 
origin, effects or traces of something more originary at work, and not the origin per se 
which remains unknown to the reflective subject. The originary duplicity, i. e. the 
irreducibly deceptive and twofold quality, of self-reflection has got something to do 
with the irreducible duality of the reflective self; it is the motive of the irreducible 
"double" that demands attention here. The self in a critical mode of self-reflection, 
for example, is always already split into two different selves: one, the observed or 
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projected self, and the other, the observing or projecting self. This internal and 
structural duality of the reflective self leaves a room for a du-pli-citous unfolding of 
the self 
The point that self-reflection carries an irreducibly or constitutively double 
structure, thereby generative of a double discourse within a text on self-reflection, 
can be illustrated by the example of Descartes's evil genius. Seen from a Derridian 
point of view, the evil genius is a personification of the hauntological force of 
hyper-reflection; it represents the ultimate source of duplicity. As Descartes's 
ultimate aim lay in solidifying the grounds of self-certainty rather than in allowing his 
alter-ego in bad faith to keep undercutting such grounds, he needed to eradicate the 
hauntological force of the double in a certain way; and the method he chose was to 
channel the two contending selves into one single self, Hence, the identification of 
the "I" of "I doubt" with the "I" of "I think. " In this regard, one can say, Descartes 
stands firmly in the tradition of unity-oriented philosophies that "suppresses the 
(originary) double, " which Derrida criticises; 
Any attempt to reverse mimetologism or escape it [... ] only amounts to an 
inevitable and immediate fall back into the system: in suppressing the double or 
making it dialectic, one is back in the perception of the thing itself, the 
production of its presence, its truth, as idea, as form, or matter. [Diss 235/ 207] 
A question that is particularly pertinent to our present concern is why then 
Meditationes creates and unfolds the double, in the first place; we are interested in 
Descartes's purpose of staging such suppression of the double. In Descartes's scenes 
of self-reflection, the evil genius is a mediating figure through which a thinker can be 
seen to return to, in other words, to "fall back" on, his thinking self, and it is precisely 
such move of separation or dissociation from the evil genius, staged as such, that 
leads Descartes to, and consequently situates him at, a level of reflection that is 
higher than that of his rival. To explain how this effect is achieved: as long as 
Cartesian Deconstruction 101 Chapter 2: Derrida after Descartes 
Descartes is aware of the very fact that the world he believes to be real could be an 
illusion created by an evil genius, his doubting self itself cannot be further deceived; 
and at least in terms of reflective position, it is Descartes the hyper-reflective thinker, 
and not the evil genius the master illusionist, who has the upper hand. In this regard, 
Descartes's use of such fictional character is strategically economised rather than 
merely "hyperbolic" in that it leads to the solidification of the Archemedian position 
of reflective subject. The move from the initial welcoming of the evil genius to the 
consequential expunging of the source of simulacrum and deception is telling in this 
regard: this shift of focus illustrates that Descartes's telos - up to this point in the 
whole of his Meditations - lies in the restoration of the centrality of the reflective 
self, and not in the fragilisation of the subject position. 
It is, however, this positive aim, this teleological drive, that Derrida questions. 
The issue Derrida raises here is that, once the evil genius is invited into the house of 
philosophy, he cannot be completely driven out of it. The reason for this is explained 
earlier in terms of the originary duplicity of self-reflection. The irreducible duplicity 
of the self of self-reflection haunts Derrida the reflective thinker, and he allows 
himself to be haunted by the self-splitting force of meta-reflection. In short, he 
remains in this reflective site of thinking; he allows the irreducible force of the 
double "returns, remains, and therefore haunts (revenant) [SpecM 25-6,31/6,101" 
him; hence, Derrida's version of cogito: Je reste (I remain, I remain haunted) [C, 
Glas, MA, SpecM, Sur, for example]. 
Egological or epistemological Cartesianism underlies the self-reflexive 
movement of Derrida's hauntology, the haunting march of his "ghost - phantom or 
revenant (revenant) - an absolute figurant, a walk-on who walks on and on, in 
accordance with [Sur 137/91]" some "obsequent logic (1a logique de 
1'obsequence)1"; "there are now only spectres2 [MA 69/68]. " In so far as the 
1 One can understand this "logic" in terms of "the law of acknowledgement" which I explained briefly in 
the introductory part of chapter 2, and which I will elaborate later in a section on Derrida's "law" [2.31. 
2 "I1 n: a plus que des spectres"; see also De I'esprit [37/24iß particularly 37/24,53-4/40,79-80/62, 
97-8/78]; the best and most recent example of his thematic exposition of hauntology is found notably in 
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discursive site of Derrida's self-reflection lies in between that of the cogilo and that 
of the sum, which he names, "Je reste (I remain), " where he stops (Je m'arrete [Sur 
137-8/91-92]), it can be said that Derrida remains committed to staying within the 
phenomenological terrain of thought rather than to break out of it. The Derridian self, 
haunted by the reflexive force of cogitation, remains (caught up) in this terrain, 
following and enacting as an invisible ghost who, without knowing "whither [SpecM 
16/xix, English in original]" it has proceeded from or it leads to, just walks "on and 
on" towards an unforeseeable end of its march. Derrida remains haunted by the 
recursive force of meta-reflection programmatically built in the cogito argument, 
which demands a mechanically ceaseless repetition of the twofold act of 
self-presentation (a representation of the reflective self by means of self-reflexion) 
and self-effacement (an obliteration of the reflected self by means of self-distancing 
meta-reflection), of self-recuperation and self-annihilation, "again and again [SpecM 
32/11, English in original]". He is, to put the same point more strongly, committed to 
remaining haunted by the meta-reflective, recursive force of the cogito, in other 
words, committed to resisting a certain ontological leap into the thought of sum; "the 
spectre is reflected in the shadow of self-reflection [MA 72/68], " in the "eye of a 
darkened intellect3 [Med, AT VII 52/CSM 11 36]. " Derrida's hauntology, in this 
sense, is Descartes's reflective epistemology devoid of its onto(theo)logical basis. It 
is in view of Derrida's implicit and irreducible commitment to methodological 
Cartesianism, exemplified in his hauntological staging of meta-reflection, that one 
can suggest further that he can be read not only as a Cartesian, but a radical one. 
A "trace", a "gesture", a hint of meta-reflective thought, remaining 
tenaciously in the "haunted" texts of Derrida, is an indication that Derrida makes an 
attempt to grasp the end point of reflective regression, the point that will, however, 
Spectres de Marx. 
3I 
should like to pause here and spend some time in the contemplation of God; to reflect on his 
attributes, and to gaze with wonder and adoration on the beauty of this immense light, so far as 
the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it. 
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never be reached. Two reasons why this end point, however, cannot be grasped by 
any means of reflective endeavour, which Derrida himself acknowledges and 
articulates, the early part of this section explained in terms of the impossibility of 
reflective ontology: first, the discursive limits of the reflective model of thinking, and 
second, the originary duplicity of the structure of reflection. Why, then, does Derrida 
insist on staying on this reflective line of thinking? Why this "passionate" pursuit of 
"the impossible"? Let us keep this question in mind, as we go on. At this point, let it 
only suffice to note that one of the "haunting" images by use of which Derrida 
promotes his textual hauntology is what may be described as a "fold (lepli)" of 
reflection, as we will see shortly how this image comes into play. 
The hauntological texts of Derrida are reflexively self-delimited, discursive 
sites where a du-pli-citous play of self-reflection stages itself "again and again"; the 
very fact that Derrida allows his authorial persona to be consistently and persistently 
haunted by the unstoppable movement of regressive self-reflection illustrates that 
such a site of thinking is reflexively generated and thus, in this sense, self-delimited; 
the structural du-pli-city of self-reflection manifests itself in the irreducibly two-fold 
manner in which the unfolding of the self in self-reflection takes place, one, the 
manner of self-effacement, and the other, that of self-recuperation. The "fold" for 
Derrida, which he borrows originally from the texts of Paul Valery [MP 
327-63/275-306] and Stephane Mallarme [Diss 257ff/227ff], and uses with a notable 
frequency throughout his writings, is a figure that marks out the limits and duplicity 
of self-reflection. 
Firstly, the fold (as in a fold in a folded piece of paper that effects a boundary 
between the inside and the outside) represents a barricade, a block, a boundary, i. e. a 
limit. Hence, Derrida's talk of "the impeded march [Frank 1992: 236]" of 
self-reflection on its "barricaded street [Diss 299/268]"; it is that which marks the 
limits of discursive progression of self-reflection - which is to imply, it is that which 
marks the regressive force of self-reflection. Similarly, Gasche's "tain of the mirror 
[1986]", the unreflective foil on the other side of the mirror, also refers figuratively to 
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such limits that reflective reason, by necessity, cannot overcome; by necessity, insofar 
as reflective reason operates, that is to say, un-folds itself, only by means of 
producing its mirror-image, i. e. by means of reflective self-introspection. In this 
context, Derrida's claim that "the fold is not reflexivity4 [Diss 302/270]" can be 
understood as meaning the following: the fold is that which marks the discursive 
limits of reflexivity, and therefore, in this sense, cannot be equated with, or reduced 
to, phenomenological or egological reflexivity itself, the fold refers to that which 
transcends the self-same order of reflexivity. 
Secondly, the fold (as in an unfolding of the self) represents the originary 
duplicity of, or the irreducibly twofold aspect of, a reflective turn of thinking; "a 
trope, a trick, a turn, within an elaborate relay system [Ormiston 1988: 46]"; "the 
deported effect of a turn, a return or detour (1'effet deporte dun tour, retour, ou 
detour) [MP 333/280]. " What is at issue here is the constitutive otherness of the self 
in self-reflection, the presence of the elements of the other within the reflective self, 
within the self that nevertheless, firstly, assumes the possibility of its immediate 
self-presence and secondly, attempts to realise that possibility by means of 
un-mediated self-reflection. For Derrida, the experience of self-reflection is a 
limit-experience: it is an experience of facing a structural impasse (the impasse being 
the "fold" in the first sense described above): it is, to use Derrida's words, an 
experience of "alienation [MP 355/299]" from oneself as well as "alteration [MP 
355/299]" of oneself. Self-reflection is an experience of self-alienation in the sense 
that an event of self-contamination takes place the moment the reflexive self assumes 
that it is in most intimate dialogue with itself, intimate in the sense of not being 
un-mediated; it is also an experience of self-alteration, namely, self-transformation, 
in the sense that self-mediation by means of the other, "by detour", as Derrida puts it, 
is not only a constitutive predicament of the self in self-reflection, but, a necessary 
condition of the possibility of self-reflection. Derrida's reading of Husserl [VPJ, for 
4 "Le pli n est pas une reflexivite. " Barbara Johnson added a word, "form, " to this sentence; 
consequently, her translation reads, "the fold is not a form of reflexivity. " 
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example, illustrates this point about self-reflection as an experience of alterity: his 
deconstructive reading of Husserlian self discloses that Husserl's "pure and ideal" 
discourse of transcendental phenomenological self-reflection is always already 
"contaminated" by the "material force" of signification, namely, by the linguistic 
force of the "T" that obliterates the locus of extra-linguistic pure self by "marking" its 
material presence5. Here, the point of contention Derrida makes, more constructive 
rather than destructive, is that such empiricality or materiality of the language of the 
self - language taken as the other of Cartesian-Husserlian subject of 
self-consciousness - is an enabling condition of self-reflection rather than a 
hampering block in the progressive unfolding of the self in self-reflection. It is in this 
vein that Derrida says [MP 360/303], "an alterity [... ] [is] folded over (repliee)" in the 
source6; the argument here is that the self-transparency of the reflective self is a 
deceptive notion; deception is always already at play in the source; the source of 
self-reflection is originarily and structurally du-pli-citous. The originary 
deceptiveness of self-reflection is ineradicable in the same way the pure origin of 
self-reflection is unobtainable. The "other" that is always already "folded over in the 
source of self-reflection" is an irreducible "alter" ego; it is, for example, the evil 
genius of Descartes who forces a reflective opening of a thinking to take place, rather 
than Descartes who re-flects upon that self-reflectively created figure, reflexively; it 
is the (reflectively open) self in self-critical mode as opposed to the (reflexively 
closed) self in self-critical mode; it is the "Je" of "Je - marque" as opposed to that of 
"Je marque" (see 1.323); it is the self of self-effacement as opposed to the that of 
self-recuperation. One textual effect of such reflective "relay" or "chain [LJ 392/4]" 
of thinking created in the process of self-reciprocation is, as one of the quoted 
passages says above, a kind of "deportation" of the reflective subject. The force of 
self-reflection (a "turning" of the mind) is, in Derrida's description, heterological or 
5The 
same point has been made, performatively, in Derrida's self-inscriptive self-reflection, "Je - 
marque", as we discussed this case earlier [1.323]. 
6 See also [Diss 302-3/270-1] 
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"heterogeneous" in the sense that it leads to a displacement of the self-same self by a 
self that incorporates the other, to a "deportation" of the reflective self from its own 
egological territory; the "source" of self-same reflection is already, he emphasises, 
"the other and plural, " "heterogeneous" [MP 330/277]. In this context, Derrida's 
claim that "the fold is not reflexivity" can be understood as meaning the following: 
the fold is a pre-condition under which the reflexive doubling of the self can take 
place, and therefore, in this sense, cannot be equated with, or reduced to, 
phenomenological or egological reflexivity itself; the fold refers to that which 
produces, whilst retaining an irreducible element of alterity within itself, the 
self-same order of reflexivity. 
Where do then these two thoughts on the fold - the un-masterable 
transcendence of the fold and the originary duplicity of it - lead to? It leads to a 
meta-reflection upon such transcendental duplicity of the fold, which is to say, back 
to hauntology: It does not lead anywhere but, for example, to this: "the fold folds 
(itself) (Le pli (se) plie) [Diss 290-1/258]". 
The fold folds itself, "again and again [SpecM 32/11, English in original]? ", 
regardless of what the reflective subject makes of it (the first point), and despite the 
reflective subject's discursive effort to terminate its duplicitous unfolding (the second 
point). The fold that folds is Derrida's "invisible ghost" who "walks on and on" 
without revealing its true identity. The fold that folds itself is an allegory for both the 
ultimate limits of reflective thinking and reflection's insatiable desire to transcend 
such constitutive limits. The fold is therefore a figure of that which "remains" in 
Derrida's limit-driven, hauntological discourse that attempts to dwell on "the theme 
of that which cannot be thematised8 [MP 332/279]"; it is what mobilises the negative 
prefix, the "de=' of de-construction, the "dis-" of deconstructive dis-integration of 
unity as in "the movement of disjointing (desajointment), disjunction, or 
7This 
phrase has been introduced earlier in this chapter. 
8 "Le theme de ce qui ne se laissepas thematiser"; my suggestion is that we translated this passage into 
"the theme of that which does not allow itself to be thematised. " 
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disproportion: in the inadequation to self [SpecM 16/xix]. "; in this way, a march of 
the fold unfolds, "on and on, " towards its unforeseen end that remains double 
(du-pli-citous), "out of joint". 
The direction in which this ghostly march of the fold unfolds is regressive 
rather than progressive, and this can be said in view of the following. A 
deconstructive move is irreversibly self-referential in that what the limit-driven line 
of reflection ends up pointing to is its own failure to overcome its envisaged limits, 
i. e. its inadequacy. Put the same thought differently, a sense of structural limits 
predetermines the direction in which deconstructive reflection unfolds, and to this 
extent, the structure of auto-deconstruction as a whole remains self-reflexively 
self-closed; Derrida's fold is a loop of abyssal self-reflexivity in which a reflective 
thinker comes to be caught. 
The failure to recapture the presence of the gaze outside the abyss into which it 
is sinking is not an accident or weakness; it illustrates or rather figures the very 
chance of the work (il figure la chance meme de I'zuvre), the spectre of the 
invisible that the work lets be seen (donne a voir) without ever presenting. [MA 
69/68] 
For Derrida, the "very" failure of reflection becomes a chance for another 
reflection. The passage introduced above shows at least two things: first, a regressive 
movement of deconstructive self-reflection, and second, the productive 
regressiveness of such movement. The rest of this section will focus on the second 
point that relates to the deconstructive economy of regressive reflection; the specific 
point to be noted here, to put it in Derrida's own words, is that the experience of 
failure "sets to work (mise en a uvre)[MA 69/68]" the "very" operation of hauntology. 
A thematic link between this particular point on the productive regressiveness of 
deconstructive move and the broader concern of this section - an analysis of Derrida's 
"fold" as a central trope governing his deconstructive discourse on the limits of 
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reflective rationality - will begin to emerge in the following paragraphs, which set out 
to interpret the experience of failure at issue as an experience of cogito. 
Staged in the passage quoted is Derrida's initial step into the abyss of 
"spectral" self-reflexivity; the "initiation" is to be read, accordingly, as an opening 
move (as in an "opening"-up of the entrance to a labyrinthine garden) rather than as a 
starting point (as in a "starter" in a three-course meal presented in a linear order). In 
Derrida's frame of thinking thus opened up, to "gaze outside the abyss" is impossible, 
for the gaze automatically "sinks (back) into" the same abyss, in other words, for the 
gaze is only present within, rather than outside, the reflexively constituted frame of 
thinking. Hence, "the failure to recapture the presence of the gaze outside the abyss 
into which it is sinking". What this illustrates is that "the gaze outside the abyss" is 
not merely a contingent impossibility, but a structural or logical one; any attempt to 
break out of the given framework of thinking is, however recursively it may be made, 
bound to fail, for the frame is the abyss, or rather, for there is nothing but the abyss 
outside the frame in the sense that to venture "outside" the frame, in this case, is to 
fall back "into" another larger frame of abyss. The abyssal frame of recursive 
reflexivity leads to the failure of a self-reflecting self to capture the gaze of the self, 
the gaze of the Veye that returns to itself, "again and again", hauntingly. 
The failure to capture the gaze of the self by reflexion not only leads to an 
infinite regress of reflection, but, here Derrida emphasises, "figures the very chance 
to work (Il figuare la chance meme de 1'ceuvre)"; the point to note here is that such 
failure can be made productive as long as the limit-experience engenders a series of 
subsequent reflections. A significant part of the oeuvre of Derrida demonstrates his 
point performatively; for example, his persistently and consistently regressive move 
towards that which cannot be reflected can be shown, most explicitly, in his 
sustained, meta-philosophical reflections on the "blink" of an eye (augenblick [VP]), 
on the "point of speculum9 [MP, 353/296], " on the blind spot of speculation 
9 "Point of speculum: here I am blind to my style, deaf to what is most spontaneous in my voice. " 
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(punctum caecumlO [MA]), namely, on the transcendental dimension of 
self-reflection that escapes the phenomenological attention of the self-reflective 
subject, for itself being an enabling condition of such reflection. 
If not Derrida himself, some commentators see, rightly, a certain systematic, 
conceptual link between Derrida's philosophical regressiveness - manifest in the 
consistent direction in which his thinking unfolds - and Descartes's cogitational 
model of thinking. Consequently, Derrida's thematic preoccupation with the 
"blindspot" of self-reflection is often identified as a sustained theoretical interest in 
"the moment before the statement of the cogito [Bennington 1991: 116], " i. e. the 
moment of "prereflexive cogito - before the "I think" can be reflected upon and 
pronounced [Spivak, OG Ix, translator's preface]. " 
Whether, then, this Derridian, pre-reflexive moment that comes "before" the 
moment of reflexive cogito is, or can be, conceived by Derrida in a radically or 
completely non-reflexive manner, neither Bennington nor Spivak asks further in any 
specific manner. The following passage from Derrida, which shows the element of 
recursive regressiveness inherent in the movement of thinking the avant (before), 
suggests that the answer is negative. 
What announces itself as ineluctable seems in some way to have already 
happened, to have happened before happening, to be always in a past, in 
advance of the event. Something began before me, the one who undergoes the 
experience. I am late. If I insist upon remaining the subject of that experience, it 
would have to be as a pre-scribed, pre-inscribed subject, marked in advance, by 
the imprint of the ineluctable that constitutes the subject without belonging to 
it. I 1 [D 598/2] 
10 What the self-portrait shows - and Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind catalogues - is the inability of 
the source point or punctum to be thcmatised or drawn, that it is instead always drawn away from 
its destiny, destination, or fatality. Its logic dc-monstrates the spectre of the invisible, lets it be 
seen without ever appearing. [Vallier 1997: 205] 
1t ce qui s annonce comme inllutable semble tire en quelque sorte dcjd arrive, arrive avant 
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"Something began before me, the one who undergoes the experience"; this 
"something" is that which precedes the time of the Cartesian cogito, that which 
comes as a pre-condition for the possibility of the cogito - language, for example, as 
we have discussed this case earlier in chapter 1. Derrida's "I" of "I am late" is, in this 
regard, an extension or deferral, rather than an eradication or deletion, of Descartes's 
"I" of "I am". A Derridian, parenthetical variation on Descartes's cogito argument 
would be: I think (belatedly), therefore, I am (late); I think "belatedly" in the sense 
that a thought of "I think" is, in fact, according to Derrida, an effect of something 
more originary at work - e. g. a work of language - rather than an un-mediated, 
immediate self-knowledge. With this reformulation of "I am" into "I am late", the 
pure "r' of "I am" unadulterated by any implicated belatedness or inadequacy is 
therefore merely pushed ahead, i. e. deferred infinitely, rather than completely 
obliterated or abandoned. This is a reason why Derrida "insists on remaining" in this 
scene of self-reflection as "the subject of experience" that undergoes, and undergoes 
willingly, the metaphysical ordeals of regressive cogitation. Although this pure "I" of 
"I am" remains uncapturable for the systematic and logical reasons of which the "I" 
of "I am late" is well aware, Derrida's experiential subject, nevertheless, marches 
towards it; the I of "I am late" that always already lags behind the I of "I am", 
nevertheless, keeps on making the recursively regressive movement of thinking the 
avant. To extrapolate this point, the avant, this Derridian moment that comes 
"before" the moment of pre-reflexive cogito, is already a reflexive concept, i. e. a 
reflexively acknowledged force of regressive cogitation that un-folds, therefore, 
reflexively. To acknowledge such force of cogitation is to allow in advance the 
regressive mode of self-reflection to set in as a norm; this force has been 
d'arriver, toujours passe, en avance sur 1 evenement. Quelque chose a commence avant mol qul 
enfais 1 'experience. Je Buis en retard Si j insiste pour en rester le sujet, ce serail en taut que 
sujet prescrit, pre-inscrit, d'avance marque par 1 emprenite de 1'ineluctable qui le constitue 
sans lul appartenir. 
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characterised earlier as "spectral"; this force, Derrida characterises here, following 
Lacoue-Labarthe, as "ineluctable" - ineluctable is the need to think the "before" 
before thinking the "now". 
A productive kind of cogitational regressiveness is also found in Descartes's 
text. The way in which Derrida economises on a sustained experience of failure (the 
failure to capture the precise moment of sum) is reminiscent of Descartes in the 
second Meditatione, where, as Derrida would say, "the very failure" to negate the 
sum "sets" the argument "to work. ": "as long as I am thinking, I cannot be nothing 
[... ]I am something, and therefore, I am12. " Observe, here, the movement of a 
thought in which "not-nothing" becomes reflexively identified as "something" by the 
I, the reflexive subject, who holds these two thoughts together at once; observe 
Descartes's awareness of "not-nothing" which becomes automatically economised 
into a meta-awareness of "something"; observe the fixity of the thought of 
"something" with which all the previous regressive thoughts (that I may be, after all, 
nothing) come to an end, the kind of fixity that remains as yet epistemological (which 
Descartes reinforces later on a more solid onto-theological ground) as opposed to 
ontological or theological. The reflexive fixing of a thought of "not-nothing" into a 
thought of "something", viewed in this regard, can be described as an epistemological 
economisation of cogitational regressiveness. 
Now, the regressive movement of Derrida's "avant", one can observe further 
in this context, unfolds at the point where Descartes's I of "I am something" assumes 
that it has achieved its reflexive equilibrium; Derrida's "I" thinks, instead, "I am 
something, and yet, something that began before me, something that remains yet to be 
12 I am referring to the following passage introduced earlier in chapter 1, where I thematised the 
automaticity and recursivity of the movement of a thought from "I am not nothing" to "I am 
something": 
[... ] Let him (a deceiver of supreme power and cunning) deceive me as much as he can, he will 
never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am something. So after considering 
everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. [Mod 11, AT VII 
25/CSM 11 171 
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seen". Hence, the search goes on; Derrida's limit-driven discourse draws on this 
philosophical need for something more originary and fundamental, i. e. something that 
remains yet to be seen, and this need remains hauntingly irreducible, i. e. 
inexhaustible. This need, Den-ida describes as "scopic pulsion, voyeurism itself [MA 
72/68]"; this irreducible force of scopic reason, he characterises here, again, as 
something "spectral, " i. e. invisible and yet operative, consistent and yet disruptive. 
Given that the spectral is, as Derrida suggests in Memoires d'aveugle, 
derivative from specular "pulsion, " would it not be, after all, somehow reducible to 
the specular or speculative, to a certain extent? This seems to be the case, for, in 
Derrida's system of "scopic pulsion, " the self that adheres to itself in the endlessly 
self-splitting speculation on itself is the self that appears to itself in the ceaselessly 
self-disruptive spectralisation of itself. The point is that the spectral marks not only 
the limits of the speculative, but, more pointedly, the insatiability of speculation's 
completion-drive; which is to imply that the Derridian economy of reflexion is still 
speculative to this extent, and to this exact extent of incompletion thus measurable. In 
this sense, it can be argued that in Derrida's case, in contrast to Descartes's, this 
desire for a scopic mastery over the self is epistemologically oriented rather than 
ontologically grounded; Further philosophical implications of the difference at stake 
will be discussed in the following two paragraphs with which the current section 
concludes. 
To use Derrida's paradigm of philosophical thinking in which a metaphysical 
desire for the origin of the self is characterised as a certain "scopic pulsion, " a 
"voyeuristic" instinct, Descartes's textual staging of the evil genius who would 
otherwise remain invisible can be read as a metaphysical thinker's attempt to 
visualise, i. e. de-spectralise, an inner ghost, who out-thinks the thinker, who would 
therefore force the thinker to reflect on himself "again and again". Such metaphysical 
visualisation of an alter ego, which leads to the textual invention of the evil genius, 
unfolds in a tightly controlled and consecutive manner, in which the privileging of the 
category of the epistemological over that of the onto-theological is implicit. That is to 
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imply, in Descartes, the aim of reflection, to use Derridian diction, would be the 
de-spectralisation (meaning, clarification) of the world, as opposed to the 
spectralisation of it to which Derrida's deconstructive project is committed. In 
Descartes's case, firstly, there is a reflectively open, disruptive move, namely, the 
emergence of the evil genius. A deliberative manner in which the hypothesis of an 
evil genius unfolds suggest that Descartes, at this stage of meditation, does draw on 
what has been described as the "spectral" force of regressive cogitation; regressive, in 
the sense that, at this point, the meditator "steps back" from - rather than progresses 
into - the world at large by leaving the possibility open that perhaps the whole thing 
may be an illusion, the possibility that, as Derrida would say, there may be 
"something that comes before" him. In the face of such metaphysical threats, 
Descartes, secondly, makes a reflexively closed, stable move. The reflexive resiliency 
or equilibrium of the cogito, which Descartes discovers in the course of equating the I 
of "I am threatened by a thought of the hypothetical evil genius" with the I of "I am 
thinking that conjectural thought, " comes to block any further possibility of sceptical 
self-corrosion. Such an economised manner of thinking, in which the operative 
boundary of the evil genius comes to be delimited13 by Descartes's subsequent turn 
of reflexion on the very hypothetical thought, suggests that Descartes's telos-oriented 
economy of thinking - the telos being the discovery of the unshakeable 
onto-theological foundations of knowledge - does not allow, any more within its 
system, a hypothetical or discursive space in which a further thematisation of the 
spectral can take place, the spectral here taken as that which remains potentially 
invisible in, and disruptive of, a stable system of reflexive cogitation. Accordingly, 
the point where the consequential self-reflexive closure of a thought takes place 
corresponds to the point where the ultimate expunging of the evil genius from the 
1 3The question of whether or not such delimitation is successful or valid lies beyond the scope of this 
study; the current analysis, as well as the thesis as a whole, focuses on the question of how the 
delimitation takes place. 
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system, after the initial welcoming of it, is also staged: "he will never bring it about 
that I am nothing so long as I think I am something. So, [... ] I am. I exist. " 
"Scopic pulsion, voyeurism itself is always on the lookout for the originary 
ruin [MA 72/68]. " Derrida's system of reflection, a priori lacking any 
onto-theologically grounded telos, and thereby built upon, if nothing else, its own 
reflective drive, cannot eradicate the spectral presence of a corrosively 
intra-systematic, sceptical move, namely, a meta-reflective move that regresses into 
its envisaged limits, into its "originary ruin"; the ontological basis of deconstruction 
is envisaged as a "ruin, " because Derrida thinks that a pristinely preserved origin is a 
priori unobtainable, for the reasons of the impossibility of reflective ontology. Then, 
what such system of thinking, embedded in a reflective structure of limit-thinking, 
can do alternatively is to attempt to thematise the very regressive force of reflective 
reason that infinitely delays the system's entry into an ontological ground. And in 
Derrida, the thematisation of the impossibility of reflective ontology takes place in a 
manner of theatrical self-exposure, or put less strongly, self-exposition; The 
self-referential texts of Derrida consistently and persistently stage the aporia of a 
hyper-reflective move in which the reflective self, on the one hand, seeks its 
ontological ground that renders its phenomenological self-reflection possible, and on 
the other, acknowledges in advance the ultimate futility of such endeavour. Hence, 
Derrida's "insistence" upon tracing back "something that comes before" him, this 
aporetic "something" that "remains, " and yet cannot be, seen, viz. the spectre and the 
fold. When Derrida follows this alternative, "aporetic" path of regressive and yet 
productive self-corrosion, what his texts produce is philosophical dramas of 
self-reflexion; Derrida the thinker is stuck in the loop of an epistemological mirror 
play in which Descartes the self-doubter, haunted by his own hypothesis of an evil 
genius, is also caught; Derrida the writer, stuck in such milieu of thinking, creates a 
world of his own. Allegedly, however, what Derrida the self-deconstructor "looks out 
for" is a pre-reflexive ontological ground of the self, and not some kind of a loop of 
reflexivity. Facing such a hypothetical objection to the line of reading pursued so far, 
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one will then have to show further how Derrida's epistemological loop of reflexivity 
creates an illusion of ontology from within, in other words, how a putative 
ontological basis of deconstruction, "for which" the deconstructive self is "on the 
look out, " is fabricated rather than discovered by Derrida the reflexive writer: this is 
the task of the next section which offers a close reading of Derrida's "interest". 
2.2 Interest 
What Derrida looks "out" for, i. e. the ontological basis of the deconstruction 
of the self, ends up being swallowed up in a loop of egological self-reflexivity: the 
ultimate resiliency of the reflexive self, exemplified in Derrida's philosophical 
reflection on the notion of "interest (interet)" [VPT 5-18/1-13], is the object of 
analysis in this section. 
What is at issue, to state it in broader terms before detailing my argument, is 
the embedded or irreducible self-referentiality of Derrida's deconstructive move. 
With this in mind, I will seek to explicate the extent to which Derrida's putative 
attempts to go "beyond" the subject-oriented terrain of self-referential or 
self-reflexive reflections can be seen as gestural in the negative sense of the word. 
The aim of such investigative reading of Derrida is to problematise his impassioned 
claim that the deconstructive force of thinking lies in its radical "exteriority"; and his 
contention will be problematised on the grounds that a highly structuralised and 
strategically exploited, regressive self-reflexivity of the self, i. e. an element of 
ineradicable interiority, is detectable in his milieu of thinking; the interior, in this 
case, refers to the reflective self, the thinking ego, whose epistemological centrality, 
as I will show, is reflected in the compositional aspects of his text. What is to be 
highlighted in the course of analysis, in other words, is that Derrida's hyper-reflective 
model of thinking, in which an envisaged impasse of reflection induces an 
"ineluctable" meta-reflection on the impossibility of the completion of reflection, is 
more centre-oriented than, as Derrida claims, "marginal [MP]". In short, the 
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following is a sceptical - sceptical in the sense of being resistant - reading of the 
putative "exteriority" or "marginality" of Derrida's deconstructive mode of thinking. 
The key point of contention underlying the resistant mode of reading Derrida thus 
proposed, to put it more polemically and schematically, is that the putative radicality 
of deconstruction's move towards its "other, " towards its "outside, " remains feigned, 
and does so to the exact extent that deconstruction also reflexively envisages the 
impossibility of such other-oriented move, in other words, to the extent that this 
double gesture of "thinking the impossible" remains self-referential; there remains, in 
the end, no outside in Derrida's deconstructive system of thinking in the sense that, 
firstly, the outside is reflectively posited or created meta-systematically as the 
unreachable destination of reflection, and secondly, his subsequent, cogitational 
gesture towards such other is thereby automatically subject to the reflexive force of 
further meta-systematic interiorisation of the outside thus posited 
intra-systematically. How this movement of the meta-reflexive interiorisation of the 
other takes place, the following analysis of a way in which Derrida's discourse on 
"interest" unfolds aims to show. With an explication of Derrida's strategy of reflexive 
writing detectable here, what has been referred to as the "meta-"dimension of 
Derrida's discourse (meta-systematicity or meta-reflexivity) will become clearer. 
For Derrida, the "other" is that which remains un-interiorisable in the 
reflexive economy of the same, in other words, that "on" which the self-same self of 
self-reflection "cannot get a grip [Spivak 1995: 244]": it is what lies "outside" the 
range of intelligibility the reflective reason delimits. A case of such other Derrida 
presents in the inaugural part of La Verite en Peinture, "Passe-Partout"[VPT 
5-18/1-13], is an inexhaustible dimension of the concept of "interest"; inexhaustible 
in the sense that a thing that interests, i. e. engages, Derrida the reflective subject, 
possesses a quality of not only being interesting to him, but, more importantly, 
"remaining [VPT 8/4]" interesting even after he ceases to take interest in it, that is to 
say, even if he decides that there is nothing more interesting in it. Accordingly, the 
dimension of a thing on which Derrida becomes interested in reflecting further is that 
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which remains beyond his reflective grasp of it, which "exceeds and overflows [8/4]" 
his "discursive doing (unfaire discussij) [8/4], " i. e. reflective endeavour; it is this 
dimension that interests Derrida, the meta-reflective thinker. 
Derrida's thesis underlying this meta-reflective move is the following: a 
thing that is not merely interesting, but inexhaustibly interesting, seen from an 
ontological point of view, has a priority over the epistemological subject who shows 
interest in it: a thing that remains ceaselessly interesting, to use Derrida's diction of 
economy, keeps to itself its ontological "fund (fonds) [VPT 17/121" from which the 
epistemological subject derives its discursive "interests": it keeps creating its "surplus 
value (plus-value) [VPT 9/5]. " The ontological is therefore, by analogy, the capital or 
stock, the immovable properties of a given thing; what the epistemological subject 
does then is to "bank (faire fonds) [17/12]" on it - this act of "banking, " Derrida 
describes as "discursive doing". 
A similar move to ontologise the epistemological notion of "interest" is also 
found in Heidegger's "interesse14, " the "inter-esse" that lies at the centre 15 of a 
thing, in medial res, which does not cease to engage the one who remains thus 
interested in the thing at hand. Arguably, in this regard, one can say that Derrida's 
notion of interest adds an economic dimension to Heidegger's, an effect of which is 
an added focus on the discursive subject caught up in the "interest"-driven economy 
of thinking; what this signifies is that Derrida focuses not only on the uncapturable, 
ontological pole in the notion of interest, but more significantly at a practical and 
textual level, on the epistemological pole. A result of this move, which we are going 
14 "Interest, inleresse, means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the centre of a thing 
and to stay with it [Heidegger 1993: 371J. " 
15 Note the similarity between Derrida's notion of interest and Heidegger's: 
When I write "what interests me, " I am designating not only an object of interest, but the place that 
I am in the middle ot(le lieu au milieu de guol je suts) and precisely the place that I cannot exceed 
or that seems to me to supply even the movement by which to go beyond that place or outside of it. 
[... ] This value of interest is thus no longer an object for demonstration. [... J Once it envelops or 
exceeds [... J our whole "history, " "language, " "practice, " "desire, " and so forth, the modes of 
demonstration should no longer be prescribed or coded by anything that belongs simply within 
these borders. [Poi 72/67-8] 
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to highlight in this section, is that he constantly envisages the impossibility to reach 
the ontological dimension of the notion of interest by pushing it ahead beyond the 
"border" of intelligibility. The ontological dimension of an interesting thing, which 
precedes and induces Derrida's epistemological unfolding of it, is an example of his 
"other", a case of "something that comes before him"; Derrida envisages not only the 
coming of the other, but the coming close to, if not becoming one with, the other; the 
latter move can be characterised as, to stay with his analogy of economy, as an 
economic approximation of the other. 
Derrida's opening line stages his thesis on the ontological priority of the 
other that comes before the reflective self: "Someone, not me, comes and says the 
words: "I am interested in the idiom of truth in painting [VPT 5/1]. '"' And with this, 
much anticipated is his focusing on the reflective self that economises on the other, 
on the "coming" of the other, i. e. on the sentence thus given; "Passe-Partout [VPT 
5-18/1-13]" as a whole is a subsequent series of reflections on this single sentence. 
Derrida begins his discourse on the truth of painting by writing "four times around 
(autour) painting [VPT 14/9], " as if the given sentence were a painting; each time, he 
writes differently about, and yet always in reference to, the words of a hypothetical 
stranger, who suddenly comes to him and says abruptly, "I am interested in the idiom 
of the truth in painting. " Derrida begins by speculating on the intention of the one 
who utters this, who has already "come" to him, before him. 
Here, we are not concerned with the question of what Derrida's four 
different interpretations16 of the sentence are; we are concerned with the question of 
why he is "interested, " in the first place, in brining a figure of the outsider into his 
discourse. In short, we are not interested in the result of Derrida's speculations, but in 
the motive of his undertaking. The question is twofold: first, what is it that Derrida, 
16 Derrida lists, as follows, four different interpretations, amongst other possible ones [VPT 9-12/5-7], 
of what the "I" of "I am interested in the idiom of the truth in painting" is interested in: when the 
hypothetical stranger utters this sentence, by "the idiom of the truth in painting" he may mean one or 
some or all of the following things: "1. that which pertains to the thing itself, 2. that which pertains to 
adequate representation in the order of fiction; 3. that which pertains to the picturality; 4. that which 
pertains to truth in the order of painting. " 
Cartesian Deconstruction 119 Chapter 2: Derrida after Descartes 
by initiating such hypothetical discourse, purports to problematise?; second, in what 
way does he prove his point? 
First, what is Derrida's point? By saying emphatically and carefully that he 
writes "around" painting, "around" the sentence given to him, as opposed to "about" 
it, what Derrida purports to show is that "the frame is missing17 [VPT 5/1]"; the 
frame of reference is already missing, the frame, in this case, being the objectively 
definable context in which the sentence is uttered. To put the same point in different 
words he used in a different context [MP 327/389] 18, the upshot of Derrida's 
argument is that insofar as the "exhaustion" or "saturation" - i. e. a clear delimitation - 
of the context from which a text arises is impossible, the acquisition of the true - true, 
in the sense of being objectively locatable - meaning(s) of the text is a priori 
"prohibited (interdit)". Accordingly, the difference between thinking "about" the 
given sentence and thinking "around" it, in this context, amounts to that between the 
objective19 or phenomenal visibility of the frame of reference both the speaker (the 
hypothetical stranger) and the listener (Derrida) shares, and the invisibility, if not the 
absence, of such referentially restraining context; by "the frame is missing, " Derrida 
must not mean that the frame as such is absent, but that it remains operative and yet 
invisible, for, without a certain, minimal and axiomatic, assumption of the 
transcendental fixity of such discursive constraints, his discourse cannot even stay 
"around" the given sentence; the "frame" that remains invisible here is to be 
understood as a kind of ontological anchor of his discourse. Hence, Derrida's 
necessity to write "around" the given words by speculating on, without deciding, 
17 "Les Bords dun contexte s evasent. " 
18 By pointing to the uncontrollable reiterability of signature as an example of the undecidability of 
context, Der ida problematises a logocentric tendency in Austin's speech act theory: Austin's tendency 
to take for granted the intelligibility or centrality - i. e. decidability - of the speaker's intention. [See 
"Signature Evdnement Contexte, " in MP 365-93/307-30]. 
19when I write "what interests me, " I am designating not only an object of interest, but the place that 
I am in the middle of (le lieu au milieu dc quoi je suis) and precisely the place that I cannot exceed 
or that seems tome to supply even the movement by which to go beyond that place or outside of it. 
[... ] This value of interest is thus no longer an objectfor demonstration. [Poi 72/67-8] (This 
passage has been introduced earlier in this section. ) 
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what the true meanings of them could be. What "remains" in the end in the single 
sentence thus given, Derrida goes on to claim in this regard, is "the savings of a 
natural language [... ] capable of [... ] saying so many things in so few words [VPT 
8/4]. " These "so many things, " Derrida argues, cannot be exhaustively explicated in 
any discursive manner; they are, accordingly, that which induces the labour of 
explication, e. g. Derrida's "discursive doing" in his text; four examples of those "so 
many things (tant de choses), " Derrida himself provided. 
The fact that it is Den-ida himself, and not the hypothetical stranger, the 
other, who does the discursive labour, can be a starting point with which we can 
pursue our second question: in what way does Derrida prove his thesis on the 
inexhaustibility of the ontological "savings" of language? The answer is: 
performatively. By the performative mode in which Derrida makes an exposition of 
his thesis on the inexhaustibility of the ontological, I mean, broadly, his strategy of 
textual staging, and specifically in this context, his strategy of what may be called 
self-parasitism. What his text on interest shows performatively, rather than articulates 
discursively, is how the ontology of interest remains productive, and for that reason, 
resists an epistemological mastery over it; four instances of the productive resistance 
of the ontological have been put on display in his text. And this mode of 
demonstrating a thesis is self-parasitic in the sense that Derrida justifies his point 
self-referentially. That is to say, his failure to catch "the frame that is missing", i. e. 
his inability to grasp the ontological truth about interest, staged as such, becomes the 
evidence that supports his argument. By describing this self-referential mode of 
argument as "self-parasitic", what I intend to highlight is the economic dimension of 
his self-justificatory move: Derrida sticks to his case of failed reflection, showing it 
as an example of his thesis on the impossibility to reach the ontological. The general 
point to note here is that, in Derrida's text, the element of textual performativity is 
not external but internal to the formation of a discursive structure. With this, the more 
specific point I am making is that the intra-textual staging of an envisaged thesis 
effects a reflexive form of argument; Derrida's "discursive doing" takes place only 
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within such a self-reflexively delimited site of reflective thinking, and for this reason, 
the validity of Derrida's argument thus presented in a performative fashion cannot be 
tested outside the very loop of self-involving self-reflexivity he has carefully 
engineered. 
To clarify what has been referred to as the engineered - that is, strategic - 
aspects of Derrida's textual performativity: Derrida's "discursive doing" involves 
both the performative self and the discursive self at once; Derrida the performer 
shows something - his "doing" something - and Derrida the theorist becomes parasitic 
on his performative self when he draws on it by using it as a justificatory, 
demonstrative basis of his theory. The textual strategy he adopts, in an attempt to 
thematise an "un-thematisable" and un-interiorisable, ontological force of "interest, " 
is to demonstrate, in advance, how his discourse itself is subject to this force at issue. 
This is a good example of the peculiarly self-parasitic way in which Derrida's 
theoretical text is "already an application, so there is no separate "Derrida" in the 
form of theory who might then be applied to something else [Bennington 1996: 17]. " 
The systematic, textual conflation of the two different orders of writing, one, 
discursive, and the other, performative, results in the creation of a self-closedly 
reflexive text that stages the reciprocity between the two by continuously unfolding 
its internal "trait (connection, pertaining) [VPT 9,13/5,8], " i. e. by rendering visible 
the hidden and tight reciprocity. This way, the two un-identical dimensions 
appropriate each other: they are parasitic on each other; on the one hand, Derrida 
thematises an ontological truth about interest, according to which the reflective self 
interested in something is structurally "prohibited" from gaining an epistemological 
mastery over it, and on the other hand, he applies to his own writing his theory of 
ontological "prohibitionism, " as it were, by setting out to write "around, " as opposed 
to writing within, the frame of reference that, as he claims from the start, remains 
invisible. To conclude: Derrida's writing on interest is a reflexive application of his 
theory on interest, and such constitutive and therefore ineradicable, meta-reflexivity 
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that underlies the structure of his performative argument indicates that his discourse 
is self-interested in the egological sense of the word. 
To point to the fundamental self-interestedness of Derrida's discourse is to 
highlight the egological centrality of Derrida's writing self. And to view Derrida the 
writing subject as one who creates a textual world of his own is to argue against 
Derrida, the thinker of "the other": it is to argue, specifically, against Derrida who 
allegedly seeks the ontological truth about non-egological interest, and more 
generally, against Derrida who contends [LJ 391/420] that the self of 
self-deconstruction, although "wholly enigmatic, " is not, in any case, that of 
"egological self-reflexivity". 
Derrida's point of contention, demonstrated as such, is that, when he writes, 
that which writes is not Derrida the author in control, but Derrida a spectre of 
writing; when Derrida writes "around" a thing the frame of reference of which 
remains invisible to him, the one who writes, he claims, is not Derrida, the reflexively 
self-controlling, writing subject, but Derrida who loses his egological self-reflexivity, 
led by some "enigmatic" and ghostly thing - e. g. the mysterious, ontological truth 
about interest that an interesting thing keeps to itself - that induces his "inaugural 
adventures" into the unknown. 
My point of contention, posed against Derrida's, is that the organisational 
meta-reflexivity of his text makes Derrida the writer looking more contrived than 
enigmatic; more playful than "rigorous"; more self-parasitic than "other"-involving; 
more, in fact, epistemologically oriented than, as he claims, ontologically committed. 
First, contrivedness: Derrida, the weaver, fabricates a text, a whole text, which 
includes a hole21 within itself - the hole, in his text on interest, is a sense of 
20 "[... ] The se of "se deconstruire, " which is not the reflexivity of an ego or of consciousness, bears 
the whole enigma. " 
21 Do not forget that to weave is first (d'abord) to make holes (trouer), to traverse (traverser), to 
work (travailler) one-side-and-the-other of the warp (le part-d-d autre de /a chafne). [MP 
xxv/xxviiij 
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irrecuperable gap between the ontological and the epistemological, generated by the 
failure to capture the ontological truth about interest. And the hole thus created leaves 
a room for the reflexive creation of textual "traits" - the traits, in his text on interest, 
are the four instances of writing "around" the given sentence. Second, playfulness: by 
creating "a kind of chain (un enchalnement) of security, of quasi-continuous 
plenitude which [... ] makes these ciphers resemble the thing itself [MP 347/2921, " 
Derrida himself shows a tendency to pursue something central as opposed to 
"marginal", a kind of metaphysical tendency he criticises22 as "logocentric" that 
privileges the terms denoting the centre, e. g. the self-same self, self-presence, 
self-consciousness, essence, Being, etc. The centre in Derrida's text is the reflexive 
self, a sort of [VP 15-16/15-16] of "hold (prise)" "protected" and "repeated" by the 
"oblique, laborious and tenacious endeavour of phenomenology" of the self. By 
drawing on the cogitational force of reflexivity, Derrida initiates a textual game of 
reflexivity that stages a "tightly woven play on succession [MP xxv/xxviii]"; 
Let us not rush [... ]. Never miss a twist or fold [... ]. Compulsively. 
As is said in common French: never miss a one (ne pas en manquer une). 
[D 606/10] 
Compulsion rather than rigour would be a better word to characterise Derrida the 
player, who is playful enough to stage his own compulsive self-analysis, that is to say, 
who is not rigorous enough to call into question the stylised, methodological 
reflexivity itself which renders his deconstructive milieu of thinking a priori 
self-centred rather than open to the other. Third, self-parasitism: the reflexive self, 
locatable as the governing centre of, i. e. the driving force behind, Derrida's 
self-analytic text, promotes the textual production of abyssal scenes of self-reflection, 
22For Derrida's image of metaphysics as a "chain" of reflexion, see also [Diss 1216] and [ED 410/279]; 
"the metaphysical is a certain determination of direction taken by a chain of sequence [Diss 12/6]"; "the 
entire history of the concept of structure [... ] must be thought of as a series of substitutes of centre for 
centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the centre [ED 410/279]. " 
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and a sense of abyssal falling is created at the moment when the reflexive self 
attempts to step outside its loop meta-reflectively, the movement of which is again 
"tightly, " i. e. meta-systematically, controlled by the recursive force of reflexion. The 
reflexive self, in this sense, is self-parasitic: it is bound to stick to itself. A "haunting" 
abyss into which Derrida's discourse plunges "headlong [TT 459/50]", "around" 
which reiterations - e. g. the four rounds of reflection on the first sentence of La verite 
en Peinture - take place, marks out the centre that governs the self-parasitic economy 
of Derridian reflection. What Derrida, the self-parasitic player, shows is how he 
economises on this abyss; economisation in this case means the consequential, 
reflexive interiorisation of the sense of the outside the reflective self envisages in a 
meta-reflective manner; one example of the outside which his text on interest 
attempts to show is the irreducibly ontological elements inherent in the 
epistemological notion of interest. 
To conclude: epistemological orientation: insofar as the ontological, the 
uncapturable other of the epistemological, is represented in Derrida's text as that 
which fails the reflective subject, Derrida's meta-reflective project remains 
hauntological rather than ontological in the sense that, this line of thinking thus 
pursued, what becomes pronounced in Derrida's text is the negative and "haunting" 
presence of the ontological, in other words, the cogitational subject of haunting 
experience, rather than the positive and un-troubling presence of the ontological. 
Insofar as Derrida makes the ontological serve the negative function of marking the 
constitutive limits of reflective ontology, the "barricade" of reflection, rather than 
makes it push through the hauntingly reflexive structure of meta-reflection, his 
hauntology remains closer to epistemology than to ontology. Such epistemological 
orientation of Derrida's hauntology becomes reinforced, when Derrida not only relies 
implicitly on the epistemological resources of cogitational self-reflexivity, but 
promotes his hauntology, rather explicitly, as the "law" of thinking which he cannot 
but acknowledge as a given condition of thinking. The final section of this chapter 
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traces Derrida's move towards a methodological solidification of the cogitational 
model of thinking. 
2.3 Law 
Derrida's philosophical fixation on the reflexive self has a methodological 
basis: he relies on the cogitational force of self-reflection, which he describes as "a 
trap23 [MP 351/2951, " and specifically, a trap of the cogito, "into which generations 
of servile fetishists will come to be caught, thereby acknowledging (viendront se 
lasserprendre ä connaItre) the law of the master, of I, Rend Descartes" : it is, in the 
words of Valery quoted by Derrida, "a reflex action of the man. " 
What is the operation of the I in the Cogito? To assure itself of the source in 
the certitude of an invincible self-presence, even in the figure - always 
paternal, Freud tells us - of the devil. [MP 350/294] 
Of a number of points Derrida makes in his reading of Valery as a Cartesian 
writer, some of them [MP 350-1/294-51, directly relevant to our reading of Derrida as 
a Cartesian thinker, can be articulated in the following way. Three points are to be 
noted. Firstly, the discursive centrality of the cogito is a trap of self-reflexivity; the I 
of I think returns to itself, falls back onto itself, even when what it thinks is a thought 
of the exterior, e. g. Descartes's thought of a hypothetical devil as that which possibly 
subverts the existing order of self-knowledge. Descartes's evil genius is represented 
as a threat to the assured interiority of the self, as that which may dislocate the 
reflective subject by means of having the whole world turned upside down. The 
hypothetical devil himself, however, as long as it is the kind that is conceivable only 
by the hyper-reflective subject, comes to be caught, in the end, in the world of 
Descartes's reflection, i. e. in a trap of self-reflexivity. Secondly, such trap of 
23See also Sarah Kof nan [1991] for a similar discussion. 
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reflexivity has an epistemologically positive, "very great value [350/294, Valery's 
words quoted by Derrida]" in that it provides a discursive security to the I of I think 
by having the I return to itself, reflexively, whenever there occurs a risk of 
self-division or self-differentiation. Descartes's textual presentation of the reflexive I 
can be interpreted, in this regard, as both the recognition and a solution of the 
Cartesian problem of irreducible duality of the reflective self: the structural division 
between the reflecting self (the I that thinks, the I that looks into the mirror or the I 
that writes, analogically speaking) and the reflected self (the I that is seen to be 
thinking, the I that is reflected in the mirror or the I that is written) is recognised and 
staged as such in the course of a reflexive unification of the aforementioned two 
different selves into one self, i. e. into the I that thinks of (or sees) itself as a thinking 
being. Descartes's definition of the self as a thinking being unifies, without 
necessarily blurring the conceptual distinction between, the subjective pole of the self 
("I" of "I think") and the objective pole ("myself' appearing in "I think of myself'), 
and the structural bi-polarity of the self, once constituted as such by means of the 
reflective self's reflexive recognition of it, brings stability to the recursively reflective 
unfolding of the I. Such structural systematisation of the reflective movement of the 
ego is conducted, Derrida says, "by means of the egotistic impression of a form 
[351/295]"; here, he describes the thinking ego's reflexive recognition of its 
cogitational structure as the reflective subject's (stamping-like) impositioning of its 
form of thinking on itself. The I of I think designated and controlled as such, or 
"written [350-1/294-5]" or "impressed" as such, taken as a secure source of reflexive 
cogitation is, in this sense, the ineradicable marker of, as Derrida put it, "invincible 
self-presence. " Thirdly and finally, what Valery "acknowledges" as "a servile 
fetishist of the law of the Cartesian I, " Derrida points out, is this ensnaring "power 
[350/294]" of self-reflexivity, this "very great value" constitutive of the backbone of 
the reflective model of thinking. The crux of this line of argument Derrida pursues is 
that the reflexive form of Cartesian cogitation becomes irreversibly inscribed in a 
reflective mind; that of my line of argument in this chapter is that Derrida is also "a 
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servile fetishist of the law of the Cartesian r' in the very sense he describes. Derrida 
is haunted by an un-erasable figure of Descartes lodged in his thinking self in the 
same way his Valery is. 
To invoke a figure of philosophical authority, to acknowledge the law of the 
master, if "servile" in itself, is not necessarily a mere expression of philosophical 
modesty; Derrida's "law"-abiding ethos can be a manifestation of something else, 
something deeper than that, particularly when a motivation behind such 
acknowledgement is self-serving. This is the case with Derrida, who obeys the law of 
the cogito rather than questions the methodological "value" of the Cartesian form of 
cogitation. The mode in which Derrida subscribes to the view that methodological 
self-reflection is a prescribed norm of thinking is self-serving in the sense that the 
pre-given condition of thinking, acknowledged as such24, becomes a self-justificatory 
basis of his system of thinking; he uses it as a means by which to authorise his text in 
a certain way; to authorise it not only in the sense of conferring authority on it by 
marking its historical locus within the bounds of tradition, but, more interestingly, in 
the sense of justifying its internal aporetics as necessary, as "ineluctable". With 
Derrida's act of acknowledgement, what becomes justified, in advance, is twofold: 
his philosophical fixation on the reflexive self and his implicit privileging of the 
reflective model of thinking over other possible ones. Derrida's philosophy of 
deconstruction thematises the limit of reflective reason and highlights the inadequacy 
of the reflective model of thinking being. And yet, oddly enough, it does not divorce 
itself from such tradition of thinking it problematises; it not only refuses to extricate 
itself from the reflexive "trap" of reflective rationality, but promotes, or even 
celebrates in a certain sense 25 such methodologised reflexivity in the form of staging 
his impossibility to overcome the reflective tradition of doing philosophy, the origin 
of which he locates in Descartes. Derrida's strategy is to highlight this experience of 
impossibility, to exaggerate it, to absolutise it, in short, to draw a sense of fatality 
24See the concluding part of 1.322 for a further explanation of this point. 25"a joyous self-contradiction, a disarmed desire [... ] of cutting the ground from my feet [TT 495/50]" 
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from the "ineluctable" failure thus envisaged in advance. To put the same point 
differently, Derrida economises on his own acknowledgement, on the acknowledged 
fact that he is unable to overcome the internalised authority that stands always 
already in front of him. Derrida's gesture of acknowledgement can be translated, in 
this regard, into a strategy of reflexive self-entrapment, an economy of reflexive 
self-limitation. 
Directly relevant to this point is Derrida's acknowledgement of his 
philosophical debt to Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, "existential" in the case 
of the former, and "methodological, " the latter [Kearney, interview with Derrida, 
1984: 109; see also Pos 18ff, 73/9ff, 54]. Derrida, for example, talks about his 
"de arture from the Heideggerian problematic (un ecart par rapport ä la 
problematique Heideggerienne) [73/54]"; "what I have attempted to do" - the 
formulation of the non-concept of dVerance - "would not have been possible without 
the opening of Heidegger's questions [18/9]. " The problem I am pointing to is not 
that Derrida is thus implicated and located in the philosophical tradition he 
acknowledges, but that, in Derrida's case, the act of acknowledgement leads to the 
self-reflexive fixing of the historical condition under which his philosophy unfolds. 
Hence, Derrida's dilemma, i. e. deconstruction's "aporia" of double bind: on the one 
hand, his milieu of thinking is thus constrained and limited, and on the other hand, he 
must, nevertheless, try to extricate himself from the snare of tradition. How genuine, 
however, one is led to ask, is Derrida's philosophical desire to overcome the limits he 
envisages? Is it not the case that he submits to the demands of the tradition he 
chooses to highlight, and responds to the internalised call of his philosophical 
"masters" he chooses to recognise, rather than breaks out of his reflexively 
formulated mould of thinking, rather than pushes through what he sees as a kind of 
oppressive regime of logocentric tradition of philosophy? 
Derrida's acknowledgement of Michel Foucault is also a case in point. 
Interesting to note, also closely relevant to our later discussion of Derrida vs. 
Foucault on Descartes's madmen [Chapter 5], is that Derrida, the disciple of 
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Foucault, prefaces his engaging dialogue with his philosophical master with a 
cautious "servile" acknowledgement, avertissement, that his discourse that is to 
unfold will inevitably be haunted by the "absent" presence of the master, namely, that 
of Foucault. Here are the first two paragraphs [ED 51-2/31-32] of Derrida's essay, 
`Cogito et histoire de lafolie [ED 51-97/31-63]': 
These reflections (refexions) have as their point of departure [... ] Michel 
Foucault's book Folie et deraison. 
This book [... ] is even more intimidating for me in that, having formerly 
had the good fortune to study under Michel Foucault, I retain the 
consciousness of an admiring and grateful disciple. Now, the disciple's 
consciousness, when he starts, I would not say to dispute, but to engage in a 
dialogue with the master, or better, to articulate in interminable and silent 
dialogue which made him into a disciple - this disciple's consciousness is an 
unhappy consciousness. Starting to enter into dialogue in the world, that is, 
starting to answer back, he always already (toujours dejä) feels "caught in the 
act (prise en faule), " like the "infant" who, by definition and as his name 
indicates, cannot speak and above all must not answer back. [... ] The disciple 
knows that he alone finds himself already challenged by the master's voice 
within him that precedes his own. [... ] As a disciple, he is challenged by the 
master who speaks within him and before him [... ] Having interiorised the 
master, he is also challenged by the disciple that he himself is. This 
interminable unhappiness of the disciple perhaps stems from the fact that he 
does not yet know - or is concealing from himself - that the master, like real 
life, may always be absent. The disciple must break the glass, or better the 
mirror, the reflection, his infinite speculations on the master. And start to 
speak. 
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Derrida, the disciple, must break the mirror in which the image of his master is 
reflected - but can he? or does he wish to? or does he allow himself this chance? Can 
Derrida, in fact, break the mirror, when he find himself "always already" caught up in 
a mirror play with his master? Does he, genuinely, wish to "start to speak" his own 
mind, after having emphasised the fact that he had already interiorised the voice of 
the master who speaks "before and within" him, i. e. "precedes" his own voice? Does 
he, really, allow himself to challenge his master in a non-reciprocal manner, when he, 
as a disciple, sees himself as a kind of "infant" who cannot answer back? 
To detect a hint of strategy from a seemingly ordinary, if only slightly 
excessive, disciple's rhetoric of subservience may be viewed as an over-reading. 
However, noting that one of the points of contention Derrida raises against Foucault 
in this lecture-essay, as we will examine later more in detail, is that Foucault is, 
contrary to what he thinks he is like, more ambitiously Cartesian26 than Descartes 
himself, one will then see how Derrida's acknowledgement of Foucault, taken as a 
pre-meditated strategy of argument, can be used against Foucault, effectively and 
economically: Foucault's naive ambition, his lack of "unhappy" consciousness can 
be contrasted with Derrida's rigorous circumspection, his unhappy recognition of his 
own condition of thinking: Foucault's ultimate failure to acknowledge the 
ineradicable presence of his philosophical master he attempts to challenge, i. e. the 
Cartesian legacy of rationalism, can be contrasted with Derrida's apriori27 
acknowledgement of the undesirable and yet inevitable "trap" of discipleship, the 
trap of a mirror play between the master and the disciple in which the disciple sees, 
26To introduce Derrida's argument in sketchy terms: Foucault is Cartesian, for his archaeology of 
madness is, in fact, a logocentric endeavour to have a rational mastery over madness rather than a 
self-effacing attempt to let madness speak for itself, and he is ambitiously so in the sense that, if, as 
Foucault argues, Descartes simply excluded the madmen from his category of thinking beings, Foucault 
attempts to include them in that category by seeking to make sense of their irrationality by some rational 
means, i. e. by means of his "archaeology of madness, " which is, in fact, a kind of explicative and 
investigative project that leads to a further silencing of the pure silence of madness. 
271Ljd [... ] interrogated by Derrida (is) what precedes every interrogation [... ] The remark we 
wanted to make before beginning turns out to be already in some sense [... ] an anticipation of 
our most intractable problems. [Bennington 1993: 9-10] 
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defines, and recognises himself in the eyes of the master, reflexively, i. e. by means of 
the reflexive interiorisation of the master's authority. The disciple, Derrida 
emphasises, "must start to speak"; but he, Derrida also emphasises, can hardly speak 
his own mind that has "always already" interiorised the voice of the master. Foucault 
wanted to speak against Descartes; but, he could not, Derrida argues, speak in a voice 
other than that of Descartes. Derrida wants to speak against Foucault; but, he may 
not, Derrida acknowledges in advance, be able to speak in a voice other than that of 
Foucault; he will, nevertheless, start to speak. The chain of implications is such that 
Derrida must also hold the view that, the issue of the possibility to overcome 
Cartesianism aside, both Foucault and he remain indebted to the master they share in 
common, Descartes. Derrida's own, internalised Cartesianism, however, is neither 
acknowledged nor articulated in any explicit manner in this essay; it only manifests 
itself in the form of Derrida (as a committed Cartesian, who believes in the 
methodological value of, if not sharing with Descartes the onto-theological faith in, 
self-reflection) attempting to "speak" and speak for Descartes, i. e. defending 
Descartes against Foucault's criticism that Descartes's system of cogitation a priori 
excludes madness, the other of reason. 
Without going into the intricate details of Derrida's counter-argument against 
Foucault's, which chapter 5 will analyse, here we shall only note a general point 
directly relevant to the concern of this section: to expose Derrida's methodic fixation 
on a kind of rule-governed process of meta-reflection and to explore the possibility to 
interpret it as a textual manifestation of his implicit, that is, un-acknowledged, 
methodological Cartesianism. 
The rule of thinking Derrida follows again here, and follows respectfully in 
this essay, is the recursively regressive movement of "before" or, similarly, of 
"beyond. " Firstly, in what way is the rule of thinking the "before" operative in 
Derrida's argument? Derrida's point of criticism, posed against Foucault, is that, 
"before" setting out to create a discourse that can be systematically divorced from 
what he perceives as a "rationalistic" Cartesian framework of thinking, Foucault 
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should have reflected upon the very possibility to pursue such alternative path of 
thinking, i. e. the possibility of "the archaeology of madness". Then, secondly, in what 
way is the rule of thinking the "beyond" operative in Derrida's argument? Derrida's 
attempted meta-reflection on ubiquitous Cartesianism as a historical pre-condition 
under which Foucault's alternative route of thinking itself can be mapped out reveals 
a deeper dimension of Foucault's internalised, Cartesian drive that lies "beyond" a 
range of Foucault's self-understanding: Derrida's thematic attention to Foucault's 
internalised Cartesian rationalism as an enabling pre-condition for Foucault's 
archaeological pursuit discloses the invisible presence of Descartes in Foucault. 
To restate Demda's point of contention, in light of the implicit Derridian rule 
of thinking noted above, what Foucault did not acknowledge enough, in short, is 
Descartes the master who comes "before" him and lies "beyond" his reach, who 
thereby not only gives a definition of what Foucault does, but also delimits the range 
of what Foucault can do. By making this critical point against Foucault, the point 
Derrida makes about himself indirectly is that he is less of a Cartesian than Foucault 
is, despite the chain of implications, insofar as his critical self-awareness of such 
embedded Cartesianism makes it possible for him to create a certain "site" of 
thinking within the discursive constraints thus imposed. To this "site" of 
deconstruction, we will come back shortly in the course of argument, and yet, what 
needs mentioning here as a point of clarification is that, if it can be said, in the sense 
described so far, that Derrida does acknowledge Descartes albeit indirectly and 
implicitly, i. e. via the mediating figure, Foucault, what he does not acknowledge, 
nevertheless, is that the way in which this Derridian site of thinking can be 
constructed is also Cartesian, seen from a methodological point of view. This 
dimension of Derrida's Cartesianism that remains un-acknowledged in Derrida, 
despite his "rigorous" act of acknowledgement, we will examine later in this section. 
My immediate concern here is to note that Derrida's methodic tendency to pursue, in 
a paralysingly reflexive way, the "before" and "beyond" of thinking, as is manifest in 
this early essay at issue, becomes reinforced later, for example, in Memoires 
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d'aveugle, where he legitimatises his own regressively reflexive tendency into 
something like a quasi-religious "law" of acknowledgement: "the acknowledgement 
before knowledge (la reconnaisance avant la connaissance) [MA 30/35]"; 
It is a matter [... j of observing the law beyond sight, of ordering truth alongside 
the debt, or ordering truth from the debt, of giving thanks at once to the gift and 
the lack, to what is due, to the faultline of the "one must"(il faut), be this to be 
"il faut" of the "il faut voir" ["one must see"] or an "il reste a voir" ["it remains 
to be seen"], which connotes at once the overabundance and the failure 
(defaillance) of the visible, [... ] the respectful observance of a commandment, 
the acknowledgement before knowledge (la reconnaisance avant la 
connaissance) [.. ]. [MA 29-30/35] 
What is at issue here is the absolutised, fixed dimension of Derrida's "law, " 
the law of "avant" or "dejä, " which cannot be de-constructed by virtue of it being an 
enabling condition for deconstruction. "To de-construct" a text, in this context, 
means to reflect meta-reflectively upon a set of constraining pre-conditions under 
which the self-same identity of a given text can be both constituted and deconstituted; 
the pre-conditions, recognised as such, give the text a definition of what it is about; 
the pre-conditions, acknowledged as such, force the text to recognise further the 
constitutive elements of the other within it which cannot be fully thought out. 
Derrida's topological description of the "site" of deconstruction, which has been 
introduced earlier in Chapter 1, corresponds to my characterisation of deconstruction 
as a meta-reflective endeavour: 
My central question is : from what site or non-site (non-lieu) can philosophy 
as such appear to itself as other than itself so that it can interrogate and reflect 
upon itself? [Kearney, interview with Derrida, 1984: 108] 
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A deconstructive movement of thinking given, philosophy as such can "appear to 
itself' and, at the same time, "as other than itself'; the moment when philosophy 
"appears to itself' is when it makes a meta-reflective move; the moment when it 
appears to itself "as other than itself' is when it recognises the higher order, i. e. the 
meta-level, of its self-reflection, in which the self-same identity of philosophy comes 
to be questioned and de-familiarised, i. e. "interrogated. " 
The irreversible, upward mobility, characteristic of Derrida's deconstruction 
taken as a self-inquisitive or self-analytic mode of thinking, resembles the reflective 
regressiveness, characteristic of the direction in which Descartes's cogitation marches 
toward its zero point, towards its Archemedian point of ultimate reference. It is in this 
sense that one can argue, against Derrida, that what his law of acknowledgement 
"safeguards [Harvey 1986: 80]" is not so much "the invisible other" that remains 
un-interiorisable, and therefore demands a respectful "observance, " as the self of 
self-observation, the reflexive self, the self-referential self, the "I" of "I think", in 
other words, the recursive force of reflexivity that maintains the self-same economy 
of meta-reflection. My point of contention, in short, is that Derrida's law of 
acknowledgement is translatable into what Derrida himself describes - in a critical 
spirit and in a self-distancing manner - as a "trap" of the cogito "into which 
generations of servile fetishists will come to be caught, thereby acknowledging 
(viendront se lasserprendre ä connaltre) the law of the master, of I, Rene Descartes. " 
When Derrida acknowledges the distant as well as "absent" master, 
Descartes, by way of undertaking his "absolute self-criticism [2], 28" what he does 
not acknowledge is that the way in which he responds to the call of his (self-critical) 
consciousness is also Cartesian - reflexive alertness is an attribute of the cogitational 
28 An innocence without naivete, an uprightness without stupidity, an absolute uprightness which is 
also absolute self-criticism, read in the eyes of the one who is the goal of my uprightness and whose 
look calls me into question. It is a movement towards the other that does not come back to its point 
of origin the way diversion comes back [... ] a movement beyond anxiety. [Recit. From 
Emmanuel Levinas (1968), Quatre Lectures Talmudiques, Paris, p. 105; Annette 
Aronowicz, (trans. ) (1990), under the title "Four Talmudic Readings", in Nine Talmudic 
Readings, Bloomington; Indianapolis, p. 48] 
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mind. If Derrida does acknowledge Descartes, he does so in the broad contextual 
sense that every thinker after Descartes, as he argues, is and must be Cartesian insofar 
as their philosophies are embedded in the Cartesian tradition of modem philosophy; 
when Derrida does not, however, acknowledge, in any explicit or positive manner, 
the pervasive presence of such Descartes in his texts, it is because he understands his 
deconstructive endeavour as an attempt to create and maintain a critical distance 
against the "logocentric" tradition of philosophy in which he finds himself located, in 
which something central, teleologically posited and implicated as such, is operative 
as the ultimate reference point of thinking, e. g. the self, reason, Being, God, etc. This 
way, Descartes, a seminal figure in the history of modem rationalism in the eyes of 
Derrida, appears in Derrida's text as a hidden master, who was acknowledged in 
some ways, and yet, was not acknowledged fully; who had to be acknowledged in 
some ways, and yet, could not be acknowledged fully. Echoing Derrida in Oedipal 
trepidation, 29 I ask the following as the open-ended conclusion of this chapter: "to 
whom" does Derrida's "hand return, " finally, if not to Descartes? 
29 What glues itself along the winding staircase, to the truncated column's body is indeed a son 
becoming father. Of his father, no doubt; of whom would one be the father? Yet his march, its 
step, it runs (sa marche) [... ] "Watch out " [... ]I was a child being carefully led by his father. 
(Today I am a father led to love by his child. )" Today, between parentheses, is writing's 
presently presenting: I am (following) a father. But, the "I was a child" of the preceding sentence, 
outside parentheses, belongs to the time of the same narrative (recit) according to which, a page 
higher or step (marche) lower, the child was the old Oedipus supported by his daughter to whom he 
gave a "confident" hand. Who lends a helping hand (un coup de main) to whom in this (hi)story? 
To whom does the hand return? What sense does it have in trembling? [... ] [Glas 
201-2/180-1811 
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3. Locating an Entry 
3.1 Recapitulation 
Chapter 3: Locating an Entry 
Chapter I and 2 offered an analysis of the specific ways in which Cartesian 
self-reflexivity is at work in Derrida's discourse. The aim of these chapters was to 
show that it is possible, and there are convincing reasons why we are led, to locate 
the putatively radical discourse of Derridian deconstruction within the conservative 
framework of traditional Cartesianism. The motive of Derrida's deconstructive 
project, in relation to that of Descartes's, can be said to be radical in the sense that 
deconstruction aims to dismantle, rather than solidify, the onto-theological basis of 
Descartes's foundationalist philosophy. The radicality ofde-construction comes from 
its in-built scepticism, its destructive side, which is corrosive ofany positive attempt 
to construct a philosophical "site" of thinking that can serve as an immovable 
foundation of knowledge in general. Derrida's thematic preoccupation with the 
impossibility to constitute ontology on the basis of reflective reason is a case in point. 
The method of Derrida's deconstruction, however, I have been emphasising, is still 
conservative in the sense that deconstruction, taken as a form of corrosive scepticism 
or rational self-critique, remains inextricably embedded in methodological 
Cartesianism, i. e. the cogitational mode of thinking. The problem I am pointing out is 
Derrida's excessive reliance on reflective rationality in the formation of his 
deconstructive project, the element which he himself problematises in the context of 
arguing the impossibility of reflective ontology. Insofar as the way in which the 
auto-self-deconstruction of the self unfolds is reflective (seen from a procedural point 
of view) and reflexive (seen from a consequential, compositional point of view), it 
can be argued that Derrida relies on the reflective mode of thinking and operates 
within a reflexively self-delimited terrain of thinking. Derrida's implicit commitment 
to methodological Cartesianism makes him a Cartesian thinker who thinks like the 
sceptical Descartes when thinking against the onto-theological Descartes. The key 
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points of contention established so far can be restated in the following way. Three 
points shall be rehearsed. 
First, I provided a reading of Derrida in which his putative attempt to go 
beyond philosophy, his so-called "de-constructive" move against the Cartesian way of 
constructing philosophical terrain, is viewed as an extreme move within, rather than 
as a new move beyond, the Cartesian terrain of philosophy. Hence, a reading of 
Derrida's Cartesianism, viz. his Cartesian impulse, his Cartesian ethos, his Cartesian 
hyperbolism, and his Cartesian extremism. 
Second, Derrida's putative radicality can be read, I suggested further, as a 
dramatic exaggeration or strategic extremisation of the formalistic self-referential 
paradox that is already implicit in the performatively self-involving structure of the 
cogito argument, which has brought to the modem Cartesian subject an anxiety, a 
problem, an aporia, namely, the self-reflexive predicament of hypercritical 
self-abnegation. Derrida remains, in this sense, more Cartesian than not. Hence, 
Derrida as a radical Cartesian. 
Third, these views on Derrida, I emphasised, are still valid even when we pay 
extra attention to his firmly and consistently sustained undecidability thesis, the 
thematic position of which can be established only meta-logically, that is to say, only 
on the basis of the viability of the aporetic tension implicit in the mutually 
incompatible, twofold "gesture" he insists on making: one, an intra-philosophical 
gesture to retain the "logocentric" order of western philosophic reason, and the other, 
a trans-philosophical gesture to transgress the disciplinary and discursive boundaries 
that the logocentrism of philosophic reason both gives rise to and relies on. A 
"tension" of dilemma arises between these irreducibly different directions of 
thinking, one, a move that follows the dialectical order of interiorisation, of 
self-identification, therefore, of self-mastery, and the other, a countermove that resists 
the interiorising force of philosophic reason. This tension leads to, to use Derrida's 
diction again, a "trembling" of the order of articulated logocentrism. An effect of this 
discursive disturbance is a philosophical experience of homelessness; Derrida finds 
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himself always already (dis)located in an "unheard-of' "margin" of philosophy. Now, 
our reading has been focusing on the strange centrality of the Derridian margin. In so 
far as this sense of displacement and loss can be "experienced" at all, and 
experienced only in a meta-logical sense, I argued, first, that what remains, after all, 
in the Derridian scene of deconstruction is the philosophical subject of experience, 
and second, that this residual subjectivity "spectrally" existing in Derrida's text can 
be characterised as a derivative from the Cartesian subjectivity. 
What has been offered in the foregoing chapters can be described as a 
deconstructive reading of Derrida. To deconstruct Derrida by using Descartes would 
mean, in this case, to render the transgressive gesture of Derrida intrinsically and 
fundamentally logocentric. I see his friendship with "margins" of philosophy - his 
intimacy with "the other" of philosophy, e. g. time and language as the unmasterable 
factors alienating the Cartesian reflective self from itself - as still logocentric for 
being, say, margin-centric; Derrida's deconstructive mode of thinking is 
logocentrically margin-centric in the sense that there is an underlying, formalistic 
sameness and recursivity in the way in which his various texts thematise and locate 
the other of the Cartesian self - Derrida's "other" is always already lodged in the 
meta-reflective dimension of his self-reflection rather than somewhere else. The key 
contention here, put differently, is that deconstruction's passion for the other of 
thought, for the "the unthought (1'impense) [Foucault 1966: 333-9/322-8], " is 
fundamentally epistemological or discursive, rather than ontological; it is always 
already moulded in a discursive structure of reflexion, which I identify as Cartesian. 
The way in which Derrida addresses the unthought is, I argued, always already pre- 
and over-determined by the proto-Cartesian force of self-reflexivity; not unlike 
Descartes, he cannot think the unthought unless in relation to the thought, the cogito. 
In short, Derrida's starting point is, always already, Descartes. 
The next section [3.2] offers a more detailed analysis of what I described in 
the above as the "formalistic sameness" of instances of deconstruction. Having 
established, in the previous chapters, the point about deconstruction being a Cartesian 
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trajectory, I will proceed to focus on the deconstructive techniques of thinking thus 
identifiable. Whilst trying to avoid an unnecessary violence of crude reductionism, I 
will nevertheless seek to identify a form, or put less strongly, a recurrent pattern, of 
deconstructive thinking. For this, a couple of examples will be examined in some 
detail; to acquire an "experiential" understanding of what the form of deconstruction 
would be is the aim of the next section. The working belief here, put in the words of 
Derrida who prefers double negation to single affirmation, is that it would be not 
impossible to give a "formal" account of what deconstruction is or what its economy 
amounts to. 
3.2 The Form that Resists 
Let us begin by looking closely at Derrida's response to a question such as: 
Q: What is the relation between deconstruction and critique? 
J. D.: The critical idea, which I believe must never be renounced, has a history and 
presuppositions whose deconstructive analysis is also necessary. In the style of 
the Enlightenment, of Kant, [... ] critique supposes judgement [... ]; it attaches to 
the idea of krinein or krisis a certain negativity. To say that all this is 
deconstructible does not amount to (ne revient pas ä) disqualifying, negating, 
disavowing, surpassing (depasser) it, of doing the critique of critique [... ] but of 
thinking its possibility from another border, from the genealogy of judgement, 
will, consciousness or activity, the binary structure, and so forth. This thinking 
perhaps transforms the space and, through aporias, allows the (non-positive) 
affirmation to appear, the one that is presupposed by every critique and every 
negativity. [... ] this necessary aporetics [... ]. [Poi 368/357]" 
Therefore, when Derrida uses the word, "critique" or "critical, " by these he means 
something radically different from, and heterogeneous to, the traditional notions of 
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"critique. " Deconstruction, he claims, is neither a meta-critique in the ordinary sense 
of the word, i. e. "the critique of critique, " nor a transcendental critique in the Kantian 
sense; it is because, although, seen from a pragmatic point of view, deconstruction is 
to be considered as a critical endeavour, it involves a "genealogical, " and not a 
logical, critique of the veryjudgmental dimension of the "critical idea" or "critical 
dogmatics 1. " 
For this reason, here, Derrida the deconstructive thinker, avoids any rashly 
"judgmental" - "positive" or naive - forms of affirmation (or negation), in other 
words, reductive forms of thinking. Derrida formulates, and answers to, the question 
of what deconstruction does not "amount to, " as opposed to the question of what it 
does amount to. That is to say, deconstruction resists a propositional self-definition: it 
resists saying "deconstruction ist (not) X"; 
All sentences of the type "deconstruction is X" or "deconstruction is not X" a 
priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, 
one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts 
"deconstruction" is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the 
third person present indicative: S is P [LJ 391/41. 
[... ] deconstruction is not a critical operation; it takes critique as its object; dcconstruction, at one 
moment or another, always aims at the trust coded in the critical, critico-thcorctical agency, that 
is the deciding agency, the ultimate possibility of the decidable; deconstruction is a deconstruction 
of critical dogmatics). [Poi 60/54] 
2Another 
example: 
[... ] perhaps deconstruction would consist, if at least it did consist, in [... J doconstructing, 
dislocating, displacing, disarticulating, disjointing, putting "out of joint" the authority of the "is" 
[TOJ 25J. 
Let two points be noted. First, deconstruction is the resistance to the reductionism of "to be"; second, it 
however remains sceptical of the form of its resistance, that is, of the constructive force of the "dis-. " 
For this reason, here the possibility of resistance is only hypothetical or fictive, namely, hauntological; 
hence, "if at least it did consist. " Note that the avoidance of affirmation has taken place twice in a 
twofold manner: by negations ("dis-") and by hypothesisation ("if'). 
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Any definition, whether positive or negative, of deconstruction is therefore to be a 
priori resisted, according to Derrida. To read the passage quoted at the start of this 
section, in light of the point Derrida is making here, what he problematises becomes 
clearer: it is a form of identity-thinking, S is P, adopted whether positively or 
negatively, in which one is led to say deconstruction "is (not) to (dis)qualify [... ] the 
possibility of critique of critique. " What deconstruction is or is not, what it amounts 
to, what it is equated with, etc. - this type of questions demanding a definite 
self-delimitation of deconstruction, Derrida points out, "a priori misses the point, " 
because what deconstruction problematises is the very3 inadequacy of the form of 
identity-thinking and what it thereby thematises is that which exceeds, or "cracks" 
open, such self-enclosed form of thinking. Hence, deconstruction's a priori 
impossibility, and refusal, to answer the question of its self-identity thus posed. 
What is it, then, that deconstruction can show, in stead, in the face of its 
generic impossibility of propositional self-definition? Could it be anything other than 
the reflexive alertness of sceptical rationality? The thought behind this question is 
that, given that the logic or law of auto-deconstruction - not to think in the form of "S 
is P" - is such that any reductive move towards a propositional self-definition of 
deconstruction is to be automatically and recursively rendered impossible or 
inadequate, that by virtue of which such consistent resistance to self-definition is 
rendered possible is the reflexive application of self-critical and self-referential 
reason, which has been characterised as alert. That to which I am drawing our 
attention is not what Derrida and self-identified Derridians refer to as the very 
impossibility to define deconstruction, but the (very) idea of the "very" that gives rise 
3See also Caputo [1996: 31-48, entitled, "1. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: The Very Idea (I)"]; 
Deconstruction in a nutshell? Why, the very ideal 
The very idea of a nutshell is a mistake and a misunderstanding, an excess - or rather a defect - 
ofjournalistic haste and impatience, a ridiculous demand put by someone who has never read a 
word of Derrida's works. Nutshells enclose and encapsulate, shelter and protect, reduce and 
simply, while everything in deconstruction is turned toward opening, exposure, expansion, and 
complexification, toward releasing unheard-of, undreamt-of possibilities to come, toward 
cracking nutshells wherever they appear. [31] 
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to such thought of aporetic impossibility, the "very" taken as an indicator - or a 
"marker", to use Den-ida's diction - of hyper-reflexive reason at work. Derrida the 
auto-self-deconstructionist recognises such impossibility reflexively (as opposed to 
non-reflectively or non-reflexively) in the sense that what he experiences, when 
applying his rule of deconstructive thinking to a formation of the philosophical 
identity of deconstruction, is the impossibility, rather than anything else, to extricate 
himself from the "trap" of discursive, self-critical reason; to put the same point 
differently, what Derrida, the cogitational subject, experiences is, if nothing else, the 
necessity to follow the logic of self-abnegation prescribed as such by himself That 
which becomes staged in deconstructive scenes of thinking, consistently and 
persistently, is therefore a thought that suffers from its envisaged fate, from the 
epistemological predicament of reflexive scepticism. 
Two sets of the conditions of the possibility and impossibility of 
deconstruction are discernible. First, Derrida's "perhaps transformative" reflection, 
which the current thesis characterises as formally meta-reflective, cannot but take 
places "through aporias. " In other words, what Derrida problematises is the fact that 
he cannot deal with aporias without, at the same time, rendering his structure of 
thinking already aporetic. Hence, the aporia is a condition of both the possibility of 
and its impossibility; the meta-discursive energy of aporia works for deconstruction, 
and the fatality of aporia, against deconstruction. Second, we, Derrida and his 
readers, can "observe4" the very happening of the aporetics, the very possibility of 
4 Recently, in a rather standard, and yet quite close, analysis of the most cautious way in which Derrida 
uses the word, "is, " Wolfrey [1988: 5611], following Derrida, argued emphatically that deconstruction 
cannot be equated with, or made into, a kind of methodology. It is because, Wolfrey explains, what 
Derrida "shows" or his sentences "mark" is the "the (very) movement of disjointing [... ] which refuses 
or resists the authority of "is" [57, (my insertion)]"; he then goes on to say that "I am observing the 
dislocating of which Derrida has spoken; the dislocating of a desired meaning by the very event of trying 
to articulate that meaning [57]. " This leads to another observation that Derrida's way of using "is" can 
be understood as an application of Heidegger's sous rature; "placing the word under erasure would 
mean writing the word and then placing a cross over it, while keeping the word visible [57-8]. " When I 
use the word, "observe, " in this text, what I mean by it does not seem to be radically different from 
what Wol&ey has in mind when he uses it. In order for any act of introspection to be rendered possible, 
there has to "be, " or at least "remain, " an object of observation, whether real or fictive, namely, the 
visible, as he says, of the invisible; otherwise, a reference, or even an allusion, to a residual metalevel 
insight into the visible of the invisible would remain absolutely and unequivocally impossible. This is the 
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the impossible. Hence, again, the twofold thesis on the possibility and impossibility 
of deconstruction. 
The aporetics of double bind is systematically disturbing, and at the same 
time, strangely stable; systematically disturbing because it paralyses the faculty of 
propositional judgement, and strangely stable because the deconstructive mode of 
paralytic analysis remains always already within the discursive structure of 
double-thinking. That deconstruction is, seen from a structural point of view, an act 
of "doubling" as opposed to singling (out) or tripling, as it were, is a highly relevant 
point. There is a formal reciprocity between the epistemology of aporetics and its 
cor-responding ontology, i. e. between the way in which Derrida deals with the aporia 
of double thinking in the course of his "perhaps transformative" meta-reflection and 
the way in which his milieu of thinking, as he emphasises passionately, is already 
constrained by the ontological origin of the double. This hypothesis of reciprocity 
gives rise to, and at the same time, renders incomplete or inadequate, Derrida's 
"transformative" reflection: the hypothesis of reciprocity at stake enables the 
Derridian reflection to take place, and at the same time, limits the ambience of such 
kind of meta-reflection. This way, the reciprocity at stake comes to sustain the 
stability of the form of Derridian double-thinking. 
The reflexive stability of the Derridian mode of thinking cannot, however, be 
neatly formalised, Den-ida emphasises. In other words, according to him, 
deconstruction is not reducible to a set of "techniques": 
Q: Could one say that deconstruction is the techniques you use for reading and 
writing? 
J. D.: I would say instead that this is one of its forms or manifestations. This form 
remains necessarily limited, determined by a set of open contextual traits (the 
language, the history, the European scene in which I am writing or in which I am 
point I will highlight as I move on. 
Cartesian Deconstruction 144 Chapter 3: Locating an Entry 
inscribed with all manner of more or less aleatory5 givens that have to do with 
my own little history, and so forth). But, as I was saying, there is 
deconstruction, there are deconstructions everywhere. What takes the form of 
techniques, rules, procedures, in France or in the West, in philosophical, 
juridico-political, aesthetic, and other kinds of research, is a very limited 
configuration; it is carried - and thus exceeded- by much broader, more 
obscure and powerful processes, between the earth and the world. 
[Poi 368-9/3571 
To rehearse Derrida's points, the reason why deconstruction is irreducible to an 
identifiable or objectifiable set of techniques is as follows: although deconstruction 
takes some "necessarily limited forms, " such forms are numerous and open to 
temporality, and what generates such various forms of deconstruction is a kind of 
ahistorical, meta-form thus remaining both generative and elusive. What remains 
invisible, i. e. unknown, to a deconstructive thinker, here Derrida emphasises, is the 
very unfolding "process" of deconstruction's formal manifestations. This process, 
according to him, is so "broad, obscure, and powerful" to such an extent that it 
always already resists being objectified or formalised. (My reading of Derrida so far 
has been pointing to a possibility of gaining an objective and formalistic 
understanding of this level of obscure formality, and we will see shortly how this 
possibility can be further explored. At this point, we will continue to stay on 
Derrida's line of thinking. ) Deconstruction therefore, he claims, is a global event 
rather than a local episode, the meaning of "global" and "local" taken in both the 
theoretical and pragmatic senses; the experience of deconstruction is deemed 
theoretically global in the sense that we cannot "step back, " like Husserl the 
transcendental phenomenologist, from the domain where deconstruction takes place, 
inasmuch as we are "always-already-there"; it is also pragmatically global in the 
s This passage has been introduced earlier [1.32], where I discussed Derrida's use of the word 
"aleatory, " as in "aleatory given" and "aleatory strategy. " 
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sense that it takes place "everywhere" in every domain of worldly livelihood. This 
line of thinking naturally leads to the following thought: 
Q: So deconstruction is not just the critical activity of a literature or philosophy 
professor in a university. It is a historical movement. Kant characterised his age 
as that of the critique. Can one say we are in the age of deconstruction? 
J. D.: Let's say the age of a certain thematics of deconstruction, which in fact 
receives a certain name and can formalise itself up to a certain point in methods 
and modes of reproduction. But deconstructions do not begin or end (ne 
commencent ni nefinissent) there. It is certainly necessary but still very difficult 
to account for this intensification and this passing into theme and the name, into 
this beginning of formalisation. [Poi 369/358] 
It is, as Derrida affirms, difficult to account for the ways in which "the 
formalisation" of deconstruction begins. On this type of "formidable question [LJ 
391/4]" that asks what "the form of deconstruction" is, which, as he says, "all his 
essays" attempt to address [LJ 391/4], I will, none the less, focus my attention; I will 
reflect on this formidably "difficult" problem, which, he allegedly endeavours to 
work out; I will focus on this blunt object of thought, on this formidably aporetic 
"problema [Pas 26-7/106]" which "lies ahead, " which asks "head on" whether or not 
deconstruction is formalisable, deconstruction taken as a discursive system operated 
on the basis of a set of pragmatic and rhetorical strategies. Accordingly, our task that 
"lies ahead" is to disclose an ultra- or meta-formalistic dimension ubiquitously 
6 "What is at issue is the concept of... and knowing whether... " What is implied by an expression 
of such an imperative order? That one could and one should tackle a concept or a problem frontally, 
in a nonoblique way. There would be a concept and a problem [... ] that is to say, something 
determinable by a knowing ("what matters is knowing whether) and that lies before you, there 
before you (problema), in front of you; from which comes the necessity to approach from the front, 
facing towards, in a way which is at once direct, frontal, and head on [capitale], what is before your 
eyes, your mouth, your hands [... ], there, before you, like an object pro-posed or posed in advance, 
a question to deal with, therefore quite as much a subject proposed (that is to say, sun endercd, 
offered up: in principle one always offers from the front, surely?, in principle. ). 
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embedded in the structure of, and restricting the ambit of, Derrida's deconstructive 
practice of philosophy. The question that needs to be addressed is: to what extent can 
this ultra-formalistic dimension of deconstruction be, in turn, thematised or 
problematised, in other words, elaborated in an appropriately deconstructive manner? 
In the course of pursuing this task further, what I intend to demonstrate is not 
that deconstruction, taken as a certain peculiar form of meta-critical discourse, is, 
after all, completely reducible to a type of modernist notion of "project, " i. e. a project 
with a foreseeable end and a set of clear and distinct objectives, the kind that 
Descartes has envisaged; nor is it my intention to conclude that deconstruction, taken 
as a textual strategy of subversion, is, after all, a philosophical manual where logical 
techniques of complication are illustrated. My claim, less extensive than this type of 
"formidably" sweeping claims, shall be only that this question of formalisability of 
deconstruction is, after all, less "formidable, " less threatening and difficult than 
Derrida seems to suggest. 
What I would problematise to a certain extent, to be more specific, is 
Derrida's self-understanding of what he does with this "Derridian" thing, called 
"deconstruction7. " The problem I am pointing out is Derrida's heavy reliance on an 
axiomatised force of (double) negation; dominant in his discourse, as we have 
discussed it earlier, is the discursive force of self-reflexion which can be, in turn, 
decomposed into a certain set of the recursively applied, formalistic rules of negative 
thinking. I identified this force of formalised self-abnegation as the most crucial 
element in the deconstructive "turn" of thinking, which "rigorously" regulates its 
twofold movement, that is to say, which tightly supervises its own move "in the unity 
of chance and necessity in calculations without end [MP 7/7], " i. e. its "aleatory" 
move. This move, every time it takes place, is therefore a carefully calculated, 
pre-meditated one taking place in a "bottomless (sans fond) chessboard [MP 23/22]"; 
7 Derrida renounces, and must renounce for a strategic reason, the intellectual ownership of 
"deconstruction" easily associated with a proper name, Jacques Derrida, [see TOJ 15 for Derrida's most 
recent and fierce denial]. However, my interest lies in specifying exactly what it is that which he refuses 
to name and claim. We will touch upon this topic shortly. 
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this, as I have been arguing, and will continue to argue, is a move of anticipation 
rather than precipitation. 
Read in this context, the following remarks Derrida makes are highly 
problematic, and problematic in a very interesting way. When faced with a necessity 
to communicate, a necessity to define deconstruction in such a way that it can be 
translated into a foreign language, into a language (the Japanese language) 
completely heterogeneous to the Indo-European linguistic family, Derrida does the 
following: after having decisively and perhaps successfully eliminating all possible 
accounts of what deconstruction is by affirming that, "in spite of appearances [... ] it 
is neither an analysis nor a critique nor a method nor an act by an individual nor an 
operation by any collective subject [LJ 391/3], " he suggests that it should rather be 
understood as an event, as a singular event that, by definition, merely "takes place. " 
From then on, he tests the following account, which is closest to, although not exactly 
is, his own idea of what deconstruction is supposed to be, or rather, what it is 
supposed to do. 
Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, 
consciousness, or organisation of a subject, of even of modernity. It 
deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed [fa se deconstruit. ] The "it" [Ca] is 
not here an impersonal thing that is opposed to some egological subjectivity. It 
is in deconstruction (the Littre says, "to deconstruct it-self [se deconstruire]... 
to lose its construction"). And the "se" of "se deconstruire, " which is not the 
reflexivity of an ego or of a consciousness, bears the whole enigma. [LJ 392/4] 
Here is an enigma. This "enigmatic" passage of thoughts, however, can be used as a 
clear piece of evidence that shows again what Derrida thinks deconstruction is not. It 
is clear, from the passage above, that he definitely objects to the reading I am 
proposing in this study, namely, the contention that the kind of reflexivity operative 
"in" deconstruction can be reduced, to a certain extent, to "the reflexivity of an ego or 
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of a consciousness. " The whole enigma, this single word, "se, " bears and cherishes, 
as Derrida himself acknowledges, he does not know. Nevertheless, the range of this 
"whole enigma, " which, by definition, is unknown to the one who remains puzzled, is 
defined, albeit negatively, by Derrida's single affirmation: what he does know in fact, 
as he says, is that, at least and in any case, the "se" of "se deconstruire" is not a 
marker of egological self-reflexivity. The claim Derrida makes here regarding the 
reflexivity of deconstruction is that the kind of auto-operative reflexivity that this 
enigmatic word "se" marks out is to be understood from some hitherto unknown 
perspectives other than from the banal and predictable perspective, i. e. from the 
perspective of egological subjectivity. Derrida's message is clear: the reflexivity of 
deconstruction operative in deconstruction is not to be understood as the egological 
self-reflexivity: at least and in any case whatsoever, deconstruction is, "in spite of 
appearances, " not this type of an egological event. 
Why "in spite of appearances? " One must ask head on: why not?, why this 
denial?, why this determination?, why this reservation? About the validity of this 
determinate move Derrida makes, about the soundness of this self-understanding of 
Derrida, I remain sceptical. I doubt that Derrida can sustain this position, for the set 
of reasons explained earlier in chapter 2 [2.28], where I highlighted the organisational 
meta-reflexivity of his text in order to argue a case of Derrida as a contrived, playful, 
self-parasitic, and epistemologically-oriented writer. What is being pointed out here 
again, against Derrida's claim, is that, insofar as his authorial control of the text, i. e. 
his egological self-reflexivity, plays a conspicuously crucial, if not completely 
decisive, role in the actual production of his self-reflexive texts bearing his proper 
name, his emphatic remark that the reflexivity of "se" of "se deconstruire" is not 
egological, is problematic; the fact that Derrida allows for all other possible readings 
but this reading, i. e. an egological reading of deconstructive reflexivity, can be 
interpreted, further in this regard, as another manifestation of his authorial 
8See the concluding part of 2.2 which has already introduced some part of the paragraph quoted here. 
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self-reflexivity in the sense that Derrida the author shields his authorial identity from 
the probing gaze of his readers - to explore further down this rather political or even 
psychoanalytic path of reading Derrida is, however, beyond the narrow scope of the 
current study. By throwing a spotlight on the element of textual reflexivity pervasive 
in the writings of Derrida, what I aim to show is restricted to the following point of 
contention: in view of the authorial centrality of Derrida's "I" of "I write", the 
discursive position of deconstructive subjectivity, if locatable as such, can be said to 
be closer to the zero point of Descartes's "I" of "I think", i. e. the reflective subject, 
than to any other possible positions where "unheard-of thoughts (pensees inouies) 
[VP 115/102]" have already gone "beyond" any absolute knowledge (au-delä du 
savoir absolu) [VP 115/102, "parenthesis in original"]. " 
One needs to "risk9" looking naive and banal, when there is no alternative to 
doing otherwise, that is to say, when one cannot but begin with meditations on this 
type of "pre-critical" appearance; Derrida himself emphasises this necessity from the 
beginning of his grammatological project [OG 90f1761ffM. This necessity to brave 
pre-critical naivete, on our part as well as on his, is justified in so far as the Derridian 
force of reflexion draws, as we have been pointing out repeatedly, on the reflecting 
subject's inability to differentiate between pre-reflective naivete and ultra-reflective 
rigour, between pre-critical empiricism and post-critical transcendentalism; notably, 
Derrida's discourse is most sensitive to this very inability, to the consequential failure 
of philosophical self-reflection to reach its teleologically projected dimension - the 
transcendental ground where the reflective self remains self-identical and self-same. 
Provided that "the very meanings of `critical' and `pre-critical' themselves 
emerge only from the history of (Kantian) transcendentalism [Watson 1985: 241 ]" 
[see also Krell 1988: 173], the question of how to differentiate, particularly after 
Kant, the "precritical" text, e. g. a psychologically ego-centric, in other words, 
9 to which word, Derrida, for whom "everything is a matter of strategy and risk [MP 7/7]", would not 
have any fundamental objections; see also [VPT 20/16] where he stages a risk involved in an attempt to 
define deconstruction, that is, a risk involved in a double writing, a writing with(out) oneself. 
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"egologically self-reflexive", text, from the critical or post-critical text, i. e. the 
transcendental, impersonal text that has got nothing to do with the empirical ego, 
remains a pressing issue for Derrida, of which he himself is very well aware. It is 
precisely this problem of undecidability that poses a problem to, and acts as a driving 
force behind, Derrida's quest for the originary "ultra-text. " The word, "ultra-text, " 
has been taken from the inaugural part [OG 90/61) of De la Grammatologie, where 
Derrida articulates precisely this concern: 
To see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to recognise in 
contortion the necessity of a pathway(parcours). That pathway must leave a 
track (un sillage) in the text. Without that track, abandoned to the simple content 
of its conclusions, the ultra-text will so closely resemble the precritical text as to 
be indistinguishable from it. We must now form and meditate upon the law of 
this resemblance... the erasure of concepts ought to mark the places of that 
future meditation. [OG 90/61] 
The "ultra-text" here, "the beyond that does not return to the within, " can be 
read as an irreducible meta-form of reflexive self-critique that haunts, if not 
necessarily "instituting" in the constructive sense of the word, the 
quasi-transcendental site of Derridian reflection; "quasi-transcendental" in the sense 
of being neither simply empirical nor strictly transcendental, but acting "as if' 
transcendental. To paraphrase what Derrida says, the dilemma with which he is 
concerned is the following: how to create a text without having its starting point 
already trapped in between the empirical naivete of the "pre-" and the transcendental 
pretentiousness of the "beyond". That is to say, the question Derrida addresses here 
is: how is it possible to understand the self-reflexivity of auto-deconstruction as 
something more than, and other than, merely egological, and at the same time as 
something less than, and other than, strictly and "purely" transcendental? Derrida's 
suggestion [OG 90/611 is to allow the auto-deconstruction of philosophy to take place 
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between "a short-of transcendental criticism (un en-decä de la critique 
transcendentale)" and "a beyond of transcendental criticism (un au-deli de la 
critique transcendentale), " which he locates as "the ultra-transcendental text. " The 
phenomenal resemblance between the putatively pure and impersonal kind of 
transcendental reflexivity and the egological and psychological kind of reflexivity - 
which has been referred to, in the passage quoted, as "the law of resemblance" - 
therefore, according to Derrida, becomes a pressing issue for him, i. e. the object of 
his "meditation". An illusion, a mere appearance, whether it is a transcendental or 
precritical one, is the starting point of Derridian meditation, and Derrida's starting 
point after Kant is nothing and nothing but this "risk" of dwelling upon the illusion. 
What needs to be dwelt upon, as Derrida suggests, is the very law of illusion, the very 
"law of resemblance" between the precritical discourse and the transcendental one, 
which manifests itself only through its phenomenal appearance. 
In view of Derrida's "must" appearing in "we must now form and meditate 
upon the law of this resemblance, " we cannot but ask the following question. Why 
then, in practice, does Derrida, the auto-self-deconstructive meditator, avoid dwelling 
on the very resemblance between the putatively ultra-critical logic of 
auto-deconstruction and its rather banal, egologically self-reflexive form, manifested 
as such in his text?, on the mimetic complicity between the ultra-critical force of 
deconstruction (which is supposed to govern any "future" meditations) and the 
pre-critical self-reflexivity of the ego (which appears to produce the egological scenes 
of meditations)? Why is it that Derrida refuses to dwell on this particular aporia of 
undecidability by affirming in a definitive - unreflective and assuring - manner that 
"the "se" of "se deconstruire" is not the reflexivity of an ego or of a consciousness"? 
Why does Derrida "turn away" from this question, not unlike his Valery [MP 
327-63/275-306]? 
A vigilant reading of Derrida is required. Needed in particular, Derrida here 
taken not only as a thinker of vigil but as a strategic thinker in vigil, is a strategically 
polemical reading of Derrida. Much needed is a closely investigative reading of 
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Derrida. We ought to think like Derrida when thinking against Derrida, in order to 
expose, effectively, the strategic aspects of his thinking; if not necessarily like the 
Derrida who has a penchant for playful "complexification [Caputo 1996: 32]" or 
"obscurantism [Po 435/429]", but like the "rigorous" Derrida, the seemingly obscure 
"traces" of whose thinking carry a certain internal, methodological consistency, to 
wit, like Derrida, the reflective rationalist. 
Viewed in this regard, it come as no surprise that Derrida thinks like 
Descartes, i. e. as a Cartesian, when defending Descartes against Foucault's 
contention that Descartes's tightly reflective, rationalistic system of thinking does not 
leave a room within itself in which the incomprehensible kind of irrational madness 
can represent its madness in its own voice. Derrida, turning against Foucault, puts 
himself in the position of his Descartes, Descartes, the "ultra-critical" thinker who 
includes (rather than "excludes, " as Foucault contends) the element of hyperbolic 
madness in his system of reflective cogitation by means of rationalising or 
economising it; to rationalise or economise madness in this case means to have it 
serve its discursive function, which is to keep pointing to a reflective thinker a 
meta-reflective dimension of a given thought. What underlies Derrida's inclusion of 
the element of madness in Cartesian rationality is therefore Derrida's positive 
evaluation of the regressive force of Cartesian cogitation. To follow Derrida in this 
line of reading Descartes, Descartes's hyperbolic concern with the hypothetical evil 
genius can be understood, for instance, as a manifestation of philosophical or 
philosophised paranoia, which is rigorous in itself, seen from a methodological point 
of view - the unstoppable, meta-reflective movement of Cartesian cogitation is 
maddening, Derrida emphasises. Surely, Derrida's philosophical alliance with 
Descartes on this particular point can be viewed as a strategic device facilitating his 
counter-attack on Foucault, but Derrida's strategy, deployed in this essay, of 
assuming a philosophical personae of Descartes, the self-critical, reflective thinker, is 
more than a useful tactic in the sense that it originates from a broader context of 
Derrida's Cartesianism, which the current study seeks to elucidate. The point to note 
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is that Derrida is always already a Cartesian, a thinker who privileges the 
hyper-critical rationality of vigil and reflexion over the lack of such reflective 
consciousness, and the Derrida-Foucault debate is only illustrative of this Derrida, 
effectively. The fact that what Derrida himself described as a certain "maddening" 
force of reflection becomes a basis of textual productivity10 is indicative of the extent 
to which Derrida internalised methodological Cartesianism as a norm of thinking. 
What I am proposing in this study is a "Derridian" reading of Derrida, where 
one pays, as Derrida does, a knowingly "prejudicial [ED 53/32]" attention, a 
hypercritical and hyperbolic attention, to specific ways in which the Derridian law of 
cogitation produces and maintains a certain, formally constrained and materially 
prolific, Derridian project(s) of deconstruction(s). This way of being loyal to the 
author is also Derridian. This line of approach will not be unlike that of Derrida's 
subversive reading of Foucault on Descartes, a reading in which Derrida detects the 
hidden "trap" of rationalist undercurrent that runs through, and determines the 
direction of, the Foucauldian anti-rationalist gestures. Following this Derrida, one 
needs to attempt to bring to the fore a fundamentally logocentric set of implicit 
presuppositions and originary values which gives rise to the consistently 
intrametaphysical, Derridian economy of anti-metaphysical gestures. Amongst those 
traditional metaphysical resources on which the Derridian economy of writing 
appears to draw, what I am singling out in this project is the metaphysical value of 
Cartesian self-reflexivity, and what I have been analysing is the Derridian mode of 
appropriating "reflexive and appropriable essence of the cogitatio [Carraud 1987: 
79]. " Although there is a wealth of analyses of reflexive elements in the writings of 
10The key theme of an interview article, "A "Madness"Must Watch Over Thinking" subtitled, 
"Refusing to build a philosophical system, Derrida privilege experiences and writes out of 
"compulsion" [Po 348-395/ 339-364, "the scare quote in the original"], " is the following: "[... ] 
madness, a certain "madness" must keep a lookout over every step, and finally watch over thinking, as 
reason does also. [374/363]" Derrida's positive evaluation of a reflexive kind of madness can be read as 
a point of contention implied in the following remarks: "To say madness without expelling it into 
objectivity is to let it say itself. But madness is by essence what cannot be said; it is the "absence of the 
work (1 absence d'oeuvre)" as Foucault profoundly says [ED 68/43]. " 
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Derrida, deconstructive readings of Derridian reflexivity seem to be still much 
needed, not to mention a Cartesian reading of Derrida. The next section [3.3] where 
the secondary literature relevant to the key concerns of the current project is 
reviewed, addresses this issue. 
3.3 Literature Review 
What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! 
What is deconstruction? Nothing of course! [LJ 5/392111 
David White's short article [1992] on a form of analytic or logical complicity 
between the Aristotelian rule of non-contradiction and the Derridian deconstructive 
strategy, is insightful. White's central question is carefully formulated and well to the 
point: "what would a Derridian critique of the formal aspect of reason have to address 
in order to be persuasive? [120]" The same question can be asked differently in the 
following manner: what would be the minimal rule, the ultimate formal-logical 
presupposition, which renders the Derridian form of arguments intelligible? The 
upshot of White's answer, which I fundamentally endorse, am simplifying crudely, 
and will develop further, is this: the "deconstructionist must presuppose the 
(Aristotelian) principle of contradiction [125]" in order to perform 
self-contradictions, in other words, in order to render the paradoxicality of 
deconstructive performance intelligible. This thought can be linked to the following 
working hypothesis of the thesis: central to any typical deconstructive (non-)thought 
is the Cartesian experience of self-fragilisation, which is acquired through repeated 
acts of self-negation or self-contradiction. 
In a curious manner, White's point bears significant relevance to some 
well-established views regarding the Derridian "form" of thinking, stated by a group 
11 "Ce que la deconstruction n est pas? Mais tout! Q 'niest-ce que la deconstruction? Mais rien! " 
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of commentators, which I would designate, for the sake of convenience, as the second 
group of Derrida readers. Well argued, in common, by the commentators comprising 
this group, which includes Karl Apel, Andrew Bowie, Peter Dews, Manfred Frank, 
Rodolphe Gasche, Irene Harvey, and Christopher Norris 12, is the thesis that Derrida 
appropriates the formal resources of deconstruction broadly from the German idealist 
tradition of speculative dialectics in which the pervasive image of the self is the 
reflective subject reflecting upon an object. A "curious" thematic connection, as I 
said earlier, between White's insight and some opinions articulated by the second 
group of thinkers thus clustered, is found in that what generates the problem of 
self-reflexivity, viewed from a formal-logical point of view, is the Aristotelian axiom 
of non-contradiction; observe that the aporia of self-reflexive self-negation arises as 
soon as one aims to gain an absolute self-understanding by means of performing and 
overcoming self-negation in a totalising manner. The problem of "understanding" the 
enigmatic thesis such as "my thesis is that there is nothing in what I am saying, 
13,, 
can be made purely formal, in the sense that one needs nothing other than the very 
sentence in order to see the structural or formal problem of semantic paradox 
involved in stating the proposition. The aporia here is structural or formal, first, in the 
sense that the "I" that performs self-negation by putting the same "I" in the double 
bind of equivocation does not have to rely on the external world in order to either 
verify or falsify the truth claim it makes in such a sentence, and second, in the sense 
that the consequential undecidability of the truth value of the sentence is therefore 
not an empirical problem but a logical one. Put simply, involved here is a "syllogistic 
rationality [White 1992: 125]": at stake is a logical dilemma14 rather than an 
12 see Apel [1993], Bowie [1993: 67-81], Dews [1995: 1-33], Frank [1989,1992: lecture 15-18, 
26-27], Gasch6 [1986], Harvey [1986a], and Norris [1987]. 
13 Refer to the opening quotation of this chapter. 
14 In an illuminating discussion of Derrida's deconstruction as a mode of literary criticism, Maria Ruegg 
[1979] makes a similar point; 
Derrida, at the very least, offers the possibility of a non-mystical literary criticism, capable of 
nonetheless dealing with the logical anomalies so characteristic of literature. The logic of 
"deconstruction" [... ) is [... Ia relatively sane, workable logical paradigm, roughly analogous [... ] 
to the indeterminate logic that underlies the development of modem science. [203) 
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empirical uncertainty. The Derridian rule of equivocation puts the "r' in a double 
bind, and as we have been seeing repeatedly, this rule is recursive throughout, and 
generative of, his performatively self-contradictory sentences. In a similar manner, as 
have discussed it earlier in chapter 1 [1.31], Descartes' cogito argument, 
demonstrated as such, also points to the performative dimension of this type of 
self-implicatively self-destructive utterances. Between Aristotle and the German 
Idealists there is Descartes, and after the German Idealists, Derrida is staging a 
Descartes again, albeit in an oblique way. 
Given that it is with this formal-logical paradox of the infinite regress of the 
self that the German idealists were preoccupied, given the history of the metaphysics 
of the Cartesian abyss 15, any re-staging of the self-inflicted, discursive trauma of 
self-reflexivity would hardly be an original endeavour, particularly in the late 
twentieth century, unless something new is presented in the exposure of that 
metaphysical malady of the self. It appears to be no coincidence, seen from this 
perspective, that the second group of Derrida commentators focuses on the affinity, 
both logical and genealogical, between the German Idealists and Derrida. To 
indexicalise their subtle and rich analyses, in accordance with the particular and 
unique focuses of their delicate deliberations, several sub-branches of this group 
could perhaps be mapped out in the following way: 
" (1) A parallel has been drawn between contemporary francophone "Derridian" 
thinkers and the German Idealist thinkers by Karl Apel [19931, who points to some 
shared, "formal" problems involved in the "totalising critique of reason" that they 
undertake in a similar manner. Apel sees deconstruction as a form of immanent 
critique of reason in which reflective reason attempts to overcome its idealist 
Also interesting to note is her next point [204]: the fact that Derrida plays a relatively safe game makes 
him rather a "conservative thinker" "despite his revolutionary logic"; This view, as we have seen already 
in the previous chapter, corresponds to mine. 
15 Steven Watson [1985] has provided a useful and comprehensive survey on this topic. 
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limits by using its self-critical resources. And the problem Apel highlights is that 
of paradoxical self-implication: the hyper-critical dimension of the self-critique of 
reason cannot be posited outside the totality of reason thus criticised. Insofar as 
this aporia of self-implication, which one can also find in the German tradition of 
transcendental idealism (Fichte or Schelling, in particular), recurs consistently in 
Derrida's deconstructive trajectory of thinking, deconstruction remains, Apel 
argues, thus implicated in that tradition. 
" (2) Both Irene Harvey [1986a] and Christopher Norris [1987], in a similar way, 
highlighted Derrida's Kantian affiliation by disclosing the transcendental or 
meta-critical motif found in the major writings of Derrida. According to these 
commentators, both Kant and Derrida engage in an internal formal critique of 
reason in that both of them are concerned with explicating, by means of 
delimiting, "the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics. " The difference 
between Kant and Derrida, however, lies in that the latter goes on further to point 
out the conditions of the "impossibility" of metaphysics as well; a case in point is 
Derrida's sustained attempt to show how the ideals of "pure" metaphysics or 
"pure" reason are "always already" "contaminated" by the empirical conditions of 
its historical possibility - e. g. the inevitable use of empirical or figurative language 
for an articulation of putatively trans-linguistic, pure metaphysical ideas such as 
self-presence or self-consciousness. 
" (3) Derrida's complicit alliance with, and yet, more importantly, simultaneous 
break with, the thinker of "absolute spirit, " Hegel, has been brought into light, as a 
result of Rodolph Gasche's reflections [197916,1986] on the "quasi-" 
transcendental infrastructure of the Derridian quasi-dialectic, which, he 
emphasises, is not reflexive. Gaschd locates Derrida in the Hegelian tradition of 
dialectical thinking in which the relationship between the self and other are 
16 Critical responses to this position have been voiced by a host of commentators, who, in common, 
articulated the fatal risks involved in Gasche's attempt at a philosophical contextualisation of the elusive 
and un-thematisable Derridian discourse; for example, see Bennington [1988: 11-60], Norris [1988: 
213-227], and Dews [1995: 115-150]. 
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conceived on the basis of the "subject-object" model of thinking; it is the unifying 
force of absolute spirit that ultimately resolves the constitutive conflict between 
the subject and the object. Gaschd's interpretation of Hegel is idealist and 
subjectivist (as opposed to materialist and objectivist) in that he sees Hegel as a 
thinker of self-same identity, and therefore, Hegel's "absolute spirit, " as a 
manifestation of reason's self-same reflexivity. While arguing the case of Derrida 
as an ambivalent thinker who relies on, and at the same time calls into question, 
this idealist tradition of dialectical self-reflection, Gaschd stresses the point that, 
insofar as Derrida is more concerned with the conditions of the "impossibility" of 
self-same reflection than with those of the possibility, he is to be viewed as a 
thinker of "heterology, " of "the other" - first, as a thinker of difference who 
attempts to go "beyond" the phenomenological terrain of self-same thinking, and 
second, as a thinker of originarity who attempts to go "deep" into the 
constitutively heterological infrastructure of self-same reflection. Derrida's 
recognition, however, of the impossibility to think the other in suitably 
"heterological" terms (impossible, due to the unavailability of a suitably radical, 
new vocabulary that can represent this "un-heard of' thought, put otherwise, due 
to the inevitability to rely on the pre-existing, traditional vocabulary of 
self-reflection, which, however, cannot "properly" convey the irreducible and 
unique otherness of the other) forces him to borrow the theoretical and 
tropological resources from the traditional, Hegelian model of self-reflective 
thinking that institutes the self-other relationship in a tightly dialectical way. 
Hence, the "quasi"- dialecticity or transcendentality of Derrida's heterological 
trajectory: Derrida has no choice, here Gasche emphasises, but to lay out his 
deconstructive thesis, "as if' it were a kind of dialectical or transcendental 
discourse, describable in traditional philosophical terms and identifiable as such, 
when, in fact, it is not. 
" (4) Andrew Bowie [1993: 67-81] and Peter Dews [1995a: 1-33,1995b: 115-148], 
in common, have articulated some formalistic similarities between Derrida's 
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solution and Post-Kantian solutions to the problem of the infinite splitting of the 
reflective self, for example, between Derrida's differance and Schelling's Being of 
identity: differance, insofar as it is "a difference that is different from itself [VP/SP 
129 (trans. )], " presupposes the ultimate reference of self-same identity, i. e. a 
deferred being, which is a derivative from Schelling's notion of Being. In this 
sense, they argue, Derrida's deconstructive thinking can be regarded as a variant of 
Schellingian identity-thinking, according to which differences are seen as 
manifestations of the self-differential movements of being. 
" (5) Both textually substantial and analytically disciplined are Manfred Frank's 
illuminating thematisation of Derrida's blind adherence to the Husserlian model of 
reflective self-consciousness [1989,1992: Lectures no. 15-18,26-271 and David 
Wood's powerful critique [1988,1989: 118-153,19901 of Derrida's implicit 
commitment to Husserlian transcendentalism, Derrida's impassioned "folly [1988: 
67]. " Both Frank and Wood see Derrida as a Husserlian phenomenologist, and 
criticise Derrida for not being critical enough in "overcoming" the Husserlian 
tradition of phenomenological thinking of the self; although Derrida's subversive 
reading of Husserl [VP] - in which Husserl's "pure, " transcendental ground of the 
self are "contaminated" by Derrida's linguistic empiricisation of such ground - 
appears to be an anti-Husserlian, counter-transcendental move, what makes 
Derrida a fundamentally Husserlian phenomenologist, nevertheless, is the fact that 
he systematically clings to a reflective, and more specifically, meta-reflective 
mode of thinking, which underlies Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, i. e. 
Husserl's method of transcendental "epoche" by which all the affirmative 
judgements are suspended. An important implication of this line of reading 
Derrida is that his thematic preoccupation with the motif of empirical 
contamination can be viewed as a paradoxical expression of his irreducible, 
philosophical desire for purity: that is to say, from Derrida's point of view, and by 
his standards of rigour, Husserl's transcendental self is not pure enough. It is the 
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demand of this level of purity, implicitly staged in Derrida's aporia-driven, 
meta-reflective move, that Wood describes as a "folly". 
" (6) Simon Critchley's reading of Derrida [1992] in line with, and at the same time, 
set against, the Husserlian trajectory of phenomenology, more sympathetic than 
Frank and Wood's, analyses ways in which Derrida problematises the 
self-reflexive circularity of the proto-Hegelian movement of Spirit. In this reading, 
Critchley focuses on the concept of "closure (cloture), " which, he argues, Derrida 
appropriates from Heidegger's notion, "the end of metaphysics. " This analysis 
traces the genesis of Derrida's deconstruction back to the phenomenological 
tradition17 that starts from Hegel and Husserl, and ends with Heidegger; and then 
it explores the possibility to read Derrida's meta-reflective move as an attempt to 
break out of such modern, metaphysical tradition of subject-oriented thinking in 
which the image of reflexive closedness of the self-same self prevails. As a way of 
highlighting the non-reflexive aspect of Derrida's deconstructive endeavour, 
Critchley makes a thematic connection between Derrida and Levinas, taking them 
as thinkers who attempt to think infinity as something other than a dialectical 
negation of totality. 
A third18 camp can be set up alongside the second. A more ahistorical and 
formalistic reading of Derrida also suggests - without failing to mention Derrida's 
17 rather than to German Idealism; see (4) 
1 It needs mentioning, albeit briefly, that there is also a literary approach to Derrida's self-reflexivity, 
"literary" not in the sense of being non-philosophical, but in the sense of dealing with the topic from an 
ostensibly rhetorical or textual point of view. Notably, early Paul de Man [1978,1979a: 
119-131; 135-159,1983: 102-141,1984] identified the literariness of deconstruction as the textual effect 
of self-reflexivity at work. Deconstruction is, therefore, for de Man, a "tropological" movement of 
self-reflexivity. The self-reflecting subject is, he argues, inextricably entangled with the narrative 
structure [ 1979: 28f1] so that the impossibility of the subject to posit its locus outside the intralinguistic 
structure of text becomes the very theme of literature; hence, de Man's definition of literature as a 
self-reflexively delimited, self-deconstructive totality. Notably, Romantic discourse, as he also suggests, 
is an example to which this concept of literature is applied. Consequently, he highlights the 
epistemological failure of the reflective subject; he says "[... ] the self-reflexive moment of the cogito, 
the self-reflection of what Rilke calls "le Narcisse exhauce, " is not an original event but itself an 
allegorical (or metaphorical) version of an intralinguistic structure, with all the negative epistemological 
consequences it entails [1979: 152]. " Amongst recent writings on Derrida's self-reflexive strategy, 
studied from a literary or rhetorical point of view, outstanding works are, to name a few, Marian 
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thematic affinity with the German idealists in one way or another - that something 
resembling the Russellian problem of meta-set theoretical paradox [Lawson 1985: 
90-124, and Priest 1994,1995: 235-245] or, put more loosely, the second-order 
awareness of self-referential paradoxes [Bennington 1993: 19ff, Kearney 1991: 
170-211, Wood 1980, Luhman 1993] generates the "postmodern, " "self-reflexive 
predicament [Lawson 1985], " which the Derridian discourse shows performatively 
[Lawson 1985]. A kind of formal-logical analysis of Derrida's "logic of supplement" 
has been undertaken splendidly by Dupuy [1990,1994], who I quoted at length earlier 
in the introduction; his reading focuses on the fundamental self-referentiality of 
Derridian mode of self-deconstruction which renders the Derridian discourse 
structurally "autonomous. " Most recent commentaries touching on the formalistic 
aspects of Derrida's texts, to name a couple of outstanding works, are M. J. 
Devaney's perceptive criticism of the Derridian brand of "postmodern logic" as "the 
innocuous logic of both/and [1997: 13-06], " and Hobson's analysis of the Derridian 
subjectivity caught up in a mise en abyme [1998: 67-83]. Also illuminating is Dews' 
discussion of some cases of "destructive self-implication" staged in Derrida's 
performative writing [1995b: 92,90-114]. 
3.4 Stepping In : Why Descartes? 
What all these commentators mentioned above have already shown in 
common is this: if my point about Derrida's self-reflexivity is banal, so is Derrida's 
programmed excuse to draw on self-reflexivity 
19. None the less, although there is a 
Hobson on Derrida's replications [1998: 59-106], Julian Wolfreys' reading of Derrida on Valbry [1988: 
119-137]. Also interesting is Wolfrey's analysis of the hauntological moments in lain Sinclair and 
Joseph Conrad [1998: 138-184]. 
19 For example, consider the critical import of the following series of questions, which, firstly, 
underplays the philosophical or ontological significance of Derrida's deconstructive endeavour, and 
secondly, raises doubts about its novelty value as a philosophical enterprise: what would be the 
philosophical worth of Derrida's self-reflexive style of writing? Why does he have to "perform" 
self-contradictions?; what does he achieve by taking a risk of entering into a realm of nothing and 
nothing but a "narcissistic, " "complacent", "baroque, " "banal, " romantic discourse of outdated semantic 
paradoxes [some words quoted from Bennington 1993: 19-20]? What does his self-referential play with 
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wealth of commentaries addressing the question of how to make out strategic aspects 
of Derrida's self-reflexivity, still needed is a more detailed map of reading, a more 
elaborate analysis of the uniquely Derridian mode of self-reflexivity and its textual 
functions as a marker of authorial presence. In the words of Derrida who says, when 
faced with a charge of nihilism, that "this interest needs to be deconstructed in their 
turn [Kearney, interview with Derrida, 1984: 124], " in the words of Derrida who 
repeats, "this misinterpretation (of deconstruction) ... 
its interests must be 
deconstructed in their turn [1984: 124], " I should like to say, following Derrida, that 
Derrida's interest in exploiting his own self-reflexive habit of thinking, in turn, is to 
be deconstructed; after all, as Derrida reminds us, "you will never have done (fini) 
with that suspension itself [Sur 121/77]. " Simply, my study intends to chart a rather 
detailed map of Derridian labyrinth of thinking, slightly more detailed than those 
already available. 
If this approach sounds already and still banal, a stronger motive behind this 
way of reading Derrida can be found in the second, and more specific, concern of the 
thesis, which is to discover the unique form of a textual alliance or affinity between 
Descartes and Derrida. A general groundwork for this reading has been established in 
the foregoing chapters, including introduction, and a more elaborate analysis of 
Derrida's reading of Descartes will be offered later in Chapter 5, after a detailed 
study of Cartesian reflexivity, which I will undertake shortly in the next chapter. The 
rest of the current chapter shall be concerned with showing how a parallel reading of 
Descartes and Derrida can be located within the existing map of Derrida scholarship, 
in other words, where the gap is and why it needs filling. 
As a way of gaining a formal understanding of that which gives rise to the 
uniquely Derridian "traces" of reflexive thinking, I began with a cluster of working 
hypotheses [two propositions in 1.2] which suggest that there is a formal-structural 
words show apart from the player's serious self-indulgence in an aesthetic pleasure of vertiginous 
regression into the self? What is so un-classic or un-banal about this seemingly anachronistic, traditional 
move? What is old, and what is new, in Derrida, in this ageless child "caught up in an abyssal thought of 
inheritance [FM 191]"? 
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affinity between Derrida's practice of deconstruction and Descartes's performance of 
the cogito. This observation itself cannot be claimed as solely mine. The same kind 
of argument has already been put forward by, for example, Calvin Schrag [1985: 
25-32], who pointed to a significant thematic link between the Cartesian subjectivity 
and the deconstructive subjectivity; his concise and illuminating remarks on 
Derrida's Cartesian affiliation, which he made in the course of thinking through the 
problem of spotting the discursive locus of deconstructive subjectivity, touch exactly 
on the key issues with which I have been concerned. To quote him at some length: 
[... ] This invention of the subject, orchestrated as an argument for the 
ego-cogito, proceeds within the framework of a strategy of systematic doubt 
[... ] The strategy of systematic doubt allegedly delivers an indubitable cogito, 
intuitively grasped in every performance of thought reflectively directed to 
itself. Thought presupposes a "who" that is thinking; doubt presuppose a "who" 
that is doubting. 
There is, we suggest, a similar play operative in the strategy of deconstruction, 
yielding not the truth of Cartesian subjectivity, the "I think, therefore I am", but 
rather a deconstructionist modification - "I deconstruct, therefore, I am". In 
dismantling subjectivity as a positional centre and a zero-point consciousness, 
peeling away the sedimented layers of philosophical construction, some species 
of claim upon the subject remain in force. The very strategy of deconstruction 
serendipitously reinvents the subject. [... ] 
[... ] One is compelled to ask and re-ask the question about the "who, " that the 
Cartesian way founders. And it founders principally because the inquiry 
standpoint is still geared to a search for a res, a residuum, a centre of 
consciousness, a stable presence that somehow supports the processual stream 
of thought. [26] 
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One of the key points I have established in Chapter 1 and 2, and will labour 
again in Chapter 5, is that the discursive locus of Derridian subjectivity, as Schrag 
also argues, is characteristically Cartesian. None the less, again as Schrag observes it, 
this does not either automatically or straightforwardly imply that the former is strictly 
or completely reducible to the latter; inevitably, a deconstructive "modification" of 
the ego-cogito argument, as he put it, is bound to take place in the Derridian version 
of the ego-cogito. Up to this point, I am with him. 
The point I do not share with Schrag, however, is regarding the mode of 
Derridian modification: "I deconstruct, therefore, I am. " This formulation is subtly, 
and yet deeply, misleading. To use Schrag's mock-Cartesian formula again, my 
alternative suggestion would be to say, instead, that "there is something (res) that 
deconstructs, thereby, there is something (res) that remains haunted, " or, put more 
straightforwardly, that "I deconstruct, there(fore), I remain haunted. " 
This is to imply, the further question I address in this project, unlike Schrag, is 
why Derrida still remains "Derridian" as opposed to Cartesian, despite his implicit 
loyalty to the Cartesian establishment of philosophy; the question I am focusing on 
here is why the understanding of this "implicit, " Cartesian dimension of 
deconstruction has to be an extremely nuanced one. By characterising Derrida as a 
"radical" Cartesian [chapter 2], I argued that there is a significant thematic 
continuity, and a unique form of complicity, between Derrida and Descartes. This 
unique form of textual alliance between the two thinkers - an intriguingly entangled, 
therefore, inevitably complicated, relationship between the two - has not yet been 
clarified to a satisfactory degree, 20 in my view and to the best of my knowledge. This 
20 In fairness, it needs mentioning that there is a wealth of discussions surrounding Foucault vs. Derrida 
debate on the status of Descartes' madmen. To name a few, Christopher Johnson offered a reading of 
Derrida's notion of infinity in this context [1993: 45-48], which is, more or less, directly relevant to my 
project, and particularly to Chapter 4. McKenna, as I have introduced him earlier, briefly discussed the 
presence of the Cartesian demon in Derrida's discourse [1992: 54f]. To introduce a substantial work of 
scholarship in which Foucault-Derrida debate is dealt with as a central topic, there is Roy Boyne's 
socio-political approach to the otherness of"the other side of reason, " i. e. the problem of madness 
[1990], and an article by Deborah Cook who contends that Derrida's reading of Foucault is deeply 
flawed and perverted [1990: 164-174]. Although all these commentators, in various ways, have touched 
upon the issue with which I am concerned, none of them has specifically or exclusively focused on the 
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"aporetically" inseparable link is what my reading of both thinkers seeks to uncover, 
and a survey of relevant literature suggests to me that still in demand is a textual 
explication of this particular dimension. Accordingly, I locate my study of Derrida 
somewhere between the first [White 1992] and the second group of Derrida 
scholarship. 
I make, however, no claim of the ownership of this site. By marking the locus 
of my discourse this way, I am not implying that this site of reading has been 
overlooked in Derrida readership; what I am pointing out is rather that it has not been 
looked through enough, and certainly not thoroughly enough. The Descartes-Derrida 
link has been much alluded to rather than fully articulated. Derrida's thematic affinity 
with (what they now mostly perceive as dead-end) philosophies of self-consciousness, 
and notably with Husserl's phenomenology of self-consciousness, has already been 
well pointed out. For example, my reading may well be taken as a small sequel to a 
couple of powerful readings by Frank and Wood, who alert us, the gullible readers, to 
the Derridian trap of self-reflexivity, namely, the trap of transcendental privacy or 
solipsism; as Wood says, Derrida's problem is that, at the most fundamental level, he 
takes the risk of merely repeating "Husserl's most logocentric commitments to 
transcendental solipsism... in Cartesian Meditations [1990: 124]21. " Apparently 
hinted, and yet only hinted in this line of reading, is a further, and arguably more 
originary, homological link between Descartes and Den-ida. However, Wood has not 
dwelt upon this particular branch of thought in that text, nor elsewhere, to the best of 
my knowledge. A very similar point regarding the Husserlian legacy in Derrida has 
also been made in Frank's powerful critique of Derrida's adherence to the 
proto-Cartesian Husserlian model of reflective self-consciousness [1989: Lecture 
15-18: 229-294,1992: 218-234] and his concomitant preoccupation with the 
Husserlian "pure self-referentiality [1989: 230], " the absurdity or inappropriateness of 
which, according to Frank, Derrida "demonstrates [1992: 232]" well, but does not 
direct Descartes-Derrida alliance, which this study is investigating. 
211 introduced this phrase earlier in 1.323. 
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problematise radically enough [1992: 234]. Again, here in this picture, Descartes is 
present, and yet, only implicitly so. 
Interestingly enough, in a short survey of the Cartesian tradition of 
self-introspection where "the optical model of the spiritual eye reduces Being to 
being an object [Frank 1992: 222]" for the cognitive subject to see, Frank 
emphatically talks about "a step taken by Descartes [1992: 222]" which, as he rightly 
observes, determines the subsequent path of proto-Cartesian philosophies of 
self-consciousness. Yet, again, this had to be mentioned only as a passing remark, as 
Frank's destination lay elsewhere. To stop, however, at a passage that holds particular 
relevance to our thematic concern: 
A future candidature of the subject is already prepared by the announcement of 
the optic model (Being discloses itself in its truth to an ideational gaze): if being 
true depends upon the "view, " upon awareness, then it is only one more to 
the subjectisation of philosophy; the view must be thought as self-reflexive and 
attributed to a subject as its owner. This is the step taken by Descartes. For him, 
thinking (cogitare) is the deed of a thinker: of an I that thinks. Thinking acquires 
the indubitable evidence which is peculiar to it only in the first person singular 
form of inflection: cogito [... ] The thought of the self-reflexivity of thinking 
makes evident the transition from the subject of thinking to the nominalised "I", 
as Foucault rightly saw. [222-223] 
What interests us is this single "step" Descartes has taken. The self-reflexive 
attribution of the ownership of the world of the I to the I by the same I that thinks, as 
is indicated by the triple appearance of the I, Frank also points out, is characteristic of 
Descartes's shift to cogitational mode of thinking: this move amounts to the Cartesian 
"turn" to the self. The whole world, once transposed into the realm of 
self-consciousness, is at the risk of being consumed -"reduced to being an object-- by 
the cogito, therefore, also destroyed - reduced to nothing - by the dubito, a derivative 
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from the cogito. This turn to the self, this reversion to the self, has given rise to the 
methodological consolidation of the reflective model of self-consciousness. With this 
inward turn of the Cartesian mind, Western metaphysics saw the herald of its 
Cartesian epoch. At this point, let us then turn to, and step into, Descartes. 
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4. Self-reflexive Economy of Descartes's Cogito 
The aim of this chapter is offer a detailed and descriptive account of the 
self-centredness of Descartes's cogitational model of thinking; accordingly, all the 
other remaining, and more comprehensive, aspects of his cogito argument - e. g. the 
onto-theological basis of Cartesian cogitation which Descartes himself expounds 
particularly in the second half ofMeditationes, the historical context in which he 
proposed the argument, the impact of his thought on the epochal formation of 
philosophical modernity, etc. - will be excluded from the object of analysis. The 
following account of Descartes is concerned strictly with the descriptive analysis of 
the methodological aspects of the movement of the cogito isolatable as such, and 
neither with the evaluation of the method of cogitational thinking in relation to its 
historical precedents nor with the comparison of the method with other possible, 
non-cogitational modes of thinking. Consequently, no historical claim or reference 
will be made regarding the significance of the cogito argument, except for occasional 
references to Husserl, who, notably, saw Descartes's cogitational model of thinking 
as the "prototype of philosophical self-reflection [1931]". 
The focus of analysis, thus limited, is the inaugural inwardness of the cogito, 
i. e. the initial mode in which Descartes "steps" into a private realm of reflective self 
and consequently makes a reflexive move towards the ego of ego-cogito. A 
step-by-step explication of the reflexively constituted, interiority of Descartes's 
cogitational self will be undertaken in the belief that it will lead to a further 
clarification of the meta-reflective, and in this sense structurally Cartesian, dimension 
of Derrida's deconstructive trajectory, which the thesis as a whole seeks to show in 
the end and has already been explored in part I. 
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4.1 Descartes's Turn: An Opening-up of the Site of the Cogito 
4.11 An Inward Turn: Reversion to Self 
<4.111 Looking > 
For a Cartesian meditator, to meditate is to "look, " to look rather than to listen 
or feel, for instance. One does not necessarily take this meaning in a metaphorical or 
metaphysical sense; the literal or physical dimension of the meaning of the word, 
"look, " is also to be noted. For example, De la Dioptrique begins with the following 
passage, in which Descartes confers an exceptional status on the faculty of sight 
above all the other sensory perceptions: "the conduct of our life depends entirely on 
our senses, and [... ] sight is the noblest and most comprehensive (le plus universel) of 
the senses [Op, AT VI 81/CSM I 152]. " Descartes's passion for independent 
observation and his love of travels as an urban modem man, depicted in Discours 
[especially Part I, AT VI 6-11/CSM 1113-116, and Part 11, AT VI 16-18/CSM I 
118-119], also illustrate the avid interest he took in the business of "looking" in daily 
context. Also, in the preface to the French edition of Principia Philosophise, he 
expounds the virtues of his philosophy of "clear and distinct" ideas and principles. He 
draws the readers' attention, as well as his, to "the benefits of this philosophy [Pri, 
AT IXB 2/CSM 179]" by using the following simile: "living without philosophy is 
exactly like having one's eyes closed without ever trying to open them [Pri, AT IXB 
3/CSM 180]. " What is there in his version of philosophy, to which we are urged to 
reopen our eyes? What kind of vision is being referred to here? What is it that can be 
beheld by the other kind of eyes, i. e. "an inner eye"? This question is to be kept in 
mind, as we move on. 
Let us begin with the difference between worldly knowledge (la 
connaissance) and philosophical wisdom (1a Sagesse) that Descartes recognises. La 
connaissance is practical or informative knowledge [Pri, AT IXB 3-4/CSM I 180], 
the kind of knowledge that a blind man, when deprived of his stick or tactile access to 
external objects, would not possess [Op, AT VI 84-87/ CSM 1152-1531; la Sagesse, 
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the kind of knowledge that a blind man can also possess, is the "knowledge of the 
truth through its first causes, [... ] of which philosophy is the study [Pri, AT IXB 
3-4/CSM 1180]. " What matters in the acquisition of la connaissance is the mind's 
sensitivity towards, and its receptivity of, "differences" in the world. The more 
differentiated one's knowledge about things in the world, the more learned one 
becomes. The encyclopaedic possession of knowledge, that is, the acquisition of 
worldly knowledge of differences per se, however, does not interest Descartes so 
much as the right application of, or the ultimate worth of, the body of knowledge thus 
gained. For Descartes, the knowledge about the Other, the Other taken as a totality of 
empirical world thus objectified, is useful or meaningful when it contributes to the 
reflecting subject's acquisition of wisdom, la Sagesse, which includes 
self-knowledge. For example, if there is any virtue either in the acquisition of worldly 
experiences or in encounters with other human beings, according to him, this virtue 
can be assessed in terms of its level of contribution to the increase of "the knowledge 
of the truth through its first causes. " Accordingly, he suggests that it is not only 
desirable but, more importantly, necessary for a man of experience to expose himself 
as much as possible to alien environments other than his own familiar habitat [Dis, 
AT VI 16-19/CSM I118-120]. He argues for this necessity on the grounds that the 
worldly knowledge of multifarious forms of life delivers one from the pitfall of 
partial knowledge and prejudices; this type of ignorance, often encapsulated in the 
form of cultural parochialism, leads to a more serious blindness to the truth of 
universal humanity. In a similar vein, for a man of learning, to have more than one 
teacher is a necessity; it is a sure way to cultivate a mind of one's own, to become 
intellectually independent of any particular schools of thoughts. 
The distinction between la connaissance and la Sagesse thus given, we will 
then narrow down the focus of our reading on self-knowledge, taking it as that which 
contributes to the acquisition of what Descartes means by philosophical wisdom. The 
point to be stressed in the course of analysis is the economy of selfreflexion 
operative in Descartes's reversion to the reflective self. By the economy of 
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self-reflexion in this context, I mean the following: in Descartes's case, the 
knowledge of the other, the knowledge about the world as a whole, matters insofar as 
it contributes to the economy of the same; the one whose interest lies in searching for 
the truth, e. g. in acquiring secure self-knowledge, Descartes's exhortation goes, ought 
to make good use of this type of worldly knowledge. The telos here is 
self-knowledge, therefore, to know the other is only a means to this end. Satisfaction 
of the desire for self-knowledge involves, in the Cartesian model, the active 
engagement with the other rather than the passive withdrawal into the world of 
selfhood in the face of an encounter with the other. The explicitness of the way in 
which Descartes articulates his desire to make a project of his life by using - digesting 
or consuming, metaphorically speaking - the other, is illustrative of the fundamental 
self-interestedness of Cartesian discourse. That which becomes pronounced in this 
picture of metaphysics is then the subject of the metaphysical desire, i. e. a voice of 
the metaphysician, rather than metaphysics per se. 
Observe, in the passage quoted below, that Descartes uses a motif of "excess" 
in presenting his version of philosophy. With this, a point worth noting further is that 
the difference between "pleasure" as the gratification of bodily needs and 
"satisfaction" as the visio-mental fulfilment of desire for philosophy parallels that 
between la connaissance and la Sagesse. Descartes invites us to open our eyes to the 
Cartesian theatre of philosophical desire, active and insatiable: 
[... ] Living without philosophy is exactly like having one's eyes closed without 
every trying to open them; and the pleasure (le plaisir) of seeing everything 
which our sight reveals is in no way comparable to the satisfaction (la 
satisfaction) accorded by knowledge (la connaissance) of the things which 
philosophy enables us to discover. [... ] The study of philosophy is more 
necessary for the regulation of our morals and our conduct in this life than is the 
use of our eyes to guide our steps [... ] The brute beasts, who have only their 
bodies to preserve, are continually occupied in looking for food to nourish them; 
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but human beings, whose most principal part is the mind (I'esprit), should 
devote their principal efforts to the search for wisdom, which is the true food of 
mind. [... ] No soul, however base, is so strongly attached to the objects of the 
sense that it does not sometimes turn aside and desire some other, greater good 
[... ], a higher good, [... ] this supreme good [... ] is nothing other than the 
knowledge of the truth through its first causes, that is to say wisdom, of which 
philosophy is the study. [Pri, AT IXB 3-4/CSM 11801 
< 4.112 Looking Again: Searching > 
For Descartes, "to philosophise" means to "start with the search for first 
causes or principles, " the one who can be called a philosopher in the "proper" sense 
of the word, according to him, is the one who begins with this "search 
I" [Pri, AT 
IXB 2/CSM 1179]. What interests us, specifically, is the meaning of the word, 
"search. " 
Descartes's "search" for la Sagesse is an "inward" move in the sense that la 
Sagesse is to be found in the mind; "First, the first causes or principles must be so 
clear and so evident that the human mind cannot doubt their truth when it attentively 
concentrates on them [Pri, AT IXB 2/CSM I 179]. " For Descartes the sceptic, it is 
possible that, after all, he may not even have the physical eyes with which to see 
things, for the faculty of sensory perceptions is, after all, unreliable; and what makes 
it possible to entertain this sceptical thought is a hypothesis of the existence of an 
inner eye, a kind of eye that looks mentally as opposed to physically. His meditation 
on the wax is a good example: 
What is this wax which is perceived by the mind alone? It is of course the same 
wax which I see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the 
I Also take note of the title of his incomplete dialogue, "La recherche de la verite par la lumiere 
Yzaturelle (the Search for Truth by means of the Natural Light)" [Rch, AT X 495-527/CSM 1400-4201 
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same wax which I thought it to be from the start. And yet, and here is the point, 
the perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination [... ] 
despite previous appearances - but of purely mental scrutiny; and this can be 
imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct as it is now, 
depending on how carefully I concentrate on what the wax consists in. [Med, AT 
VII 21/CSM 113 1] 
In a similar way, the third Meditatione opens with the wilful elimination of 
the senses, which leads to the deliberate isolation of the mind in self-regard. The 
inward turn of the mind gives rise to a model of thinking that is introspective, 
therefore, self-referential. With this move, an act of self-intimation becomes more 
violent and explicit. Here, self-harm and self-love take place at the same time in the 
unfolding of self-will; 
I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will 
eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is 
hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. I 
will converse with myself and scrutinise myself more deeply; and in this way I 
will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. 
[Med, AT VII 34/CSM 11241 
In order to fulfil this "will, " Descartes looks again, and, this time, looks into 
himself. With this unique force of the "again, " the external world, in its entirety, 
comes to be transposed into the meditator's consciousness. With this great turn to 
himself, the whole world becomes folded within the "inner space2" inherent in the 
2 Richard Rorty [1979: 49-50] points out that Descartes (and Locke) described an observer 
fundamentally different from anything in Greek and medieval thought. Rorty pays a particular attention 
to the meta-space of self-reflection secured in the Cartesian mind, describing it as "an inner space in 
which both pains and clear and distinct ideas passed in review before an Inner Eye, " he adds that "the 
novelty was the notion of a single inner space in which bodily and perceptual sensations [... ] were 
objects of quasi-observation. " 
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single gaze of the meditator. The "entire earth is to be shifted" into the world of the 
mind; and what makes this "shifting" possible is the hypothesis of an immobile point, 
a zero point of departure-cum-destination, a vantage point of view, from which the 
interior world of the self (as opposed to the world of exteriority and the other) can 
unfold. Accordingly, Descartes is led to identify and characterise this point of 
necessary fiction as an "Archemedian [Med, AT VII 24/CSM 11 16]" view-point. 
What Descartes narrates in his autobiographical versions of philosophy, notably in 
Discours and Meditationes, is that which happens in, and appears to, his mind, the 
moment he reverts to himself, the moment he turns to his version of philosophy. 
4.12 A Circular Turn: Return to Self 
< 4.121 Directing > 
The Cartesian version of the "I", most minimally defined, can be conceived 
as an introspective reversion to the "I. " What remains as a tropological effect in this 
act of turning is a sense of "direction, " initial and minimal. The "directed-ness" of the 
pure ego is also what Husserl points out as the first aspect or effect of the cogito: 
[... ] after the manner of the cogito, the subject "directs" itself within it towards 
the intentional object. To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "glancing 
towards" a directedness which [... ] springs forth from the "Ego, " which can 
therefore never be absent. [Husserl, Ideas §37,109] 
The mental object, toward which the ego is directed, is, in Husserl's term, the 
"intentional object. " In a similar manner, Descartes also, for example, in de la 
Diaoptrique, brings to the fore this dimension of intentionality; I am referring to the 
section where he discusses the "inner" vision man is capable of possessing [Op, AT 
VI 84-86/ CSM 1153-154]. "Intentional forms" in the mind, he argues, are present in 
the minds of both the sighted and the blind. Therefore, conceived as the metaphysical 
Cartesian Deconstruction 175 Chapter 4: Self-reflexive Economy of Descartes's Cogito 
being's meta-physical capacity to look into and inside itself, this form is considered 
to be ubiquitously inherent in all human minds. This form, accordingly, is that which 
configures "the imagination of the philosophers. " This peculiar capacity of the human 
intellect, according to Descartes, enables one to direct one's attention to the inner 
world of self-consciousness away from the external world; 3 it is in this way that a 
blind man can "see" without his physical eyes. Husserl's view on this matter is not 
much different from Descartes's in its basic contention: "[... ] one's mental eye [... ] 
belongs to the essence of the cogito, to the act as such [Husserl, Ideas I §37,109]. " 
The Cartesian turn to the "I, " characterised this way, is initially an act of pure 
intending, of "inward directing. " The cogito is, firstly, a "turning-towards. " It is a 
mental event that happens in the mind, when the mind actively turns towards itself, to 
which the intentional objects correspond correlatively. In this sense, it is an 
"objectifying turn of thought", as Husserl defines it accordingly [Husserl, Ideas §37, 
110]. 
Arguably, the problem of "direction", i. e. where to turn to?, is the most 
central and pressing issue for Descartes, whose central interest lies in gaining 
self-certainty, metaphorically speaking, in protecting himself from the risk of 
precipitation. Descartes in a dream finds himself reading a line from an ode of 
Ausonius: "Quod vitae sectabor fiter? (What road in life shall I follow? ) [Cogitationes 
Privatae /Observations, AT X 216/CSM I 4fn]. " The centrality of this dream 
experience to the life of Descartes is reflected, almost directly, in his articulation of 
the key question of Discours: what is the "right way to conduct my reason4"? 
3 Perceptual activism is one of the most distinctive features of Descartes's introspective model of 
thinking. If positivists' or empiricists' eyes are that which only "sees" passively, the Cartesian eyes, in 
contrast, are that which "looks" actively. Ian Hacking summarises this difference in the following way: 
"Cartesian perception is the active rendering of the object transparent to the mind. Positivist seeing is 
the passive blunting of light rays on opaque, impermeable "physical objects" which are themselves 
passive and indifferent to the observer. [Hacking 1975: 33]" 
4Read also: 
[.. ] the diversity of our opinions does not arise because some of us arc more reasonable than others 
but solely because we direct our thoughts along different paths and do not attend to the same 
things. For its is not enough to have a good mind; the main thing is to apply it well. [... J Those who 
proceed but very slowly can make much greater progress, if they always follow the right path, than 
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[... ] A single man is much more likely to hit upon truths than a group of people. 
[... ] Unable to choose anyone whose opinion struck me as preferable to those of 
all others, I found myself as it were forced to become my own guide. Like a 
man who walks alone in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly, and to use 
such circumspection in all things, that even if I made but little progress, I should 
at least be sure not to fall. [Dis, AT VI 16-17/CSM I 119] 
Descartes's man, "a single man, " a master of himself, is the kind of person willing to 
brave the night of epistemological abyss, and to do so by himself; he turns against the 
public, and turns, instead, to himself, looking for a single direction leading to a good 
life. Where is the single light, "the natural light of reason, " which will illuminate the 
"darkened intellect (caligantis ingenii)"of mine? [Med, AT VII 52/CSM 11361, asks 
Descartes. 
< 4.122 Idio > 
A turn of the ego towards the "non-absence" of the ego cogilo, as Husserl puts 
it, is singular, first, in the numerical sense of the word; the ego involved in this turn is 
numerically singular, although its derivatives can be made plural, as in alter-ego, for 
example. Despite the numerical singularity, this ego is not yet "a person", i. e. a unit 
of protected privacy, a publicly numerable human entity. At this inchoate stage of 
subject-formation, the singularity of Descartes's "a man who thinks" is conceptually 
closer to the idiotic individuality or idiosyncrasy of Deleuze's "idiot, " "the 
conceptual personae (le personnage conceptue! ) [1991: 60-81/61-85]" than to the 
solitude or autonomy of a reflexive being; 
those who hurry and stray from it. [Dis, AT VI 2/CSM I 1111 
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[... ] The idiot is the private thinker, in contrast to the public thinker (the 
schoolman [le scholastique]): the teacher refers constantly to taught concepts 
(man-rational animal), whereas the private thinker forms a concept with innate 
forces that everyone possesses on their own account by right ("I think"). Here is 
a very strange type of persona who wants to think, who thinks for himself, by 
the "natural light. " This idiot is a conceptual personae. The question "are there 
precursors of the cogito? " can be made more precise. Where does the persona of 
the idiot come from, and how does it appear? Is it in a Christian atmosphere, but 
in reaction against the "scholastic" organisation of Christianity and the 
authoritarian organisation of the church? Can traces of this persona already be 
found in St. Augustine? [... ] In any case, the history of philosophy must go 
through [passer] these personae, through their chances according to planes and 
through their variety according to concepts. Philosophy constantly brings 
conceptual personae to life; it gives life to them. [Deleuze 1991: 60-61/62] 
The first entertainment of the idea of cogitare separates the "I" of "I think" 
from the world. The first person conjugation of the verb, cogitare, separates the "I" 
from other persons; it is the "r' that "cogitat, " and no body else. The "I" that makes 
this utterance is not even solipsistic or solitary yet in any active senses the `solo-' 
conveys. In other words, this "r' that appears to the reflective self as a "strange type 
of persona, " not yet as "me, " remains as yet a third person, an "it. " The "I" as an "it" 
is merely being "idiotic" as opposed to "solitary" or "autonomous, " for solitude or 
autonomy requires self-identity, while idiocy does not. The thought behind this 
distinction is that to be solitary and autonomous, minimally defined, is to be in a 
self-identified state of one's separation from the world. The ego's solipsistic concerns 
with itself will occur, therefore, only after this type of "idiotic" being can be 
self-identified as such. Having not yet been self-identif ied as such, at this seminal 
stage of cogitation, the idiotic ego remains merely idiosyncratic; it has not yet 
become autonomous. In other words, it does not yet appear to itself in any "clear and 
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distinct" forms of self-understanding. The "idiot" is a figure that, whilst being 
alienated from the reasonable public, is not yet capable of deliberative self-alienation. 
< 4.123 Auto > 
What the "idiotic" ego lacks, in comparison to an individual ego, is temporal 
awareness. The first person present conjugation of the verb, cogitare, separates the 
present "I" from all the other "I"s of the past and future. This act of self-eventuation 
takes place in the present tense. This particular moment of self-presence, this 
moment thus singled out, is the "now-point" of self-reflexion. At this stage, the ego of 
ego-cogito is no longer passive; it is active. It is not merely or passively alienated 
from other beings in the world; rather, it actively alienates itself from the world, and 
converts its worldly alienation into a particular instance, into a particular event in the 
new world of interiority, in a new world "of its own. " The moment when a self is 
present to itself, coincides with, and corresponds to, the moment when it actively 
presents itself to itself. Each moment the cogito is pronounced by the speaking 
subject, there occurs an irreducible act of self-presencing. The first person present 
conjugation of cogitare leads the grammatical subject to recognise the moment of 
self-presence in the very experience of conjugation. In this sense, we can characterise 
this move the cogito effects as a move from the pre-reflexive presence of a self to the 
reflexive self-presence of a self to itself, which corresponds to a move from "idio" to 
"auto. " 
This particular, or rather particularising move is that which automatically 
singles out the moment of conjugation, the moment of reflective curvature of 
cogitare. In this sense, this act of "singling out" is an act of singularisation, in other 
words, a move to self-authenticate one's particularity. This move of automatic 
self-authentication marks out the unique force of the ego-cogito: each time cogitare 
is conjugated in the first person present-tense, the ego-cogito is truly and always a 
self-reflectedly and self-closedly authentic event. A movement of self-reflexivity can 
be traced here: it is that which bridges and underlies the passage from presence to 
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self-presence, from the idiotic presence of a self to the automatic self-presentation of 
such a self. 
Thereby, the word, "self-reflexion, " can be understood in the following 
twofold manner. First, self-reflexion is a descriptive name for that which the 
self-reflective self experiences procedurally at the time of its first person 
present-tense cogitation: it is a procedural notion, signifying a "movement" of 
thought. Second, it also marks the happening of a constitutive experience, an 
experience that constitutes and completes the circular movement of a dialectic of 
reflexion: it refers to a constituted phenomenon of thought-effect. In Descartes, 
particularly in his Regulae, these two aspects are clearly differentiated from each 
other, articulated as such in two different sets of terms. 
To note the two different senses of self-reflexion is important in that the 
conceptual "shift" from idio to auto, along with the consequential movement of the 
self from presence to self-presence, can be further clarified on the basis of that 
difference. This section [4.123 Auto] will be devoted to an elaboration of the 
difference at stake. The aim of the analysis is to gain a structural understanding of the 
way in which Descartes uses, as I will show towards the end of this section, the 
automaticity of self-reflexion as the justificatory basis of his cogito argument. 
When the self-reflecting ego pursues the task of self-identification, what the 
ego experiences, as Deleuze puts it, is an experience of "passing through. " There is 
an experience of passing through a series of steps of thinking. Descartes describes the 
steps of thinking involved in self-reflexion as "a train of reasoning [... ]" where "a 
long chain is connected to the first [R, AT X 369-370/CSM I 15-16]. " Note that 
self-reflexion takes the form of an inferential or deductive "chain. " 
The necessity for a thinker to follow these steps of thinking is what Descartes 
emphasises in Regulae, particularly in the opening pages. When undertaking a 
project, Descartes emphasises, one needs to have an aim, a set of clearly laid out 
objectives [Rule 1], which, as he continues to argue, needs to be accompanied by the 
right application of the appropriate methods [Rule 3-4]. Having introduced the word, 
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"step, " in Rule 5,5 he then continues to use it with a notable frequency [Rule 5-6] 
until he stops at Rule 7, where he suddenly decides to recast this series of "attentive" 
and "careful, " "detailed, " and "discriminating" reflections [R, AT X 384-7/CSM I 
23-24] into a "wholly uninterrupted sweep of thought [R, AT X 388/CSM I 25]"; 
again in Rule 8 he says, "we must stop at that point [R, AT X 392/CSM I 28]. " Then, 
he continues to dwell on this fixed thought until he reaffirms in Rule 116 the need to 
discontinue the inferential reasoning when the necessity arises. Following Descartes, 
we will dwell on this necessity to discontinue, on this moment of completion. 
Interestingly, in Rule 11, which acts as a summary account of the preceding 
ten rules, Descartes expands on the irreducible difference between "a movement of 
the mind" as a "passage" in the mind and the "completion" of the movement; 
[... ] inferring one thing from another involves a kind of movement of our mind. 
In that passage, then, we are justified in distinguishing intuition from deduction. 
But, if we look at deduction as a completed process, as we did in Rule Seven, 
then, it no longer signifies a movement but rather the completion of a 
movement. [R, AT X 407/CSM 13 71 
Cogitation, understood as a procedural term, is a dynamic "movement" of 
reflection; in contrast, when viewed as a mental entity thus acquired, it is a 
"completion" of the movement, therefore, a static moment of reflexion, 
self-identified as such by means of a higher level self-reflexion. If the mind "passes 
5 The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects on which we must 
concentrate our mind's eye if we are to discover some truth. We shall be following this method 
exactly we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and 
then, starting with the intuition of the simplest one of all, by to ascend through the same step to a 
knowledge of all the rest. [R, AT X 380/CSM 1201 
6 If, after intuiting a number of simple propositions, we deduce something else from them, it is useful 
to run through them in a continuous and completely uninterrupted train of thought, to reflect 
on their relations to another, and to form a distinct and, as far as possible, simultaneous 
conception of several of them. For in this way our knowledge becomes much more certain, and our 
mental capacity is enormously increased [R, AT X 407/CSM 137J 
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through" the steps in the first phase of cogitation, in the second phase, it "runs 
through [R, AT X 407/CSM I 37]" at once, at one go, "at one glance [R, AT X 
370/CSM I 15], " "as if it were at a single glance [Second Set of Replies, AT VII 
110/CSM II 110J. " The discursive space held between Rule 5 and 7 is different from 
that between Rule 7 and 11: the former is concerned with the opening up of the space 
of reflection, and the latter, with the reflexive closure of the same space. To explain 
this more, the former kind of reflection is possible as the mind has the capacity to go 
through deductive steps of reasoning. Then, it must "stop" at a certain point where 
the movement becomes "superfluous, " as Descartes says [R, AT X 392/CSM 1281 in 
Rule 8; it must stop when the thing appearing in the mind turns out to be "something 
which the intellect is unable to intuit sufficiently well"; in other words, this process 
of reflective reasoning must stop where the intellect cannot perceive any longer the 
thing at stake at a "single" glance. The train of thoughts must return to its station, to 
its destination, to its conclusion, to its envisaged end of project; this necessity, in 
turn, marks out the intellect's inability to pursue transgressive or infinite reflections. 
We will return to this moment of failure shortly after. 
What renders possible the first movement of reflection is the force of 
deduction; in turn, the second movement of returning becomes possible, when guided 
by the instant spark of intuition7. The "steps" which deduction follows are 
inferential, "botched together [R, AT X 368/CSM 11 141, " thereby, multiple and 
complex; and by contrast, the step which intuition takes is im-mediate and simple, in 
other words, singular. As Stephen Gaukroger observes, 
7 In what follows, my discussion of Descartes's intuition focus exclusively on the first intuition, I exist; 
accordingly, the second intuition, God exists, will not be dealt with. I will confine my discussion to a set 
of problems pertaining to the existence of the thinking "I, " the problem Descartes formulates and deals 
with before deciding to involve God in his human drama. The second intuition: God exists, he claims, is 
inextricably linked to the first. The rationale for this is the deductive derivability of the second from the 
first. I borrowed the distinction between the first and second intuition from Gueroult and Grene [Grene 
1985: 181 
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Descartes tells us that in the case of lengthy inferences we must go through the 
inferential steps more and more quickly so that in the end we grasp the premises 
and conclusion in one instantaneous step. In doing this we assimilate inference 
to the canonical case of intuitus. [1989: 58] 
With the mind's deliberative act of delimiting its own terrain of self-reflexion, 
describable as an act of reflexive closure as opposed to an act of reflective opening, 
the clarity, distinctiveness, unity, and simplicity of self-reflexivity becomes privileged 
over its shadow, obscurity, elusiveness, and complexity8. Prescribing the Rule 7, 
Descartes re-directs his attention to "the obvious transitivity of connections 
[Gaukroger 1989: 58]" amongst ideas within that closure, not to the complicated 
contiguity amongst ideas thus related to each other in infinite branches of the 
Porphyrian tree9. 
This decision, this turn, this return to the starting point, this reflexive closure 
of the mind, is not without a justificatory basis. We will now look briefly at how 
Descartes justifies this need for reflexive stability, in other words, in what way he is 
led to the conclusion that the reflexive closure of the self, as opposed to the 
experience of "stepping" beyond, is to be the last step to take. In short, the question 
is: why this return, this rush to the starting point? Why rush, now? The task is to 
8 For example, take note of the opening passage of the Rule Four which issues the following warning: 
"So blind is the curiosity with which mortals are possessed that they often direct their minds down 
untrodden paths, in the groundless hope that they will chance upon what they are seeking [R, AT X 
371/CSM 115]. " 
9 Eudoxus: [... ] If, for example, I were to ask even Epistemon himself what a man is, and he gave a 
stock reply of scholastics, that a man is a "rational animal, " and if, in order to explain these two 
terms (which are just as obscure as the former), he were to take us further, through all the levels of 
which are called "metaphysical", we should be dragged into a maze from which it would be 
impossible to escape; [... ] you see immediately that the questions, like the branches of a family 
tree, would rapidly increase and multiply. Quite clearly, the result of all these admirable questions 
would be pure verbiage, which would elucidate nothing and leave us in our original state of 
ignorance. 
Epistcmon: I am sorry you despise the tree of Porphyry, which the learned have always admired [... ]. 
[Reh, AT X 515-516/CSM 114 10, see translator's footnote] 
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elucidate the justificatory basis of his argument: what needs to be analysed is the 
self-supporting aspects of his trajectory. For this, I suggest we turn to the distinction 
Descartes makes between intuition and deduction prior to the prescription of the Rule 
5. Already in Rule 3, he says, 
By "intuition" I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the sense or the 
deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things together, but, the 
conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there 
can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding. Alternatively, and 
this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear 
and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. Because it is 
simpler, it is more certain than deduction, though deduction is not something a 
man can perform wrongly. Thus everyone can mentally intuit that he exists, that 
he is thinking, [... ] The self-evidence and certainty of intuition is required not 
only for apprehending single propositions, but also for any train of reasoning 
whatever. [... ] Hence, we are distinguishing mental intuition from certain 
deduction on the grounds that we are aware of a movement or a sort of sequence 
in the latter but not in the former, and also because immediate self-evidence is 
not required for deduction, as it is for intuition. [R, AT X 369-371/CSM 114-5] 
In the above, the distinction between intuition and deduction is clearly 
articulated, and there seems to be nothing fundamentally new in this passage that we 
have not noted earlier. None the less, those words I emphasised seem to invite further 
reflections. A threefold account of the conceptual elements of intuition shall be 
given: automaticity, infallibility, and immediacy - the aim of the analysis is to see 
how these notions are interconnected. 
To begin with the automaticity or autonomy of intuition, intuition proceeds 
"solely" from the light of reason. Elsewhere, Descartes also stresses the autonomous 
aspect of intuition by affirming that it relies on nothing but the light of reason, which 
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"operates on its own [Rch, AT X 521/CSM II 415]"; then, he immediately adds that 
an argument based on good sense and intuition, with which the natural light of reason 
provides the human, is "less liable to go wrong" than an argument relying on a set of 
arbitrary "rules" of thinking, which tends to generate a long chain of reasoning, 
which, thereby, is more prone to errors. This shift of emphasis from the automaticity 
of intuition to the infallibility of it is exactly what takes place again in the passage 
quoted above. What I am highlighting here is Descartes's discursive move in which 
he assigns an epistemic value to the automaticity of intuition: his point is that 
deduction, when properly based on intuition, can"not" go "wrong. " 
The infallibility of intuition is, in turn, further explicated on the basis of the 
"immediacy" of intuition's self-manifestation. Intuition is evident, according to 
Descartes, neither in view of, nor on the basis of, another piece of more fundamental 
evidence, but already evident in itself, therefore, self-evident. There are things that 
cannot be "explained" or "logically defined" further on a more fundamental 
axiomatic ground than on its own, but, can only be "demonstrated" solely by virtue of 
the natural light of reason, for they themselves are the products of solar reason [A 
Letter to Mersenne, 16 October 1639, AT 11 596-7/ CSM 111 139]; included in these 
"things which are very simple and known naturally" is intuition. 
Note that, here again, Descartes's gives the name, intuitionl0, to that which 
marks the limits of discursive meta-explanation. Similarly, he says, "I have no 
criterion for mine (my truths) except for the natural light [... ] there are many things 
which can be known by the natural light, but which no one has yet reflected on [A 
Letter to Mersenne, 16 October 1639, AT 11 596-7/ CSM 111 139]. " Observe further 
that what interests Descartes is an economy of delimitation rather than the problem of 
1 OThis is far from claiming that Descartes was the first one who discovered this truth about intuition, 
namely, intuition as a solution to infinite regress. (For a summary account of the historical background - 
the Platonic-Augustinian, in particular - that heavily informs Descartes's ocular notion of "intuition, " 
see Cottingham [1993: 94-96] ). In explicating the manner in which Descartes falls back on intuition and 
identifies it as the reliable and irreducible, epistemological ground of self-knowledge, the point I am 
making is, however, regarding neither the novelty of his move nor the banality of it; the point I am 
stressing here concerns the economic dimension of Descartes's act of marking out the locus of intuition 
as such. What is meant by the economy of designation in this context will be shown shortly. 
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the limits. The limit-consciousness itself, for Descartes, is an epistemological 
resource for self-knowledge, not an ontological or existential predicament of the self 
an experience of the limits, of the failure, gives him a chance to convert the very 
awareness of the limit into notions such as the axiomatic and the self-evident, 
namely, the "intuition" that cannot be negated further. Blaise Pascal's rather sarcastic 
remark on the Cartesian economy of thinking sums up the line of argument we have 
been pursuing. He says: 
In addressing itself only to the simplest things, this worthy science renders them 
incapable of definition by the same gesture that their simplicity makes them 
proper as its objects, in such a manner that their lack of definition is an asset 
(une perfection) rather than a drawback. 
I1 [Recit. Judovitz 1989: 951 
The Cartesian version of economy of reflexion operates on the basis of the 
primacy of intuition. The role of Cartesian intuition is regulative rather than 
generative; it allows Descartes to return to that which remains as one and the same, 
namely, the self-evident, every time the necessity arises to delimit the totality of 
referential chain of reflective reasoning. The need Descartes articulates here is a need 
for "a divine or transcendental referent to buttress the axiomatic [Judovitz 1988: 96], " 
as Dalia Judovitz puts it. This necessity to "buttress the axiomatic" by means of 
drawing on the natural light of reason, arises inevitably in Descartes's system of 
cogitation, for his goal-oriented project requires that the ultimate threat of the 
regressive infinity of reflections be excluded. In order to ensure that, first, a reflective 
"train" of reasoning stops at a certain point, and second, the stationary point, in turn, 
acts as a secure starting point of projective regression, Descartes, in the end, has no 
choice but to appeal to a notion of truth conceived and defined in terms of what 
II Pascal, Blaise, L. Lafuma (ed. ) (1963), Oeuvres completes, Paris; Seuil, p. 351 
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Gaukroger described as "a psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject 
[1988: 55]"; 
Truth must be taken as primitive in some context, but not in all, and this much 
can surely be accepted with accepting reductionism. Descartes's account blocks 
off further elucidation because it establishes the primitiveness of truth in too 
strong a way. Consequently, when we are asked to justify something 
fundamental, such as an inferential principle, we are forced back ultimately on 
to a form of psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject. 
With this appeal, the automatic becomes the simple and primitive, the simple 
and primitive becomes the obvious, and the obvious, the axiomatic12. In this way, the 
act of self-clarification leads to, and amounts to, an act of self-validation. To 
volunteer to "accept" the necessary reductionism at a certain point is to acknowledge 
the failure of further reflection at that point. Seen from an economic point of view, 
this moment when the reflective self acknowledges its failure to move on is precisely 
the point where the self knows its limit, where it delimits its own reflective territory; 
thereby, this self becomes self-reflexively authentic to itself. 
An act of performative self-delimitation - via reflexion - where the self 
performatively authenticates the founding value of its own intuition, cannot, however, 
be perceived as a valid discursive move by the other, unless there is already a 
communal consensus regarding the epistemological value of self-evidence and its 
concomitant, demonstrative powers. The fact that what comes to the fore at the 
beginning of Discours is the community of people with "good sense, " i. e. the 
12 For Descartes, intuition is the place where psychology meets logic, where the former is conflated 
with the latter. David Weissman [1996: 148, Essay 31 points out, rightly, that Descartes encourages "a 
psychological reading of his notion of truth: clarity and distinctness imply that the mind's eye is 
perfectly focused, and that truth is achieved when the matters to be known are presented, without 
meditation, to our inspecting minds"; however, as Weissman also goes on to argue, "confidence in their 
truth requires that clarity and distinctness should also be a logical test. We defend ourselves from error 
only as an idea of judgement is counted true because its negation is a contradiction. " 
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community that shares the natural light of reason, rather than a member of the 
community, i. e. Descartes himself, is telling: the delimitation of the community of the 
reasonable public is a discursive trap with which he later catches himself. When 
Descartes literally marks the limits of his discourse by saying that "I have no criterion 
for my truths except for the natural light13, " what he does discursively is therefore to 
affirm the powers of demonstrative reasoning; what he shows or "demonstrates" is 
that the human capacity for demonstrative reasoning is that which is "already" there 
in the intellect in the form of "natural light of reason. " The self-evident automaticity 
of demonstrative reasoning is what he axiomatises in order to validate his 
self-reflexive reversion to the thinking subject. 
What Descartes's system necessitates, in this regard, is the last referent 
secured against the threat of the infinite regress of the reflexive self. That with which 
Descartes finally identifies this referent is intuition or self-evidence. The example of 
the intuitive understanding of the self he offers is the ego-cogito. What validates the 
cogito argument, "cogito ergo sum, " is the irreducible self-referentiality of the first 
person singular present act of self-reflexive cogitation, namely, I think (of myself as 
that which thinks): the validity of the ego of ego-cogito's leap into its sum is 
maintained on the self-evident basis of the ego's phenomenological adherence to its 
own awareness of self-presence, or rather, on the basis of the ego's impossibility of 
being otherwise, that is, of the impossibility of it being self-absent. This force of 
natural reason, to which, as Descartes emphasises, the human reason cannot but be 
subject, guarantees and sustains the epistemological supremacy of the first person 
singular reflexive act of cogitation. Thereby, what remains, what remains for the 
self-reflexive ego to appropriate, is the self-reflexively "given" temporality, the 
now-point of the cogito, or to be more precise, the hypothesis of self-presence 
"taken" as a now-point, which corresponds to the grammatical time of the linguistic 
expression, "cogito. " 
13 another example: "bur mind is of such nature that it cannot help assenting to what it conceives clearly 
[A Letter to Regius, AT III 64/CSM 11I 147]. " 
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This way, the self-reflexively economised hypothesis of a now point endures; 
it endures whilst being sheltered in the "as long as. " Conclusively, what Descartes's 
cogito argument shows and shows performatively boils down to this: as long as I am 
aware of myself, as long as I am capable of turning towards myself, I cannot be made 
nothing; nobody, no evil genius, can "bring it about that I am nothing as long as I 
think that I am something (ut nihil sim quanuliu me aliquid esse cogitabo). [Med, AT 
VII 25/CSM 11 17], " Likewise, Derrida argues, as long as there is the "I" that is 
clearly aware of the ideas presently appearing in its mind, these ideas are something, 
"even though they may not exist anywhere outside me, (they) still cannot be called 
nothing [Med, AT VII 65/CSM II 45]. " 
To conclude: when the "I" of the ego-cogito performs the reflexive act of 
cogitation by attempting to articulate its ineluctable will to self-presence14, by 
attempting to substantialise the unavoidable hypothesis of self-presence, the "I" is 
converted from an "un-self-identified idiot" into "a self-identified idiot, " namely, into 
an individual, a singular person, an autonomous entity of thinking. In this sense, this 
type of self-conversion amounts, firstly, to the performative self-identification of the 
numerical distinctiveness of the ego, and therefore, secondly, to the automatic 
self-authentication of the self-same identity. The Cartesian process of 
self-transformation is irreversibly regressive: it is a process of rescuing oneself from 
the abyss of idiocy (the first move), from an "abyss of vacuity [Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 9], " as Hegel would put it; and in the course of overcoming 
the first threat, it increases the risk of falling into another abyss (the second move), 
the abyss of solipsism. The automaticity of self-reflexive closure increases, rather 
than precludes, the latter possibility. 
14 For an illuminating discussion of the conceptual relationship between reflexivity and will in 
Descartes, see Weissman [1996: 149-150, Essay 3], where he explains the irreducible duality in the 
Cartesian model of thinking in terms of the differential order of self-awareness. According to Weissman, 
one way to translate the cogito would be to say, "I discern myself, reflexively, as I think of other things 
[149], " in other words, "First-order thinking is provoked by whatever things are presented for 
inspection. Second-order thinking [... ] does not occur without the other: performance or control of 
some vital mental function and self-awareness [ 150]. " 
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< 4.124 Concentric > 
The Cartesian mind is structured like a machine, a doubling machine, the 
originary structure of which is that of recursivity. A recursive doubling of the self 
gives rise to the infinite transcendence of the self What the reflexive machine does is 
to split the domain of the self into two, immediately in a split second. This doubling 
happens in such a way that the dualised self is inevitably led to experience an instant 
experience of otherness in itself, an experience of self-doubt. What the ego of ego 
cogito experiences in the split-second is a paradox of successful failure: the "I" 
succeeds in bringing into awareness the failure of self-mastery. Hence, the 
transcendence of the self that takes place infinitely. 
Descartes's genius, in this regard one can say, lies in having created his alter 
ego, the evil genius, in other words, in having formulated sharply and economised 
effectively, if not solving satisfactorily, this paradox of successful failure. When the 
"I" of "I think" fails to capture the infinite transcendence of the self, the very 
awareness of it by the same "I" renders the event of self-reflexion productive. Hence, 
the Cartesian "economy" or machinery of reflexion. The novelty value of Descartes's 
method of reflexion is found in that it establishes the mechanically reciprocal 
relationship between the finite and the infinite in such a way that the possibility of the 
infinite, God, can be secured on the basis of the finite, and vice versa; in a similar 
way, the elusive self - the idiotic self or the abyssal self - is also forced to participate 
in the economy of self-reflexion. For Descartes, to resolve the paradox of 
self-transcendence of the self means to hypothesise the recursivity of the moments of 
transcendence, in other words, to formalise the mode of transcendence. Descartes's 
specular ego is the cognitive subject, who sees the "form" of this happening by 
turning and returning to itself, and does so repeatedly. 
The point of departure in the cogito argument, to which Descartes ultimately 
returns through repeated movements of reflexion, enfolds, and at the same time, 
unfolds itself; it "enfolds" itself in the sense that the steps of thinking he needs to go 
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through in order to get to the end point, are already implicit in the starting point; it 
"unfolds" itself in the sense that it is only through an experience of going through 
these implicit steps of thinking that the point of departure can be discovered anew. 
This point, a point of both departure and arrival, is where the self finally finds itself 
self-present. This point is to be grasped in such a way that it can secure the path of 
self-knowledge. It is these twofold, dialectical "steps" of self-overcoming that 
Descartes exhorts us to follow, and to follow along with him. 
What does Descartes usually do in order to hold tight this point in his sight? 
Notably, he "concentrates"; he "reflects upon matters at stake more attentively [Med, 
AT VII 55/CSM II 38], " for example. The hypothesis of a concentric point of 
thinking is a necessary condition for the possibility of concentration. Concentric 
movements of repeated thinking are what the Cartesian thinking machine follows and 
must follow. Could Descartes have thought "cogito" without, at the same time, 
allowing himself to be surrounded by an image of circle? Descartes on the verge, on 
the verge of abyssal collapse, concentrates, and concentrates again, lest he lose the 
very tension of circular thoughts in which his thinking being is held, and held 
hostage. 
Concentration does not diverge; it converges. The self that departs has to be 
identical to the self to which the departing self finally returns. The Cartesian self, to 
stay with the analogy of a circle, is the self that occupies the focus of a circular self; it 
thereby "watches over, " - to put it in the words of Derrida - and directs, all the 
egological movements happening within its phenomenological space thus opened up. 
Concentration is a way to control the phenomenological excess of the self. In 
Descartes's model of thinking, the thinking ego, every time it attempts to think, even 
when attempting to transgress the very order of the circular, is always already bound 
to return to this originary point of departure; hence, a return to the very self, the self 
that exceeds itself by thinking more than what it thinks (of) 15. With Descartes's 
"To introduce Weissman's diagram of the Cartesian self-reflexivity, the structure of the Cartesian mind 
[1996: 330-331, Essay 7]: 
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concentric movements towards the res cogitans, the milieu of speculative cogitation 
becomes circumscribed as such. 16 Once all the faculties set about col-laborating in 
the phenomenological construction of this circular site of philosophy, what is bound 
to happen to the self on the verge of metaphysical collapse, according to Descartes, is 
a miraculous event of self-resuscitation; miraculous, because this event amounts to a 
leap into a good faith in the "good sense, " in the "natural light of reason. " When this 
experience of self-conversion takes place, one is led to overcome self-doubts. And the 
overcoming of scepticism, Descartes suggests, is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of a new beginning. In what follows, we shall concentrate further on this 
Cartesian way of beginning. 
4.2 Descartes's Trope: A Passage to the Cogito 
4.21 A Way of Beginning 
Self-doubt is a unique form of criticism. Given that to criticise is to "find fault 
with" thoughts or statements others have made, when one allows this ordinary sense 
"The structure that Descartes ascribed to mind may be represented as two acts of awareness focused by 
some content. In the figure, a is any content of awareness, x any act of first-order awareness, [... ] and y 
is second-order, reflexive awareness. Every a and every x are accessible toy: but more, each of them is 
only if it is or can be perceived by y. " 
16 
[... ] The Cogito as a beginning: it expresses the unity of all faculties in the subject; it thereby 
expresses the possibility that all the faculties will relate to a form of objet which will refleds the 
subjective identity, it provides a philosophical concept for the presupposition of a common sense; it 
is the common sense become philosophical. [Dclcuze 1968: 174/133] 
Chapter 3 of Deleuze's Difference et repetition [1968: 167-217/129-167] analyses "the image of 
thought' in Kant and Descartes. In the beginning part of this chapter, Deleuze also characterises the 
Cartesian model of thinking as circular [see 167ff/129f1]. 
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notion of "to be critical" as a starting point, the self-reflexive form of self-doubt, in 
turn, comes to pose an intriguing problem. To doubt oneself is an intriguing form of 
criticism in that there is no easy telling which one, that is to say, which self is the 
winner or loser, when the self-critical self is facing the moment of self-doubts. The 
problem is this: the moment the self in self-doubt subjects itself to the critical force of 
self-investigation, the thinking subject is both defeated and defeating: defeated in so 
far as the self is put in doubt and, equally, defeating in so far as it is, after all, the very 
self that is capable of doubting. It is in view of this equivocal undecidability of the 
polemical position of a self-doubter that doubting oneself is often characterised as a 
"self-refuting" act of the mind. Self-doubter is an auto-critic, and the paradox of 
self-doubt arises in an automatic manner; one is most fragile when in extreme 
self-doubt, but, again, in turn, most guarded at the ultimate point of self-fragilisation. 
By setting out to doubt oneself, the auto-critic begins to enter into the labyrinthine 
field of self-refutation. 
Descartes the auto-critic, who argues for and against himself, again, is the 
case in point. The Cartesian self, emerging in his philosophical dramas such as 
Meditationes and Discours, is a kind of self that is at war with itself. In these 
autobiographical texts, Descartes exemplifies a way in which one overcomes various 
threats of self-doubts. He demonstrates a way in which he finally comes to obtain a 
secure sense of selfhood, i. e. reflexive equilibrium. For him, to become a critical 
thinker means, first and foremost, to change from a self-doubter to a survivor of 
self-refutation: it is to convert himself from the former to the latter. 
The rest of this chapter [4.2-4.3] will offer a reading of the way in which this 
change takes place in Descartes' texts: we will be looking closely at the pivotal 
moment when a fragile ego becomes the assured subject, the moment when the ethos 
of his discourse changes from being sceptical to being afirmative. The analysis aims 
to explicate, firstly, the way in which self-reflexivity is operative in the Cartesian 
discourse, and secondly, the way in which the self-reflexive movement of thoughts, 
finally, effects the critical transition at stake, namely, "the turning point" in the 
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Cartesian discourse. In short, those "turns" of the Cartesian mind shall be analysed 
from a procedural or experiential point of view, on the one hand, and as a constituted 
event, on the other. The present section [4.2 Descartes's Trope: A Passage to the 
Cogito] focuses on the first theme, transition; the second theme, the Cartesian 
experience of conversion, shall be discussed later in next section [4.3 Descartes's 
Curvature: Cogito, instead]. 
This section explores a double reading of Discours, the text taken as both an 
autobiographical narrative and a dogmatic treatise. The broad concern of the analysis 
is to explicate the relationship between the logical process of overcoming self-doubt 
and its rhetorical effects. The specific task, accordingly, is to give a close reading of a 
certain textual tension existing within Discours: the tension between Discours as a de 
facto treatise and Discours as a de jure "story, " between a discourse of dogma and a 
discourse of confession. My aim here, in examining the rhetorical and logical 
machinery behind Descartes's double discourse, is not to "find fault with" the 
internal rupture and incoherence thus detected within the text. We will not be 
concerned with a question such as whether this sudden transition is a legitimate 
move; the question of genre shall not be dealt with here directly, if only addressed 
indirectly. Rather, our immediate concern lies in looking at the critical, turning points 
in Discours from both logical and rhetorical points of view. Accordingly, what is to 
be analysed is the way in which Descartes uses his technique of self-reflexive 
thinking to the effect of maintaining the aforementioned double discourse within the 
text; with this, the methodological relevance of this technique to his life-long project 
of self-discovery shall be discussed at the end of this section. Simply, we will begin 
by following the self-reflexive movement Descartes initiates at the beginning of 
Discours. 
4.22 Only a Fable: "What I Seem to See" 
Famously, Descartes said: 
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My present aim, then, is not to teach the Method here (ne pas d'enseigner Icy 
la Methode) which everyone must follow in order to direct his reason correctly, 
but only to show (mais seulement de faire voir) how I have tried to direct my 
own... I am presenting this work only as a story (une histoire) or, if you prefer, a 
fable (une fable) in which, among certain examples that one can imitate, you 
will also find many others that you would have no reason to follow; and so I 
hope it will be useful for some without being harmful to any, and that everyone 
will be grateful to me for my frankness. [Dis, AT VI 4/ CSM 1112, translation 
revised] 
When Descartes states that Discours is a "fable, " the authorial intention is 
clear: this text is not to be taken as a theory or an academic treatise but rather as a 
literary narrative. What the text aims to achieve is a demonstrative exposition of a 
method that can be, thereby, "shown" as a sample, as opposed to the dogmatic 
imposition of a method that is to be "taught. " What Descartes intends to show in the 
text, in other words, is not the universally valid, one and only method of true 
sciences, i. e. "the Method", but a method his experiences in the past have led him to 
adopt as the most practical and useful guideline in his life-long pursuit of the truth. 17 
Therefore, "a fable" here does not mean a fictitious story, it rather signifies an 
autobiographic narrative, authentic stories authored by the person who claims to be 
identical to the "I" appearing in the text. 
Given this distinction, two different ways of reading the text can also be 
prescribed, in a correlative manner. One the one hand, we can approach Discours as 
17 It is important to note that Descartes made it clear that he intended to present Discours as a 
discourse rather than as a treatise. When Mersenne raised a question about the title, Discours, Descartes 
replied in his letter as follows: 
I have not put Treatise on the Method but Discourse on the Method, which amounts to the same 
as Preface or Note concerning the Method, in order to show that Ido not intend to teach the 
method but only to speak about it. For, as can be seen from what I say, it consists much more in 
practice than in theory. [A Letter to Mersenne of 27 February 1637, AT 1349/CSM III 53] 
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an autobiographical narrative, a "fable, " documented by a concrete and empirical 
person, therefore, a historical and personal text, which, as Descartes insists, has the 
temporal flow of a narrative. This is the direction of reading the author exhorts the 
readers to follow. On the other hand, the other direction of reading, which Descartes 
has advised the readers not to follow, is this: one can approach Discours as an 
impersonal, theoretical "treatise, " constructed upon some axiomatic grounds of the 
"Method, " devised in an argumentative framework. Following this alternative line of 
reading, the readers will then be expected to identify the discursive position of the 
theorist within the theory; they will, consequently, examine the validity of 
truth-claims made in the text, and test the universal applicability of the method 
adopted therein. Accordingly, in this type of reading, the presence of the empirical 
personae of the author will have to be effaced to a certain extent, and to such a degree 
that the impersonality of the discourse becomes an indicator of the level of its 
universal validity and applicability. Now, clearly, Descartes did not want his Discours 
to be read this way, its practical benefits to be evaluated this way. The point he 
highlights is that Discours is a historical narrative inasmuch as it is a piece of writing 
appearing in the 17th Century, and that it is a personal narrative inasmuch as it is the 
autobiographical record of a historical man, Ren< Descartes. Given the authorial 
intent clearly articulated from the beginning of Discours, it would be therefore most 
natural as well as appropriate to approach Descartes as a thinker who is interested in 
simply displaying his own way to discover the truth of his existence in his version of 
philosophising over his problems in his life. The voice of this particular individual is 
immediately heard when we pay attention to the autobiographical and narrative style 
of Discours; exactly the same point can also be made regarding Descartes, the author 
of Meditations, a literary self-portrait. 
As a preliminary consideration, it would be necessary to introduce a couple of 
relevant cases in point in order to ensure that we fully register Descartes's intention 
on this matter. The inaugural part of Discours, for example, is self-effacingly humble. 
The readers are invited to recognise the presence of a modest writer who not only 
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"has never presumed his mind (esprit) to be in any way more perfect than that of the 
ordinary man ... (but also) 
indeed, has often wished to have as quick a wit, or as sharp 
and distinct an imagination, or as ample or prompt a memory as others [Dis, AT VI 
2/CSM I 111-112). " The writer's modesty comes from his "frankness. " Descartes's 
self-exposure is full-blown to such an extent that the author discloses to his readers 
his innermost, private feelings of incompetence and envy. There are also repeated 
emphases on "his" experiences that are not necessarily generalisable as "the" model 
of human experiences in general. Also in Meditationes, we often come across 
passages where Descartes expresses an inexplicable, and yet, ineluctable necessity to 
"confess, " as opposed to a desire to assert, as it were; he confesses that there is an 
irresistible, internal force of self-persuasion which leads him to believe in certain 
things, despite his scepticism; 
I cannot but confess (non possum non fateri) that it is easy for Him (God), if he 
so desired, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I think I see utterly 
clearly with my mind's eyes. And, on the other hand, when I direct my attention 
to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of 
their truth that I spontaneously declare [... ] [Med AT VII 36/CSM H 25, 
translation revised] 
Here, the watchword is "cannot but, " a linguistic marker of ineluctability, by 
which indicated is that a certain intellectual force of persuasion is at work. 
Accordingly, what needs to be recognised by the readers is the ineluctability of the 
philosophic impulse. Ineluctable is the double failure ("cannot but"); therefore, by 
implication, ineliminable is the very force of the intellect. Note that, at this point, the 
ineluctability becomes the discursive basis of the constructive experience of failure. 
Observe here the dialectic of recuperative double negation, subtly operative in the 
expression, "cannot but" Similarly, Descartes says, 
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When I say that I am so instructed by nature (me ita doctum esse a natura), I 
merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to 
belkve(spontaneo quodam impetu meferri ad hoc credendum) in this 
connection, and not a natural light which makes me recognise that it is true. 
There is a big difference here. [Med AT VII 38/ CSM II 26-71 
In a similar manner, an apologetic tone of ineluctability - which, however, does not 
weaken the prevailing sense of confidence - is clearly audible, particularly in the 
introductory part of Discours, again, where he says, 
[... ] Nevertheless, I have already reaped such fruits from this method that I 
cannot but feel extremely satisfied (je ne laisse pas de recevoir une extreme 
satisfaction) with the progress I think I have already made in the search for truth, 
and I cannot but entertain (je ne laisse pas de concevoir) such hopes for the 
future as to venture the opinion that if any purely human occupation has solid 
worth and importance, it is the one I have chosen. [Dis, AT VI 3/CSM I 1121 
Consequently, if there is any virtue in these texts, according to the author 
himself, it is nothing but this type of self-avowed ingenuousness 
18. The good readers 
of Descartes, those who recognise the good intention of the author, are then supposed 
to believe in the pedagogical benefits of reading Discours. We the readers are 
encouraged to read this text not because it teaches us the one and only truth, or the 
18 To introduce another example, at the end of Discours, Descartes says: 
Should anyone be shocked at first by some of the statements I make at the beginning of the Optics 
and the Meteorology because I can them 'suppositions' and do not seem to care about proving 
them...! have called them'suppositions'simply to make it know that I think I can deduce them from 
the primary truths I have expounded above ... I 
do not boast of being the first to discover any of 
them, but I do claim to have accepted them not because they have, or have not, been expressed by 
others, but solely because reason has convinced me of them (seulementparce que la raison me 
les a persuadees). [Dis AT VI 76-77/ CSM 11501 
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one and only Method leading us to the promise land of truth, but because the writer is 
truthful to himself in referring to himself, in other words, truthful in that he shows to 
us his own small path leading to his own simple truth. It is in view of these exemplary 
or demonstrative values that Descartes says that his readers ought to be grateful to 
him not for the unfailing verity of his doctrines, but for the unadorned veracity of his 
story. The virtues of Discours are to be found in its un-fictitious authenticity, the text 
taken as a work of the first-person narrative of first-person experiences rather than as 
an academic treatise designed for the purpose of indoctrination. The humble writer 
says something like this: what I present here as a method is only a suggestion, 
therefore, it is up to you readers to decide whether or not to follow my footsteps. 
Likewise, the frank writer says something like this: I hide nothing: I am confessing: I 
am completely revealing myself. Here, Descartes the writer does not assume the 
authorial authority of theorists; he does not demand or command. 
Instead, Descartes simply shows, and shows honestly. He writes in such a 
manner that, whilst writing, he appears to be "displaying", as if he were "painting", a 
series of exact and complete scenes generated by the reflective turns of the mind. He 
opts for this descriptive writing style as an appropriate means to achieve his aim to 
represent his experience exactly, veraciously, and authentically. 
(1) However (Toutefois), I may be mistaken; perhaps what I take for gold and 
diamonds is nothing but a bit of copper and glass... (2) I shall be glad, 
nevertheless (mais), to reveal in this discourse the paths that I have followed, 
and to represent my life in it as in a picture, (3) so that everyone may judge it 
for himself; and thus,... (4) I shall add a new means of self-instruction to those I 
am accustomed to using. [Dis, AT VI 4/CSM 1112, numbers (1-4) added] 
Thereby, the descriptive range of his self-exhibition becomes expansive; as the 
narrative unfolds, it extends to such a degree that, as one can see from the example 
above, he is forced to show the readers, by force of his own reflection, the moment of 
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intense hesitation, that is, the moment when he could not come up with a definite 
answer to the question he has posed to himself. the question of the possibility of 
self-deception. Whether or not he himself can tell whether he is mistaken in taking A 
for B at a given point, regarding this question that asks the (im)possibility of 
self-deception, he has not yet given a definite answer. 
Instead, what Descartes does, subsequently, is to turn to the other side of this 
problematic event of self-reflection; he reflects on the very happening of the question. 
The second turn to the "nevertheless, " taken as a certain "movement" of reflexion, 
effects a return to the questioner. To shift the focus of representation from the "what" 
of the question to the "who" of the questioning, this is a strategic decision the 
questioner makes, the questioner in intense, and more importantly, strategically 
intense, self-questioning. What matters to the questioner at this point is not so much 
the burden of going forward with the question thus posed to himself, as the necessity 
to stop there and show the readers as well as himself that it is nobody but him, 
himself, who is now facing the self-imposed question, namely, that it is Descartes 
himself who advances the question. With this turn to the interiority of the questioner, 
the question becomes a hostage to the questioner, but not the other way around. 
Maurice Blanchot also takes note of this move, of this turning point in the Cartesian 
scene of reflection; he characterises this method, unique to Descartes, as "the mode 
of holding oneself and of advancing of the one who questions [1969: 2/41. " What 
Descartes aims to demonstrate here is this movement of a search, of a research, in 
other words, the movement of a methodologised reflexion: he shows, first, a way in 
which self-doubt takes place, and second, a way in which the self-doubt can be 
overcome, if not resolved completely. A possible solution he puts forward here, by 
way of performative demonstration, is to force the self-imposed question to be finally 
redirected to the questioner himself. The force of reflexion is such that there arises a 
need to avert the probing gaze of the intellect from the abyss of self-doubt, and this 
metaphysical need is what Descartes fulfils at this point. This point of strategic 
a-verting is a discursive point where his self-doubt becomes economised. 
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Let us then look, in detail, at this economy of self-doubt, the economised 
reflexivity in Descartes. (1) illustrates Descartes's obsession with the metaphysical 
threat of global trompe 1'oeil; at first, he only "seems" to see. His initial anxiety is 
about the possibility that a set of things he seems to see clearly and distinctly might 
be, after all, "mere shadows" of reality, not the reality itself, the metaphysical worry 
here is that it might be "pictures of perceptions", not the direct perceptions per se. 
Therefore, it is impossible for Descartes, the sceptic, to rule out the possibility that 
the whole of Discours itself as "a fable, " might be not only a story regarding trompe 
1'oeil, but a story written in a state of trompe 1'oeil, after all. This, of course, is a pure 
possibility, but, at the same time, an unavoidable threat by implication, given this: (1) 
"Toutefois, il se pout faire queje me trompe, et ce n'est peut-titre qu'un peu de cuivre 
ou de verre que je prends pour de 1'or et des diamants. " 
4.23 Only a Fable?: 
A Rhetorical Move in the Articulation of the "Seeming" 
(3) "afin que chacun en puisse juger, et qu'apprenant du bruit commun les 
opinions qu'on en aura, "- to paraphrase it: I merely represent my 
internal experiences, as if in a picture, and present this pictorial writing 
as the most truthful representation of the states of affairs constituting my 
mental reality. The readers can "imitate, " in turn, my method of 
representation I have applied in my writing, so that they also can 
represent the truths of their experiences in their own writings. As long as 
our self-representations are perfect in such a way that, in each case, they 
represent most accurately and exhaustively what we have experienced, as 
mine does, the veracity of the represented, in each case, will be 
guaranteed. Now, it is advisable for the readers to begin by imitating my 
work. Of course, it is only a suggestion; it is up to each reader to decide 
whether my examples are "worthy of imitation [Dis, AT VI 4/CSM I 
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112]. " None the less, it is expected that, as long as my technique of 
mirror writing remains the most useful means by which to reflect the 
truth about the self, one will not be able to resist following the path I 
have drawn in my work, in the same way that I could not but follow the 
path that had been revealed to me. It is in this regard that I have chosen 
the method of exhaustive self-representation as a new means of 
instruction not only for others, but also for myself. Hence, (4) "cc soit un 
nouveau moyen de m'instruire, que j'ajouterai ä ceux dont j'ai coutume 
de me servir. " 
On this critical note, we have reached the point where "frankness" becomes a 
"method" of science; seen from a rhetorical point of view, it is a transitional point 
where the autobiographical "fable" begins to claim the status of a doctrine. The 
textual ethos of frankness is appropriated or "invented" by Descartes as a sound 
criterion by which the reliability of doctrines can be measured up. In other words, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy says, "very curiously, Descartes's proof is limited to a high degree of 
credibility (le degre dune forte credibilite) [Nancy 1979: 25]. " 
Let us look again in more detail into the way in which the transition or 
conversion takes place. The below (A-E) is an argumentative version of the passage 
quoted [(1)-(4)]; 
A: I am now writing only that which is being revealed to me: 
what I am writing is what I seem to see at the moment of writing rather than 
what I can definitely say that I see. 
B: But, what I seem to see may be an illusion. 
C: In this regard, I cannot say that what I am writing represents the true states of 
affairs. 
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D: None the less, I cannot deny either that, at least, I "seem19" to see. 
E: Thereby, I am "certain" of the fact that I seem to see while I am writing. 
When the writer's authorial ingenuousness is combined with his epistemological 
indecisiveness (A- C), the narrative contents cannot be claimed as theoretical or 
doctrinal, simply because there is no intention on the part of the writer to justify the 
truthfulness of the statements thus made. In contrast to the move made up to this 
point, when the transparency of the confessional self serves as the discursive grounds 
of self-assurance (D - E), the writer can then begin to validate the claims made in his 
writing by attempting to "show" that there is a certain degree of truthfulness or 
"credibility" in them. Put simply, with the second turn to the "but" as in D, 
Descartes's suggestions, his exhortations, have already become, de facto doctrines or 
treatise. The justificatory basis for this furtive upgrading of the status of his proposed 
method from "a method" to "the Method, " from an example to an exemplar, is the 
authenticity of the first-person experience of reflexion; the result coming out of, and 
remaining after, the methodological self-doubt, is after all an experiential truth that 
becomes indubitable by virtue of having undergone the test of a self-reflection. This 
way, the methodological value of reflexivity becomes dear to Descartes; this value 
itself has never been subject to the Cartesian doubt. 
It is in view of this critical "turn" or "trope" of thinking in Descartes that one 
is led to observe, following Nancy, that Descartes's lack of certainty displayed in the 
inaugural parts of the text is, after all, a "feigned rhetoric. " As Nancy goes on to point 
out, "the rhetorical character of this "however(toutefois)" [... ] - it is clear that this 
hesitation is feigned. Yet it is precisely the status and the function of the feint that 
must be examined [1979: 661.20" 
19In a similar manner, Descartes concludes his second Meditation with the following note: " (... ] Yet, 
I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false [... ] [Med II, AT VII 19/ CSM 
1119] 
20 The "however" that Nancy refers to is the one in (1), the kind that appears in (D). Not a small 
number of commentators explored the rhetorical aspects of Descartes' texts. For a general review of the 
literature dealing with the rhetorical elements in Descartes's texts, particularly in Discours and 
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The rhetoric of this type of "however" disguises Descartes' authorial 
assertiveness. If the first turn of "but" in B21 negates his certainty about the objective 
reality of his own perceptual contents, the subsequent second turn of "but" as in the 
"none the less" that opens D, 22 reinforces his self-certainty about the veracity of his 
perceptual experiences. Consequently, the first type of "but" will not carry its 
negative significance any further after having been negated again by the second turn 
to the "but", in other words, after having been strategically used as a generator of the 
positive grounds of transparent self-consciousness. The initial display of epistemic 
instability [A - C] is a rhetorical investment, which retrospection economises later; to 
"economise" means, in this case, to reflect upon a thought by recasting it into a 
hermeneutical structure of self-doubt. Consequently, with this turn of reflexion, the 
virtue of intellectual honesty becomes an epistemological asset, a metaphysical value. 
In other words, Descartes invents the negative value of pre-reflective naivete in order 
to construct a theory on the basis of the clean consciousness of acknowledgement. 
Likewise, he feigns his innocence in order to hide his desire to assert. In this way, the 
narrative status of Discours changes, furtively, if not illegitimately, from a story to a 
theory, and from a fable to a treatise. 
4.24 A Critical Transition: From a "Fable" to the Method 
At this point of critical transition, arises an authorial certainty; at this point, 
solipsistic conviction turns into, or rather converts itself into, universal indubitability. 
The point of the absolutely irrefutable is the pivotal point of Cartesian reflection, 
where the epistemological self-doubt comes to an end, where Descartes, the empirical 
person, the writer of Discours, becomes an exemplar of the cognitive subject [see 
Meditations, see Judovitz [1989: 86-136, chapter 3: theory of the subject as literary practice]. 
21 as in (1) "however[toutefois], I may be wrong; perhaps what I take for gold and diamonds is nothing 
but a bit of copper and glass. " 
22 as in (2) "I shall be glad, nevertheless[mais], to reveal in this discourse what paths that I have 
followed, and to represent my life in it as in a picture. " 
Cartesian Deconstruction 204 Chapter 4: Self-reflexive Economy of Descartes's Cogilo 
Judovitz 1989: 3-38, from self to the subject]. Where a humble writer disappears, 
there emerges a self-assured author. At this point, Descartes becomes an 
epistemologically reliable subject. The authenticity of confessional consciousness can 
be warranted, as is exemplified in Discours, when the confessor is self-identified 
anew as the reflecting subject, an impartial witness, entitled to be certain of the 
veracity of what (s)he sees. The subject in reflexively "discursive" confession, the 
one who does not fail to articulate what needs to be negated, this kind of confessional 
subject, becomes epistemologically reliable. 
The important point to note for us, the readers, is that epistemological 
reliability, achieved in this way, renders the author of Discours, in fact, contrary to 
the author's overt intent, more of a discursive theorist than of an autobiographical 
writer. The author of this type of double discourse, in fact, acquires his discursive 
authority by actively subjecting his selfhood to the discursive position of the knowing 
subject. With this movement of self-subjection, namely, the subjection of a discursive 
self to the subject position, the epistemological status of "the being that thinks" 
changes from a self into the subject, from a doubting self to the infallible subject. 
Two conclusive points shall be noted. 
Firstly, the foregoing analysis [4.21-23] of Descartes's usage of "but" as in 
"cannot but " and "but (toutefois, mais), and but again" suggests that Descartes's 
consequential turn to the epistemologically critical subject position, which takes 
place after a couple of "turns" of his argument, is a tropological movement as well as 
a logical event. The thought underlying this suggestion is that the logical acts of 
self-negation generate rhetorical effects of affirmation; in Descartes, for instance, the 
infallible subjectivity of the thinking self cannot be established without the same 
self's acknowledgement of its generic inability to negate itself. 
Secondly, Descartes's drama of self-doubts exemplifies the paradox of 
epistemological zero point: precisely at the most vulnerable point of relentless 
self-doubt, the fragile self becomes the invincible subject: the sharper the zero point 
is, the stronger the subject position becomes. The experience of this paradox, 
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Descartes believes, can be shared amongst members of the community of the 
"reasonable" men, in so far as they are willing to follow the passage to the Cartesian 
self, to the self that is, as Kolakowski puts it, "self-closedly and self-reflectedly 
[1988: 67]" authentic to itself. With Descartes's turn to the interiority of reflexive 
self-consciousness, philosophy experiences an uncanny experience of stepping into 
the heart of the riddle of self-reflexivity. However, also with Descartes, this move has 
been economised; the experience of the cogito is highly self-regulated, and closely 
controlled, in the sense that what he demonstrates with the cogito argument and 
demonstrates performatively is, after all, the necessity to submit himself to a 
rigorously dialecticised, rhetorical force of tropological cogitation. Through these 
steps and turns of thinking, Descartes comes to find a way to overcome himself23. To 
be critical is, first and foremost, to be self-critical: this is Descartes's lesson, which 
philosophical modernity takes as a lasting legacy. To be self-critical, as Descartes 
showed with his examples, is to appropriate, and at the same time, fight this puzzling 
force of self-reflexivity. 
4.3 Descartes's Curvature: Cogito, Instead. 
"When we turn inward upon ourselves, we turn aside from truth": when 
Gaston Bachelard [1964: 15, trans. ] says this, quoting Heracleitos, this statement is 
meant to be addressed to a host of modern philosophers of self-consciousness, the 
Cartesian fire-watchers. Although decisively simplistic, arguably for that very reason, 
this proposition contains something insightful; what it shows and shows effectively is 
the fatality of Cartesian reflection, its irreversibility. In so far as the inaugural move 
23 Analysing Descartes's "inner man" from a historical and biblical point of view, Kolakowski [1988] 
makes the following remark: 
It took up and radicalised the Augustinian attack on self-will as the seed of evil [... ] Augustine 
looked into himself only to fud God, rather than himself. Descartes, however, discovered the inner 
world not in order to transubstantiate it into the divine ground of being; it was supposed to be the 
final step itself. [66-67] 
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of "turning towards" oneself takes place as a move away from the true qua true, 
against the other qua the other, the irreversibility of the direction of this turn is an 
inevitable effect. The reason why the question of "the true qua true" is not raised as 
such [Benjamin 1987: 10] in the Cartesian discourse can be seen, when one looks at 
the economic dimension of the Cartesian model of cogitation. 
The economy of cogitata is operative in the Cartesian discourse. One can find 
a strikingly vivid example in the Second Meditatione, 
What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say `a 
rational animal'? No; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what 
rationality is, and in this way, one question would lead me down the slope to the 
other harder ones, and I do not have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind. 
Instead (Sed hic24) I propose to concentrate on what came into my thoughts 
spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used to consider what I was. [Med, 
AT VII 25-26/ CSM II17] 
Instead, Descartes turns to himself. The force of the "instead" opens up an 
alternative route leading to truth. Therein, the very nature of truth is altered; in turn, 
that which is to be disregarded, for the reasons of economy of thinking, is therefore 
the radical alterity of the true qua true. Reflecting upon his own thought, Descartes 
turns away from the true qua true. With this turn, the true qua true becomes the other, 
"the other harder question. " With this turn, truth becomes, figuratively speaking, 
domesticated within the house of philosophy; philosophy, in turn, becomes 
domesticated within the house of the philosopher. To "domesticate, " in this case, 
means to internalise the external, to put things in an egological or human perspective. 
As Jean-Luc Marion points out, "the ego exists before and more certainly than any 
other being, because and uniquely because no being exists except in so far as it is an 
24 Sea: back to the main theme, hic: here in, here upon, in this matter, at the present [see OLD] 
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objectum, thus as cogitatum [1982: 79]. " In this line of reading, what needs to be 
clarified, as Marion goes on to suggest, is "the nature of the "-logic" in Cartesian 
thought"; in Cartesian logic, "ontology envisages being as such qua cogitata, 
curvature of thought [80]. " 
Instead, Descartes turns to himself. The force of the "instead" effects the 
automatic self-institution of selfhood. This originary turn of a self to the reflected self 
is equivalent of the Archemedian "rolling back. " That is, the Archemedian revolution 
in philosophy results in the conversion of the nature of truth, the interiorisation of 
truth. Descartes's concern here is therefore to locate the immovable anchor-point of 
reflexive movements, within which the entirety of the universe can be enfolded [Med, 
AT VII 24/CSM 11 16]. With this inward turn of a self to the self-same self, "clear and 
distinct" become dichotomies between one and the other, in and out, or here and 
there, now and then, etc. Unquestioned binarism, which sets a priori the "I" in 
opposition to the "non-I, " underlies the Cartesian desire for self-understanding. In 
Meditationes, for example, where a dramatic unfolding of these logical folds of 
binarity takes place, what is staged is a way in which the self-preservation instinct of 
the Cartesian mind confronts various threats of the otherness of the world, in other 
words, a way in which "whatever is in my own thought" is jealously guarded against 
"whatever is not mine. " Cartesian egocentrism finds its philosophical expression in 
the diction of introspective reason. "Clear and distinct" is the irreducible primacy of, 
although not necessarily the exact location of, the egocentric self in the Cartesian 
landscape of thinking. 
Instead, Descartes turns to himself. The force of the "instead" causes the 
disregarding of the true qua true, on the one hand, and the registering of the truth as 
cogitata, on the other. With this turn, with this economic decision, the Cartesian "r' 
braves its consequential blindness to the true per se; this decision amounts to the 
"othering" of truth, to the distancing of the "myself' from the true qua true. The 
radical alterity of the true qua true, the infinite transcendence of the other qua the 
other is to be ignored and bracketed off in the interests of the "I" that questions: "I do 
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not have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind, " on questions that generate an 
interminable, therefore un-economic, series of thoughts, Descartes affirms, subtly as 
well as straightforwardly. The ego's announcement of the ego cogilo secures an 
exclusively territorialised site of thinking, where the thinking self in self-reflexion 
resists disappearing, and thereby persists in adhering to itself. 
"Descartes, " let us not forget, "arrived at the minimal, fundamental truth of 
his existence curled up by himself in soliloquy in the corner of a warm room [Bluhm 
1996: 308]. " Returning home by venturing out25, "finally at home with itself [Hegel, 
Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy, Vol. 1: 227], " the modern philosopher frames 
himself, finds himself, within this milieu of philosophy. The modem epistemological 
subject subjects himself to this reflexive force of self-framing; Descartes's venturing 
into the inside of the frame of self-representation, a variant of which Foucault 
analyses in his study of Veläzquez [1966: 19-31/3-16], 26 marks the birth of 
philosophical modernity. To open this site of self-reflection is to let the natural light 
of reason "flood27" in, to let it shed its light upon the "darkened intellect [Med, AT 
VII 52/CSM 11 36]. " The "pregnant [Husserl, Ideas, 104]" ego thus born into the new 
world of interiority, the ego "in great labour, " the "dormant ego" thus "reawakened 
(wiedererweckt)" [Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 6/45], announces its entry into its 
own property, into its own labyrinthine field of self-representation. 
25 For example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty says: "thought must be defined in terms of that strange power 
which it possess of being ahead of itself, of launching itself and being at home everywhere, in a word, 
in terms of autonomy [1945: 371, trans. ]. " 
26 I am referring to Foucault's analysis of the modernist motive of "entering" and "framing" in his essay 
on Veläzquez's Las Meninas. 
27 In an illuminating exploration of the thematic relevance between Descartes's interests in Camera 
Obscura and the birth of the modern, observational subject, Jonathan Crary [1990] makes the following 
remark, which is highly relevant to our discussion of the Cartesian "economy" of reflexion: "the orderly 
and calculable penetration of light rays through the single opening of the camera corresponds to the 
flooding of the mind by the light of reason, not the potentially dangerous dazzlement of sense by the 
light of the sun [1990: 43]. " Descartes's appropriation of the natural light of reason, in this sense, is 
calculated: it is an economic investment, not a blind indulgence. 
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5. Self-reflexive Economy of Derrida's Hauntology 
5.1 Derrida's Starting Point 
The Cartesian space of philosophical reflection is a site reflexively inscribed, 
and recursively fortified, by the self-same movements of the cogilo. It is from within 
this site of Cartesian interiority that Derrida's philosophical adventure begins. The 
foregoing analysis of Descartes emphasised the irreducible self-referentiality of 
Cartesian discourse, and its discursive force of self-entrapment. Derrida's attempt to 
articulate the irreducible or constitutive otherness of the self appears to challenge the 
Cartesian order of self-referentiality. However, this is a deceptive move - the current 
chapter aims to give a close reading of the Cartesian undercurrent in Derrida's 
(non-)project of deconstruction. A specific point which I have already argued 
[introduction, chapter 1,2, and 3] and will go on to elaborate in this chapter, relevant 
to the larger theme of Derrida's Cartesianism, is that Derrida's phenomenological 
attention to the irreducible otherness of the self does not have a therapeutic function; 
his deconstructive phenomenology of the self does not provide an alternative 
framework of thinking in which the egocentric folly of Cartesianism can be 
corrected. Instead, his commitment to methodological Cartesianism, implicit and 
unwavering, results in an exacerbation of logocentric symptoms of reflexive thinking. 
Derrida, in this sense, is par excellence a faithful victim of Cartesian rationality. 
Derrida's thematic interest in time and language - the key elements of his 
"other'- does not help him extricate himself from the snare of cogitational 
reflexivity; on the contrary, it leads him to a further reflexive path of thinking. To 
recall, at this point, Derrida's diction of "self-contamination" may be necessary. 
Derrida recognises the elements of time and language as some of the key enabling 
conditions for self-reflection - which is to say, self-reflection takes place at a 
particular point of time and cannot take place without the language of the self being 
used by the reflective subject. And in this sense, for Derrida, time and language are 
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the mediating grounds of self-relation. With this thought, the problem he seeks to 
point out is that the recognition of the temporal and linguistic dimensions of 
self-reflection - such ineradicable dimensions interpreted as the markers of the 
irreducible presence of the other in the self - leads to a contamination of the ideal of 
atemporal and alinguistic, i. e. pure, self-presence. The conclusion Derrida draws 
from this line of thinking, an aporia, is that there is, therefore, no such a thing as the 
"pure" self. Derrida's thought here, put otherwise, is that the self is originarily 
contaminated, i. e. heterogeneous to itself; time and language are "hetero"geneous to 
the pure self in the sense that they are self-alienating forces - albeit already implicit in 
the self - which prevent the self from having an unmediated, "auto"union with itself. 
Directly relevant to this point concerning the presence of the heterogeneous (or 
simply, alien) other in the self is Derrida's thematisation of the differential force of 
time as that which delays the union of the self with itself- his talk of dfJj rance as 
that which "differs from itself [VP/SP 129 (trans. )]. " Also noteworthy, in this regard, 
is his textual staging of the inscriptive force of ecriture, e. g. his marking of "Je - 
marque" [1.323], which shows a way in which the self-splitting force of the language 
of the self is at work. Now, the reason why this thought of the irreducible otherness of 
the self, articulated or staged as such, is aporetic for Derrida - as opposed to, say, 
therapeutic or liberating or even enlightening - is that his philosophical pathos is 
incurably self-centred, and his philosophical ethos, irreversibly puritanical; to put the 
same point more philosophically, a desire for the pure, un-mediated, and self-present 
self is the driving force behind his talk of the inevitable self-contamination of the 
self. Hence, what remains is despair; the shadows of self-reflection [MA]; the ashes 
that there are [C]. In the world of oneness, there is always already, contends Derrida, 
the other which remains as an irreducible threat to the world of "the one" of 
self-same identity. This thought of defacto contamination posed against de jure 
purity concerns Derrida. This concern, in turn, forces another movement of cogitation 
to take place; and this time, the Derridian movement actively involves "the other", 
the kind of other that Descartes's model of cogitation focusing on self-consciousness 
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tends to leave aside as minor concerns, e. g. the differentiating force of time that 
disturbs the punctuality of cogito, and the structural l dimension of the language of 
the self over which the linguistic self, the implicated user of that language, cannot 
have mastery. The difference, seen in this regard, between Descartes and Derrida, 
both taken as reflective thinkers, lies not so much in the direction in which their 
reflections unfold as in the extent to which they recognise the constitutive otherness 
of the self, if both of them pursue the zero point of self-reflection, i. e. the point where 
the self recognises its undeniable self-identity reflexively, Derrida is more "patient" 
or "circumspect" than Descartes in following the process of getting there, in the sense 
that he sees more obstacles in the way. The reason why Derrida is still to be regarded 
as a reflexive thinker, despite his explicit thematisation of the otherness of the self, is 
that the way in which he recognises these constitutive forces of self-alienation - 
forces of time and language - is reflexive. What Derrida stages in his texts is what 
Valery describes as "a reflex action of the man [MP 351/295], " in the sense that he 
constantly and persistently forces himself to remain alert to the ineradicable threats of 
time and language, which he defines as something alien and heterogeneous, i. e. 
external, to what is traditionally conceived as the pure self; by Derrida the thinker of 
dii ferance, the pure self, rendered instantly "different from itself', is therefore 
infinitely "deferred", pushed ahead somewhere towards its zero point of reference, 
without being grasped as such. What makes Derrida a radical Cartesian rather than an 
anti-Cartesian, despite his recognition of the "heterogeneity" at stake, is that his 
fundamental concern is with the impossibility of being a perfect Cartesian, in other 
words, the impossibility of resolving the constitutive problem of contaminated 
auto-affection. The Derridian warning, avertissement, issued reflexively, is such that 
the thinker is forced to pay attention to that which "in advance contaminates, 
pre-occupies, and inhabits [SpecM 255/160], " his own ambience of thinking. Here, 
the philosophical worry itself is characteristically Cartesian. 
1 See the first three paragraphs of 1.322 (pp. 58 - 59) for a further explanation. 
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The "other"-involving movement of Derridian cogitation, which takes place 
explicitly rather than implicitly (Descartes's case), can be described in the following 
way. Derrida turns the Cartesian ambience of reflection into either a haunted house of 
epochal metaphysics2, the Heideggerian kind, or an and biblical desert, the image of 
which comes from "the despairing "messianism" [SpecM 267-8/169, "scare quote in 
original"]. " In a similar manner, he turns the autobiographical impulse of Descartes 
into the rigorous passion for "heterology [Gasch61986: 79-105], "- "heteroportrait3 
(1'hetero portrait) [MA 69/68]" or "hetero-biography4 (1'hetero-biographie) [D 
604/8], " for instance - and Descartes's wax into "cinders [C]. " 
Derrida refuses to "convert5" himself to a good metaphysician, i. e. a 
metaphysician with a good faith. Instead, he re-verts; he reverts to the sceptical phase 
of Cartesianism, where the hypothetical presence of the evil genius still hampers the 
full-blown self-manifestation of the good metaphysics. This reversion is justified in 
the name of methodological rigour. Derrida therefore risks staying evil; he remains as 
a Cartesian sceptic, and a radical one. In Descartes, the ultimate expulsion of radical 
evil synchronises with the minimal, and yet substantial, resistance of the good reason. 
Descartes's reversion to the reflecting self effects a resistance to the infinite regress 
of reflection. This reversion is justified in the name of a good faith, a faith in the 
God-given "natural" reason. Now, Derrida's role is to allow the bad genius to replay 
his role, therefore, to delay the eventual resuscitation of the good faith, or rather, to 
leave the climactic tension as it is; the "coming" of the good Cartesian thinker is, 
thereby, deferred. Derrida is suspicious of the onto-theological founding values of the 
first person present-tense experiences, namely, the metaphysical values of 
2 Mark Wigley [1993] offers a brilliant discussion of the sense of "frustration" haunting the house of 
Derrida [1993: 162-174, section on "Haunted Houses" in Chapter 6: Doing the Twist], which, he 
shows, comes from the sense of "indigestibility" of the interior. Also relevant to this point is his 
discussion of Derrida's house in relation to Heidegger's [1993: 35-59, Chapter 2. Unbuilding 
Architecture]. 
3 Here, Derrida makes reference to the issue of irreducibility of sexual difference exemplified in Pablo 
Picasso's relationship to Gertrude Stein. 
4 reference to Lacoue-labarthe 
51 am referring to the Cartesian experience of "conversion, " which I discussed in 4.3. 
Cartesian Deconstruction 213 Chapter 5: Self-reflexive Economy of Derrida's Hauntology 
"self-presence. " None the less, following Descartes, Derrida still sees an 
epistemological value in the first person cogitation; I have repeatedly emphasised the 
point that, without an implicit and minimal acknowledgement of this cognitive value, 
the Derridian economy of performative writing would not work. In other words, the 
logocentric subject of first-person experiences still reigns supreme in the Derridian 
world of ruptured interiority, the world of double selves. Hence, an elliptical form of 
reflection, more ostensibly complicated than the Cartesian version, is necessitated. 
Unlike Descartes, Derrida focuses on the alienating otherness of the self, the 
"I" experienced as "moi" as opposed to "Je"; and this otherness of "me" is the source 
of metaphysical schizophrenia. 6 Instead of taking for granted the intimate and 
immediate familiarity of the natural pre-critical I, Derrida treats it as an object of 
phenomenological analysis, the Husserlian "I" caught up in "the double horns [VPT 
5/2]" of a "general sucker (ventouse) [Poi 6/7]" of "the madness ij d'[ED 
56/33-4]. " One must begin, Derrida insists, by subjecting oneself to the maddening 
force of "entre crochets (between brackets) [Poi 17,13-36/9,5-29], " "this hook (le 
crampon) [Poi 14/5]" "that just won't let go [FM 174]" of the word itself. One must, 
Derrida emphasises, pay a "vigilant" attention to the happening "around" the word, 
"I", the "I" taken as "it (ca), " around the Freudian "id/it, " which "gets unhooked (ca 
decramponne), like hooks that unhook, like pliers or cranes [... ] that grab in order to 
loosen the grasp [... ] [Poi 17/9]. " Derrida's point is that an "immediate adherence to 
[Poi 17/9]" the "I" that both hooks and slips, this type of act must take place. 
What the "I" experiences here, as Derrida says, is a certain "Cartesian 
experience [ED 55/331 of madness. " To insist upon the necessity to repeat this type of 
Cartesian experience is to express an inability, on Derrida's part, to do philosophy 
without repeating a certain kind of Descartes, Descartes the "adventurous, perilous, 
enigmatic, nocturnal, and pathetic [ED 55/33, "enigmatic" omitted in the 
6 In the sense that the writings of Derrida draw, for its textual production, on the self-distancing force 
of "moi, " rather than the self-unifying force of "Je, " one can say that he is closer to Montaigne than to 
Descartes, Montaigne who was plagued by the inability to negate the possibility that he might be, in 
fact, mad [See Judovitz 1988: 8-38]. 
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translation], " founding Father of modern philosophy, Derrida has no choice, he seems 
to imply, but to make a Cartesian attempt to meditate upon the very mad punctuality 
of "here and now, " upon the very event of cogitation. What he affirms here is then 
that he prefers the form of first person reflexive self-introspection to other possible 
options. 
5.2 Derrida's Turn to the Cogito 
Once, Derrida, interestingly enough, emphasised the absolute necessity of the 
"narcissistic reappropriation [Derrida 1987: 167]" of the Cartesian self in the face of 
the other. The destination of this line of thinking is clear: what the subject ends up 
experiencing in that absolute self-criticism is a repetitive experience of the auto, 
namely, the auto-deconstruction of the self. In another text [SpecM 161-2/98], more 
interestingly, Derrida confines the validity of this reading: the aporia of narcissism, 
"the decentering (le decentrement) [... ] of the ego cogito [... ] is the explicit theme of 
deconstruction. " However, his agreement with us is only partial; his emphasis here is 
on the aporias of narcissism, namely, narcissism "decentered, " and not on the aporias 
of narcissism. None the less, again, we are not ready yet to shift our accent of 
reading. Let us read, in some more detail, the passage at issue: 
The century of "Marxism" will have been that of the techno-scientific and 
effective decentering of the earth, of geopolitics, of the anthropos in its 
onto-theological identity or its genetic properties, of the ego cogito - and ofthe 
very concept of narcissism whose aporias are, let us say in order to go too 
quickly [... ], the explicit theme of deconstruction. This trauma is endlessly 
denied by the very movement through which one tries to cushion it, to assimilate 
it, to interiorise and incorporate it. In this mourning work in progress, in this 
7 "I believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the rapport with the other would be 
destroyed and absolutely, destroyed in advance. " 
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interminable task, the ghost remains that which gives one the most to think 
about - and to do. Let us insist and spell things out: to do and to make come 
about, as well as to let come (about). [SpecM 161-2/98] 
The "movement": highlighted here8 is the movement of interiorisation, bound to fail, 
which therefore causes "mourning work in progress, " as the "denied" trauma recedes 
endlessly and violently into its own source of malady. For Derrida, the experience of 
the auto remaining "ghostly" in the subject that auto-deconstructs, is irreducibly 
"infinite, " for it involves a certain infinite paradox that troubles the subject bound to 
fail to be completely "narcissistic" in its idealised sense of the word. 
The constitutive and structural problem Derrida faces repeatedly is the 
irreducible presence of the other in the pure interiority of the narcissistic self [Pass 
31-2/12]; 
It is consequently impossible to construct a noncontradictory or coherent concept 
of narcissism, thus to give a univocal sense to me (donner un sens univoque au 
mot). It is impossible to speak it or to act it as "me. " (comme "moi"). [Pass 
33/13, translation revised] 
In this passage again, the Cartesian form of reflexion retains its undisturbed, 
self-same configuration. The Derridian form of reflexion problematises the Cartesian 
possibility of self-same thinking; it programmatically points to the hauntingly 
residual elements of the other found within the putatively self-same form of "the 
one. " However, this does not necessarily imply that the reflexive elements such as 
recursivity and automaticity are lost in the Derridian form of reflexion. On the 
contrary, these elements reappear, albeit hauntologically, in Derrida's scenes of 
reflections which, as I have been arguing, unfold on a level of self-consciousness 
8A spectral emergence of the figure of Marx in the post-Marxist era 
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higher than that of Descartes. In other words, what Derrida formalises in a 
meta-reflective manner is the impossibility of securing a formality of that "pure, 
non-contradictory, and coherent" kind of narcissism. For this reason, we often come 
across the recurrence of the same "Derridian" aporia throughout his texts: As Frank 
says, in Derrida, "the aporia is always the same [Frank 1992: 2311. " 
Let us then ask: how can there be such a thing as the Derridian aporetics, 
identifiable as such, provided that his aporias are, presumably, the aporias of 
non-identity, of non-unity, of non-conformity, in other words, of the absolutely 
unexpected "coming" of the other? Why is it that one can even be justified in 
conjecturing that, for Derrida, the aporia will (have) always be(en) the same? 
An answer to the questions raised in the above can be formulated in the 
following terms. Most of the typical Derridian problems of double bind share one 
homological trait: the structure of dilemma, the antinomical structure of 
on-the-one-hand-and-on-the-other. Seen from a narrative point of view, both the 
Cartesian discourse and the Derridian are constructed upon the internal rupture 
caused by the two contending selves; the phenomenological structure of double 
thinking, which finds its proto-type in the discursive structure of the cogito, is again 
duplicated in the pre-critical dimension of Derridian discourse. The empirically 
predictable, formal automaticity, characteristic of the way in which the Derridian 
cogito becomes always-already-irreducibly "contaminated, " invites the following 
reading: Derrida's discourse strives for a meta-level purity, a formalistic function of 
which is, particularly in his case, to compensate for the empirical "dirtiness, " to use 
the idiom of Signeponge. In short, the meta-dimension of Derrida's texts is, 
"auto-immunised [SpecM 224/141], " for his discourse constantly aims to formalise 
the mode of its own empirical contamination. Derrida makes these 
"quasi-"metalogical "feint" turns of splitting, of distancing, and of doubling, along 
with a hypothetical Descartes, and against the historical Descartes, at the same time; 
Derrida does this as a fallen Cartesian, and yet as a failed Cartesian with a blind faith 
in the methodological security or "auto-immunity" of the Cartesian-Husserlian 
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reflexivity, which, as he himself rightly points out [SpecM 224/141 ], " guarantees the 
viability of "the living ego. " Derrida is a "hypercritical (hypercritique) [Pass 50/21]" 
Descartes. 
A more specific point implicated in this line of argument that highlights 
Derrida's methodological commitment to the proto-Cartesian, self-reflexive mode of 
thinking - in which the other, "the unthought, " is thought always in relation to the one 
that thinks - is that Derrida's other cannot but lose its unthinkable originality or 
foreignness; it becomes, ironically enough, one of Derrida's "other"s, a case of the 
typical Derridian other. Being aware, however, of the same kind of criticism Derrida 
makes of Foucault, of the thinker [ED 56ff/34ffJ who allegedly made a grave mistake 
of neutralising the originality of pure madness by attempting to arrest it with a "trap" 
of "a restraining and restrained language of reason [ED 56/34], " we should perhaps 
rephrase the same thought by putting our point of criticism less strongly. 
The revised thought should, nevertheless, include this: at best, Derrida's other 
is describable as the traumatic source of intrasubjective anxiety as opposed to as a 
generative ground for the intersubjective possibility of the other-involving ego. The 
other thus placed within the speculative landscape of the subject who thinks, is forced 
to participate in the intrasubjective economy of the same, in the sense that it acts as a 
"remaining" reminder that prompts the thinker to register the constitutive lack in the 
system of his thinking that strives for completion. In so far as Derrida's other serves 
this function of threatening a unity-oriented system of thinking, the thinker of the 
remainder cannot be said to think against the system of the one. As long as Derrida 
prefers to face this kind of discursive suffering and turbulence, he remains Cartesian, 
he remains a metaphysical insomniac, just like Descartes the sceptic. 
In the following two sections of the final chapter, we will set about reading 
Derrida's reading of Descartes. For a specific analysis of the way in which Derrida's 
reflexive alertness produces a proto-Cartesian mise en scene of egocentric 
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predicaments, I have chosen "Cogito et Histoire de la Folie [ED 51-97/31-63]9, " in 
which Derrida counter-poses, not surprisingly and yet still interestingly, a 
sympathetic reading of Descartes and Descartes's madmen against the dismissive one 
offered by Foucault. Derrida's interpretation of the discursive status of Descartes's 
madmen is, in my view, correct in itself and consistent with his own philosophical 
positions. The question that interests us here is regarding the very correctness of 
Derrida's reading of Descartes and its consistency with his broader philosophical 
commitment to methodological Cartesianism10; we shall be concerned with the 
questions of why Derrida could not have gone wrong on this particular point and why 
Derrida cannot but read Descartes in the way he did. Derrida reads Descartes's 
madmen, as I will argue, as a Cartesian (madman). To anticipate the key contention 
of my reading, Derrida's defence of Descartes against Foucault's problematisation of 
Cartesian rationality is a (madly) rational, Cartesian one. 
For a close reading of Derrida, I will concentrate only on the passages directly 
relevant to the key concerns of this study. My analysis focuses on the way in which 
Derrida deals with the reflexively "haunted, " Cartesian self, a modern man in 
self-afflictivel 1 reflection, a man in a philosophical or metaphysical madness. 
9 From here, all the page numbers referenced shall be those appearing in this essay, unless noted 
otherwise. 
10 Therefore, the question of whether he misreads both or either of Foucault and Descartes is rather a 
secondary concern in this enquiry, although not irrelevant. 
II In an illuminating exploration of the "masochistic" dimension in postmodern or poststructuralist 
discourse on desire, some typical examples of which can be found in Roland Barthes's A Lover's 
Discourse, and Foucault's Care of the Selj, Nick Mansfield [1997, see particularly 78-87] identifies this 
poststructuralist personae as the "masochistic subject" "engaged in an endless process of 
self-destruction and self-expression [87]. " I would locate the origin of this movement in the cogito 
argument, to the highly regulated rationalist order of which both Foucault and Derrida subject 
themselves. In so far as both of them acknowledge the difficulties in breaking away from this historically 
constituted, Cartesian mould of thinking, they remain Cartesian; and yet, and in so far as Derrida has 
some fundamental doubts about the viability of Foucault's "pathos" which explores a non-Cartesian 
path of thinking, which desperately attempts to break this silence, which emphatically gestures towards 
the "other" of Cartesian Reason, Derrida remains, I would argue, more masochistically faithful to the 
philosophical patriarch, Descartes, than Foucault does. Interestingly, Mansfield also mentions the 
Derridian subjectivity as a variant of the Barthes-Foucauldian [78]; also of interest to us, in line with this 
psychoanalytic reading of the philosophical impulse of auto-criticism, is a similar study on 
"masocriticism" by Paul Mann [1994: 3-29] which discusses, mostly, Deleuze's treatment of 
masochism. 
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Accordingly, the object of analysis is limited12 to the ways in which Derrida, in his 
defence of Descartes against Foucault, uses his strategy of reflexive thinking, closely 
similar to those reflective "turns" of thinking we have discovered in Descartes 
[chapter 4]. 
Following the argumentative order of Derrida's essay, the first phase of 
discussion [5.3 A Turn That Maddens], offers a reading of Derrida's rationalist 
violence exercised on Foucault's path-breaking "pathos [60/37]. " The suggestion 
underlying this scheme of reading is this: given that it is Foucault, and not Derrida, 
who problematises the Cartesian violence of exclusivist rationalism, Derrida's 
effective defence of Descartes against Foucault can be read as a Cartesian revolt 
against a (pathological) kind of philosophical romanticism, against a pathos-governed 
way of thinking; a good example of philosophy's romantic naivete Derrida brings to 
the fore in this essay is Foucault's nostalgic pathos for some "non-Cartesian" 
madmen, the kind of men that Descartes has to ignore, forget, and exclude, for the 
sake of the constitution of the reasonable world of autonomous subjects. Section 5.3 
will therefore show Derrida as a staunch defender of Cartesian rationalism. 
The second phase of discussion [5.4 The Narration Narrating Itself], the last 
section of the thesis, concerns Derrida's direct engagement with Descartes. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on Derrida's understanding of Cartesian reflexivity, 
i. e. Derrida's interpretation of what it means for Descartes to "reflect"; the focus of 
reading shall be laid on one particular, lengthy paragraph where Derrida allows 
Descartes to appear onto his own stage of reflexive thinking as a madman in reflexive 
affliction, as a man in metaphysical madness, precisely as the kind of man that, 
according to Derrida, Foucault wrongly argues Descartes has excluded from his 
discourse. This section will therefore present Derrida as radical Cartesian thinker 
who explores the hyperbolic dimension of Cartesian trajectory. My aim in having 
12 Other directly relevant texts - Foucault's direct reply to Derrida [Foucault 19721 and Derrida's 
indirect response to him via Freud [Derrida 19921 - will not be discussed in the text; my central concern 
here is to read Derrida and Descartes. 
Cartesian Deconstruction 220 Chapter 5: Self-reflexive Economy of Derrida's Hauntology 
Derrida encounter Descartes this way, i. e. both through Foucault and directly, is to 
elucidate the deeply proto-Cartesian dimension of Derrida's deconstructive project. 
5.3 A Turn that Maddens 
The "subversive" force of the Derridian "logic of interruption" lies in the fact 
that it discloses an inevitable and constitutive impurity in any philosophical 
trajectories, philosophy here taken as a rigorous science, the kind that both Descartes 
and Husserl have envisaged. Derrida's "hypercritical 
13" move uncovers the 
hypocrisy of philosophy. According to Derrida [57ff/ 35ff], "Western reason" has 
been hypocritical, and, more importantly, cannot but remain so, or, to be more 
precise, cannot rule out the possibility that it will remain so, inasmuch as it has been 
constructing, and cannot but construct, its founding values on the basis of the other of 
logos being necessarily eliminated; and this act of elimination, "the act of force (coup 
de force) [69,71,84/43,44,45,54]" cannot but remain un-critical or pre-critical 
inasmuch as Western reason cannot overcome, in principle, this constitutive inability 
to incorporate madness within it, madness taken as an "other" of logos. Judged in a 
higher court of reason, i. e. seen from a higher-level position, self-critical, modern 
reason is particularly guilty of hypocrisy, because its self-identity is constituted 
through a pre-critical elimination of the uncritical; hence, by implication, the 
hypercritical force of Derridian reason is less guilty, less impure, insofar as it is 
hyper-aware of the ineluctability to repeat this metaphysical guilt. Whence does then, 
one may be led to ask at this point, the hypercritical force of Derridian reason come, 
if not from the hyperbolic force of Cartesian reason? We will keep this question in 
mind as we move on. 
13 Dupuy [1994] aptly characterises this hyper-move of Derridian auto-deconstruction as the 
"self-deconstruction of every pretension to autonomy [93]. " 
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Derrida, accordingly, interprets Foucault's reading of Descartes as a most 
complicated and sophisticated example where the violent and ineliminable force of 
logos is at work. What Derrida aims to reveal is Foucault's "hypocrisy, 
14" which 
runs deep in his seemingly friendly gesture towards the other of Cartesian reason. We 
must see, Derrida stresses, the other side of the Foucauldian archaeology of madness, 
which turns out to be de facto another Cartesian project. Derrida's message, in other 
words, is this: at a most fundamental level, at the level Foucault's self-consciousness 
has not reached, and cannot reach, he is no stranger to Descartes, the founding father 
of modern rationalism. Derrida's allegation is that Foucault repeats the same kind of 
rationalist crime against madmen that Descartes committed earlier. 
Derrida's strategy, thereby, is to ironise Foucault. His tactic is to make it 
possible to interpret his "master's [51-2/31-2]" attempt to articulate the "silent 
murmurs" of madmen, i. e. to capture "the silence itself [58/36], " "the madness itself 
[56/33-4], " as the most subtle and underhand suppression of pure madness. The 
mistake the master has made, most subtle and yet fatal, which the disciple is at pains 
to point out, is that Foucault has mistaken A for B, A being a de facto "maddest 
[56/34]" rationalist project to re-silence the pure madness, and B, the de jure 
Foucauldian "archaeology of silence" which putatively allows the pure silence to 
"speak for itself': the master thinks he is doing B, but in fact, he is doing A, argues 
the disciple. The problem, allegedly, is that Foucault either pretends dextrously or 
believes naively that he engages in the latter, a genealogy, when, in fact, what takes 
place, regardless, is the former, a project. Foucault's aporia Derrida highlights is that 
his inescapably "rationalist project" attempts to render possible an impossibility. Of 
this aporia, as Derrida notes very carefully [59-60/36-7], Foucault himself is very well 
aware. None the less, Foucault's awareness of this aporia is not exhaustive or 
extensive to the paralysingly hypercritical degree, to which Derrida's is: this is the 
claim Derrida is making here implicitly, which the readers ought not to miss. 
14 See Boyne [1990: 58-59] for a similar interpretation. 
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According to Denida, Foucault is playing an inevitably losing game by trying to 
overcome, by reason, reason's constitutive inability to face or experience the 
otherness of its other, in this case, to experience the "madness itself. " Foucault's 
irony Derrida brings to the fore is that Foucault neutralises the originality of madness 
by attempting to articulate the very unutterable15 originality; in other words, 
Foucault repeats the same logocentric sin that he himself accuses Descartes of having 
committed, by allowing himself to be involved in the same old rationalist crime as 
Descartes's, albeit in a less direct and more deceptive manner than Descartes did. 
Thereby, the only solution Derrida can think of [58/36], in his less pretentious agony 
over the terrible and interminable "misfortune of the mad, " is either just to shut up 
completely or to mumble away silently, "following the madman down the road of his 
exile. I& 
If, as Derrida insists, the following is indeed the case: 
J11 (lout) our European languages, the language of everything (tout) that has 
participated [... ] in the adventure of Western reason - all this is the immense 
delegation of the project defined by Foucault under the rubric of the capture of 
objectification of madness. Nothing (rien) within this language, and no one 
(personne) among those who speak it can escape the historical guilt [... ] which 
Foucault apparently wishes to put on trial. But such a trial may be impossible, 
for by the simple fact of their articulation the proceedings and the verdict 
unceasingly (sans cesse) reiterate the crime. [58/35] 
15 "To say madness without expelling it into objectivity is to let it say itself. But madness is by essence 
what cannot be said; it is the "absence of the work (l'absence d'auvre)" as Foucault profoundly says 
[68/43]. " 
16 Either do not mention a certain silence (a certain silence which, again, can be determined only 
within a language and an order that will preserve this silence from contamination by any given 
muteness), vz follow the madman down the road of his exile. The misfortune of the mad, the 
interminable misfortune of their silence, is that their best spokesmen are those who betray them 
best; which is to say that when one attempts to convey their silence itself, one has already passed 
over to the side of the enemy, the side of order, even if one fights against order from within it, 
putting its origin into question. [58/361 
Cartesian Deconstruction 223 Chapter 5: Self-reflexive Economy of Derrida's Hauntology 
If "nothing within this language, " nothing in the philosophical language of the West 
that forms the basis of the hypocrisy of "Western reason, " can represent the true 
interests of the madmen, therefore, if we, the Western men, are all "guilty" of this 
silent crime that crushes another silence, then, the one who speaks of this truth and 
nothing but this truth is, at least, less guilty than all the others who merely and 
silently "reiterate the crime. " Derrida, as he insists, is also one of "us"; he is bound to 
fail to retain a clean consciousness. None the less, as he implies, his consciousness is 
more sanitised than all the others, for he has taken the quasi-transcendental step of 
thinking, i. e. for at least he attempts to step outside the tradition in which we are all 
implicated. In short, what Derrida does here is to claim that his ethical consciousness 
is the least contaminated of all, if not the purest. In the absence of absolute purity, the 
higher court of Derridian reason rules that what matters now then is the degree of 
impurity, the less, the better. 
In the interests of sanitation, Derrida then must go insane in a certain sense, 
insanely clean, as it were. Mental sanitation requires, in Derrida's case, a certain kind 
of metaphysical insanity. This is the force of Derridian reflexion; as Derrida says, 
emphatically, "a "madness" must watch over thinking [Poi 349-75/339-6417, "scare 
quotes in original"]. " Reflexive reason's impossibility of going mad, of dealing with 
natural or clinical madness, in turn, generates a thought afflicted by its own 
self-inscribed limit, a reflexively reiterative thought that remains "maddening, " 
metaphorically speaking. The point where clinical madness comes to mark out an 
impossibility of reason to be otherwise or the "inadmissibility [74/47]" of the other of 
reason into the order of reason, this point where the other is to be excluded from the 
order of reason "by decree [74/47], " in turn, is precisely where philosophical madness 
becomes a necessity, a must. It is at this point that philosophy must actively 
17 In French original, this interview bears a short interesting description that reads, "Refusing to build a 
philosophical system, Derrida privileges experiences and writes out of "compulsion. "A dialogue 
concerning traces and deconstruction. [Poi 3491 " 
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hypothesise another madness, as if in madness - therefore, in quasi-madness -, in 
order to "keep distance [84/54]" from the actual or real, clinical madness which is 
definable as the lack of reflexive self-awareness. Therefore, as Derrida rightly points 
out [85/55], the truth and act of the cogito is valid, "at its moment, under its own 
authority, even ifl am mad, even if my thoughts are completely mad18, " i. e. even if 
my senses are incorrigibly deluded. Thereby, two different senses, levels, and forces 
of madness, empirical and meta-physical, are to be registered [see 81 fI/50I ]; and the 
philosophical madness takes place in the meta-level self-consciousness. In this sense, 
when Derrida insists " "madness" must watch over thinking, " the act of 
quasi-madness he advocates can be understood as an act of Cartesian reflexion, a 
Cartesian adventure into the night of meditations, a Cartesian staging of the 
experiences of insomnia, namely, the Cartesian vigil. 
Apparently, a tenaciously constitutive problem remaining in Derrida's move, 
in his quasi-transcendental move that "must" absolutise the force of reflexion, is his 
"imperative, " i. e. the "must (il faut)"; and this problem, Derrida's system of thought 
cannot and must not tackle head on, for a structural reason. The Derridian imperative 
pursues the Derridian thinker like a torment, a torment that becomes, thereby, an 
obsession19; Derrida, the Cartesian thinker, is again pursued by the evil genius, a 
generic foreigner to the world of pure interiority. The question we are to raise, in 
turn, is whether the Derridian force of reflexion can override this force of affirmative 
imperative, namely, the blinding force of reflexion itself. Earlier [2.3] ,I argued that 
there is always already in Derrida's system of thinking a final and focal point that 
remains un-deconstructed, and I identified it as the Cartesian "law" of thinking; this 
point of absolute self-certainty, of absolute resistance, which refuses to collapse into 
18 "Dann son instant, dons son instance proper, 1 acte du Cogito vaut mane si, 'e suis fou. mime si ma 
pensee estfolle due part en part. " 
19 Before asking whether insanity must be excluded or mastered - that is to say, domesticated - by 
philosophy, one must try to think its obsession with(/obsessive fear for, !a hantise) madness: a 
certain way in which philosophy is regularly visited, haunted, inhabited (hab! tee) by madness. 
There is a domesticity of "philosophical madness. " [D 611-2/16J 
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a nothing, is a point where the auto-critical force of Cartesian reason comes into play. 
Now, Derrida's use of the typically Cartesian diction of extreme binarism in the 
passage above, i. e. "all" or "nothing, " indicates, again, that there is a certain gestural 
movement towards meta-level mastery of the text, which remains unarticulated, 
therefore, which remains operative and operative only as a blindingly "maddening" 
force of reflexion. This implicit meta-level discourse acts as the fundamental, and yet 
invisible, philosophical ground upon which Derrida's injunction to us to become 
rigorously "mad" can be justified. In other words, the Derridian discourse that 
characteristically employs the self-implicatively totalising words of "all" or 
"nothing, " indistinguishably resembles a transcendental phenomenological discourse 
where totalising words such as "all" and "nothing" are privileged for its ultimate and 
pure self-referentiality20 over empirical words such as some. Such an upward 
movement of reflexion generates a meta-logical space of thinking which renders a 
totality of thoughts incomplete in relation to that which remains to be thought, 
namely, the unthought. This type of meta-thought of incompletion remains vague and 
obscure21 for it, by definition, defies a clear-cut definition. 
I suggested earlier that the Derridian reflection's "upward drive" can be read 
as a quasi-transcendental move of self-consciousness towards a kind of meta-purity, a 
purity that in-corpor-ates empirically contaminated thoughts of the limits within its 
interiority. To incorporate the empirical into the transcendental through formalisation 
is not so much to allow the discourse to be actively contaminated as to protect the 
20 See Fink [1988: 13-19, § 3. The "Self-reference" of Phenomenology] 21 This level of meta-awareness cannot but remain vague, since it cannot be defined as such, cannot be 
defined otherwise than as that which defies phenomenal objectification. D. M Armstrong's analogy of 
the ` unscanned scanner" is a good illustrative example that explains why this level remains constitutively 
and structurally obscure: 
If we make the materialist identification of mental state with material states of the brain, we can say 
that introspection is a self-scanning process in the brain. The scanning operation may itself be 
scanned, and so on, but we must in the end reach an unscanned scanner. However, the 
unscanned scanner is not a logically unscannable scanner, for it is always possible to imagine a 
further scanning operation. Although the series logically must end somewhere, it need not have 
ended at the particulate place it did end 11968: 110] 
Between Derrida's "sun" as in the "hyper-impossibility (of complete reflection) [... ] in the singular 
obscurity of this sun [SN 35/45]" and Armstrong's scanner, there seems to be a conceptual intimacy. 
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meta-systematicity of the discourse from being further contaminated. In Derrida's 
economy of thinking, incorporation, therefore, amounts to a meta-level act of 
sanitisation. In this sense, de-construction is de-contamination, if not purification. 
One method by which Derrida sanitises the empirical "dirtiness" of the signified, I 
argued, is to formulate the inevitable aporia of contamination by using a tightly 
structuralised, and formally recyclable, diction of the double bind, i. e. the Derridian 
grammar of "two texts, two hands, two visions, two ways of listening. Together 
simultaneously and separately [MP 75/65]. 22" 
Now, let us then look at the way in which Derrida's "mad" commitment to 
preserve the meta-purity of contaminated thoughts, his meta-move to place them 
within a securely inscribed, meta-reflexive discourse, generates a voice of authorial 
certainty in his discourse, which one can identify as a voice of Descartes [see 4.21. 
Why this meta-assurance has gone, and more importantly must go, unnoticed by the 
thinker of vigil himself, in spite of, and more importantly by virtue of, the vigil - this 
question that explores the paradoxical nature of Derridian vigil is what the next 
couple of pages shall address. The relevance of this specific question to our broader 
concern in reading Derrida, Derrida taken as a committed Cartesian, as a thinker with 
a blind commitment to the Cartesian method of vigil, shall be also shown in the 
course of analysis. 
The point I would problematise, following Roy Boyne [1990], is simply that 
"Derrida's reason assures him that reason-in-general cannot be surpassed [1990: 
60]. " Derrida says, and says emphatically, 
There is no Trojan horse unconquered by Reason (in general). The 
unsurpassable (indepassable), irreplaceable (irremplacable) and imperial 
grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it not. iust another actual 
order or structure (une structure de fait), a determined historical structure, one 
22 "Deux texts, deux mains, deux regards, deux ecoutes. Ensemble b lafois el siparement. " 
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structure amongst the possible ones, is that one cannot speak out against it 
except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within; and within its 
strategic domain (qu'on nepeut en appeler contre eile qu'd eile, on ne peut 
protester contre eile qu'en eile, eile ne noes laisse, sur son proper champ, que 
le recours au strategeme et ä la strategie). [58-9/36, translation revised]" 
Derrida's certainty about his impossibility thesis, which is the driving force behind 
his argument against Foucault, is problematic and intriguingly so. First, I will explain 
in what specific sense it is problematic, and then, why this problem cannot be 
resolved in Derrida's system of thinking in any decisive manner; hence, an intriguing 
aporia. 
First, Derrida's assurance is deeply ironic. It is because, one the one hand, 
what Derrida problematises "rigorously" is precisely the theoretical certainty 
underlining the Foucauldian adventure beyond Western reason, and yet, on the other 
hand, he does not raise any doubts about his own certainty that underlies this move. 
The reason why I qualify Derrida's argument specifically as being "ironic, " instead of 
describing it as self-refuting or one-sided, is because, more interestingly, one can 
level at Derrida exactly the same kind of allegations that Derrida has levelled at 
Foucault. The point I am highlighting is not only that Derrida's argument is 
potentially self-refuting, but, more significantly, that this potentiality seems to be 
suppressed in his text. The discursive force of infinite counter-arguments is already 
there in Derrida's text; this is what is meant by the potential presence of the force of 
self-refutation. It is inscribed on the very "path" of thinking Derrida has chosen to 
follow; in what way? 
Derrida's contention is that Foucault advocates the possibility of the 
genealogy of silence, first, as if he could "speak23 [53/32]" "the language of the 
23 "When one attempts, in a general way, to pass from an obvious to a latent language, one must first 
be rigorously sure of the obvious meaning. The analyst, for example, must first speak the same 
language as the patient. [53/32-33]" 
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Other, " and, second, "as if he knew what "madness" means24 [66/41 ]. " That is to say, 
what Derrida tries to undermine is the set of implicit presuppositions underlining the 
Foucauldian trajectory. The first presupposition is that reason-in-general can 
articulate the hitherto silenced dimension of madness; and the second, by implication, 
is that reason-in-general could be otherwise than as it is. It is in this context that 
Derrida asks, in turn, "will it not be possible to interrogate certain philosophical and 
methodological presuppositions of this history of madness? [54/33]" 
Now, simply and likewise, one can pose exactly the same kind of threefold 
"investigative" and "rigorous" question to Derrida. In other words, any one who 
follows the Derridian path of argument can be forced - if caring to be forced - to ask 
the kind of questions that call into question the metaphysical presuppositions upon 
which Derrida's counter-argument is based. By adopting the Cartesian-Husserlian 
vocabulary of "rigour, " "investigation, " "a necessity to be assured, " Derrida, a 
closeted Cartesian foundationalist with a fundamentalist bent, is bound to provoke a 
reading by another foundational ist of the same kind who, in turn, by force of 
argument, cannot but put the presuppositions of his discourse in doubt. Unquestioned 
assumptions Derrida makes here must be, in turn, called into question, by force of his 
argument; thereby, the parody must go on. 
Let us go on. Firstly, can Derrida be rigorously sure that he is "speaking the 
language of one, " at the time when he is speaking of Foucault's inability to speak the 
language of the other? Does he not already presuppose that he would always already, 
i. e. inevitably, "speak the same language" as the logocentric language of the 
practitioners of psychiatry? Likewise, secondly, can Derrida be then "rigorously" sure 
that the "logos itself [56/34]" cannot be otherwise? Does he not unduly exaggerate 
the forcefulness of the force of logocentrism, "as if he knew what logos means? " 
Finally, therefore, our hypothetical Derridian enquirer will then be led to ask, finally, 
24 Everything transpires (se passe) as VFoucault kim what "madness" means (comme st Foucault 
savait ce que Folie " veut dire). Everything transpires as if, in a continuous and underlying way, 
an assured and rigorous precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least of its nominal 
definition, were possible and acquired. [66/41] 
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"will it not be possible to interrogate certain philosophical and methodological 
presuppositions of this history of' logocentrism, which allegedly could not but 
silence pure madness, even in its most rigorously altruistic attempt to represent the 
silence itself? Now, if so, if Derrida must, by force of argument, give positive 
answers to the first two questions and, thereby, if the last point of our hypothetical 
Derridian contender is rendered valid, what could be the theoretical grounds of this 
level of certainty that the historical Derrida retains? What could be the theoretical 
grounds, on the basis of which he proposes the following thesis? The logos itself, in 
principle, cannot be "mad, " "mad" in the natural and clinical sense, as long as it is 
protected by its generic impossibility of being so, in other words, as long as the 
natural threat of clinical madness will always already be overcome by a metaphysical 
madness staged at a higher level of critical rationality. 
I repeat: what could be the theoretical grounds supporting this level of 
certainty, the certainty about the inadequacy of logos, if not the "unsurpassable, 
unique and imperial grandeur of the order" of the Cartesian reason, which Derrida 
takes for granted as a historical given? Now, are we not here being reminded of 
Descartes' argument which insulates the territory of the cogito against the 
hypothetical threat of clinical madness? At this point, note that Derrida's strategy is 
to subvert Foucault's position by highlighting the insurmountable force of the logos 
itself, "the syntax of reason [70/36-7], " to which, putatively, the Foucauldian 
discourse is subject. Again, what Derrida does is to show that he is the least naive of 
"all" of "us, " less naive than his "master, " Foucault. Derrida's determined stance of 
anti-naivete, manifest in this particular move against Foucault, hinges on a set of 
twofold Cartesian presuppositions: first, he cherishes the cognitive value of 
anti-naivete, and second, he privileges the discursive force of logocentrism which can 
override any naively - that is to say, unreflectively - transgressive moves. In short, the 
irony here is that a blind faith in a possibility of the non-exclusivist non-Cartesian 
reason (Foucault's) is refuted by another blind faith in an impossibility of the 
non-Cartesian reason (Derrida's). The only difference is that the former is, allegedly, 
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more naive than the latter; the thinker situating himself in the former position is less 
reflective than the one in the latter. Foucault's discourse is therefore, Derrida purports 
to show, one "step" short of Derrida's. Then, which brand of blindness, one might 
wish to ask at this stage, is more insightful, and more advanced, in other words, more 
ironic? 
Derrida's (meta-)certainty about this matter, as I have indicated earlier, is 
ironic in an intriguing way. He seems to have no other choice but to assume that he is 
certain, at last; he seems to have no other choice but to proceed, regardless. And this 
kind and level of metaphysical pretentiousness is necessitated for a strategic reason - 
which is to imply that to stop at this stage and conclude that Derrida's argument is 
inconsistent, therefore, flawed, would be perhaps to expose only a half of the problem 
at stake. At least, and at last, Derrida must act as if he were certain, in other words, 
"the disciple must [... ] start to speak [52/32] 25, " for, otherwise, i. e. without this 
assumption, the disciple's discourse that challenges the master's would either 
collapse into a pre-Cartesian realm of the pre-critical, natural madness which lacks 
precisely this dimension of reflective self-consciousness, or recede into a higher level 
metaphysical madness induced by the hypercritical force of reflexion at work. As 
Derrida himself well pointed out [58/36], in either of these two cases, he would have 
to remain silent, anyway, first, silent as an outcast from the world of the intelligible, 
whose (non-) voice is a priori stifled by the dominant force of reason, and second, 
silent as a most rigorous Cartesian metaphysician, as an internal revolutionary 
attempting to arise from within the tradition plagued by "the fundamental 
permanence of the logico-philosophical heritage [63/39], " and yet, who only has to 
delay his action for the lack of a more proper or adequate word to pronounce. 
Therefore, this level of absolute certainty, this irony, this inconsistency, this 
25 [... I This interminable unhappiness of the disciple perhaps stems from the fact that he does not )-et 
know - or is still concealing from himself - that the master, like real hfe, may always be (est 
peut-@tre toujours) absent. The disciple must break the glass, or better the mirror, the reflection, 
his infinite speculation on the master. And start to speak (commencer b parier). [52/32] 
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dissension, this decision to leap into an act of faith - to "start speaking" - at a certain 
point, is a necessary condition for the metaphysical viability of Derrida's discourse; 
he must act, must start attempting to utter his words. Without this implicit 
commitment to arrive at, and secure, a vantage point of the macroscopic reason, his 
argument against Foucault would not hold. To generalise this point, Derrida the 
author of the Derridian text not only cannot see the irony his text performs, but, more 
importantly, must not do so. The force of Derridian reflexion is such that the validity 
of his own position also needs to be put into doubt. However, he does not, and, I 
highlight again, must not let happen this stifling act of self-silencing, for this is an 
un-economic move in terms of the production of a text that "speaks for itself"; or 
rather, for the same reason, he must let the same act happen in a less silent, that is, 
more articulate, way. 
Derrida's strategy, thereby, is to allow the metaphysical silence to articulate 
itself. We have reached the point where the limits of reflective reason have become 
the very concern, if not the tangible intelligible object, of the analyst; hence, 
Derrida's reflection on the logos, on the logos "itself' that escapes the cognitive 
grasp of the rational being. His attempt is to alert himself to this inability of reason, to 
this failure of historical logos. His urgency is "maddening" in this regard. Given that, 
as he argues, natural madness cannot but be thus silenced a priori, the possibility that 
remains viable is to let the metaphysical madness articulate itself from within, in the 
diction of meta-physics, in other words, in the language of fiction. This, Derrida 
emphasises, is the one and only way in which - the only and necessary detour through 
which - logos can have access to its other, i. e. its madness within: it is only by going 
through this bypass, according to Derrida, that metaphysics can experience its own 
exteriority. 
The power of the Cartesian mind lies in its capacity for fiction, its ability to 
represent itself in the form of fiction. Its extreme agility allows, for example, a 
simulation of the natural experience of madness; and this metaphysical simulation of 
natural madness takes place in a safely secured, mental space of pure hypothesis. In 
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view of this capacity of the mind to open itself up to the hypothesis of madness, it 
would be, Derrida argues [71ff/45ff26], deeply unfair to complain that madness has 
been excluded from the Cartesian territory of reason. 
The second phase of Derrida's argument against Foucault is concerned with 
marking out the ineradicable place of madness in the Cartesian metaphysics. This 
move may seem rather confusing as well as confused; earlier, he argued that logos 
cannot be mad; and this time, he argues that logos cannot not be mad. Apparently, 
this move is not meant to be read as a naive fallacy of contradiction. This seemingly 
flawed move, however, is legitimate, for Derrida uses the different senses of madness 
in the two different phases of argument, respectively: in the first case, natural 
madness, and the second, metaphysical madness. In this sense, one can say that the 
argumentative structure of Derrida's text hinges, firstly, on this distinction and, 
secondly, on the discursive move based on the validity of this distinction, all of which 
he, quite rightly in my view, seems27 to identify as the Cartesian as well as his. The 
textual movement from natural madness to hyperbolic madness - the pedagogical 
dismissal of the first and the metaphysical admission of the second - is exactly what 
Descartes follows, as Derrida well points out [see 74-80/48-5 1, in particular]. 
Descartes the sceptic's hypothesis of the otherworldly world, a world that is 
otherwise than what it looks like, is rather a mad thought, as a naturally demented 
person would entertain exactly the same thought. The difference, however, lies in that 
the same thought cannot be dismissed as simply "mad, " when it enters the realm of 
fiction, that is to say, in so far as the thought appears in the hyper-critical phase of 
hyperbolic doubt, and not in the natural phase. Put otherwise, the critical difference 
lies in that metaphysical madness can be even "madder" than natural madness, for its 
26 This phase of argument is prefaced by Herder's aphorism on madness, which laconically sums up 
Derrida main contention: "there had to be folly so that wisdom might overcome it [71/45]" 
27 Derrida does not spell out clearly this thesis himself, however, the distinctive difference between the 
two is clear both in Descartes's argument and Derrida's exegesis of Descartes. More importantly, 
Derrida must maintain this implicit distinction in order to advance his argument, as we will see why 
more clearly later on. 
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delusion is deliberative, that is to say, for there is no "force" of reflective deliberation 
in the natural phase of madness. 
Hence, we have Derrida's eulogy [81ff/52ff] of the Cartesian hyperbolism or 
"hyperbology, 28" which he deliberately contrasts with Foucault's naive 
condemnation of Cartesian determinism, of the Cartesian exclusion of madness; 
"everything that was previously set aside as insanity under the name of extravagance 
is now welcomed (accueilli) into the most essential interiority of thought [82/53, 
translation revised]. " The irresolvable, therefore fatal, aporia implicated in this move 
that welcomes the other, which Descartes's text, in turn, suppresses by means of 
taking a further step of interiorisation, and which, by contrast, Derrida "welcomes" 
again by means of taking a further step of exteriorisation, is that this excessive and 
self-distancing movement of "hyper-" keeps "introducing" silent "subversion to pure 
thought [82/53]"; the "subversive" force of hyper-reflexion is thereby repressed in the 
case of the former (Descartes), and expressed in the latter (Derrida). An extra, "feint" 
move of hyper-reflexive reason in which the thought violently exposes itself to its 
exterior, i. e. to that which has not been thought-out, must happen, Derrida insists; this 
fictive, and yet, radical gesture of exteriorisation, must happen, Derrida insists. The 
mime, therefore, must continue. 
5.4 The Narration Narrating Itself 
It would be not only natural, but inevitable for a faithful reader of Derrida to 
anticipate an "extravagant" level of reflexivity in Derrida's reading of Descartes; it is, 
at this point, hardly surprising to learn that Derrida the reader had to plunge himself, 
armoured with strategies, into the task of allowing "the (Cartesian) narration to 
narrate itself [88/58 (my insertion)]. " This next step of reading, which Derrida must 
28 Interestingly, in a similar manner, Derrida makes a complimentary remark [D 636-8/40-42] on 
Lacoue-Labarthe's "hyperbologic, " which, "programmes the inevitable effects of a "logic" of mimesis 
[D 636/41]. " 
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and does follow, is illustrative of the way in which Derrida's discourse "welcomes" 
the maddening force of metaphysical scepticism. Derrida not only allows, but, rather 
forces, the intra-metaphysical hyperbolic move to take place. 
In proposing to read the "narration that narration itself' in Descartes's text, 
Derrida's aim is to bring into light the ultra-formalistic, trans-historical, 
meta-dimension of Descartes's historical narrative. The dimension to which Derrida 
is referring is where "the narration narrates itself': it is, in other words, the 
meta-dimension of hidden narrativity which resists being exhaustively narrated by an 
historical narrator. Denrida attempts to reach this zero-point of thought in the course 
of reading [81 ff/52ff] Descartes's "critical" or "hyperbolical" phase of the "properly" 
"philosophical" madness. Derrida's intention, as he says, is to provide a properly 
hyper-"sensitive (tres sensible) [59/36]" reading that protects the formalistic purity of 
the metaphysical madness of Cartesianism from the Foucauldian attack or 
contamination of structuralist, historical determinism. What Derrida does here is to 
purify and protect, in other words, not to contaminate further; he protects the purity 
of transcendental contamination from a further empirical contamination; he protects 
the originary purity of philosophical madness from a historical naming of it. Thereby, 
Derrida's thematic interest lies in stepping beyond the historical Descartes narrated 
by the historical Foucault, into the originary realm of logos where "reason and 
madness have not yet been separated [91/58]. " Note below that, for this reason, 
Denrida is determined to avoid any historical determinism; and that, for the same 
reason, his consequential hyper-determinism derives its formal-logical resources from 
the hyperbolic dimension of Descartes's reflexive epistemology. 
I believe(Je crois) [... ] that (in Descartes) everything can be reduced to a 
determined historical totality except that hyperbolical project. Now, this project 
belongs to the narration narrating itself (recit recitant) and not the narration 
narrated (recit recite) by Foucault. It cannot be recounted, cannot be objectified 
as an event in a determined history. [translation revised, 88/57-58] 
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What is hyper-deterministic about this passage is that, whilst arguing against 
historical determinism, i. e. the historicisation of Descartes's narrative, Derrida is 
rigorously deterministic about the distinction between the transcendental level of 
narration and its historical manifestation; accordingly, Derrida wishes to leave the 
transcendental level intact. Observe here that he draws on the diction of reflexivity in 
order to show the mode in which narration resists being historicised: "the narration 
narrating itself. " Derrida takes it for granted, or rather actively assumes, that the 
originary "law" of narration should conform to a certain minimal form of reflexivity, 
which may not necessarily be "ours" or "historical. " But, how does Derrida know that 
the law of narration can be put in such terms? The putatively alienating force of 
originary narration, thus represented by Derrida in this mechanical formulation, 
carries a terribly familiar ring around it: a meta-narrative that transcends historical 
narratives, the "narrativity itself "which narrates itself, appears to be tamed and 
tailored by the economy of formulaic thinking: the autonomy of meta-narrativity is, 
according to Derrida's formulation, guaranteed by its putative automaticity. The 
putative homogeneity between autonomy and automaticity at stake, which Derrida's 
formulation presupposes here, should remain only hypothetical and epistemological; 
he, however, already assumes that the putative mode of this relationship is, and must 
be, real and ontological. Apart from the issue that this assumption remains to be 
justified, there is a more serious problem with this move Derrida is making: his 
unquestioned commitment to the reflexive model of thinking precludes the 
conceivability of other models of originary thinking: simply, the philosophical 
possibility Derrida's system of thinking does not allow in advance is that the 
originary narrativity of narration may have a radically heteronomous, ontological 
structure inconceivable in the diction of reflexive self-referentiality such as "the 
narration narrating itself. " One must ask whether Derrida's attempt, with his reflexive 
formula, to measure the magnanimity of the "undetermined, " of the "unknown, " is a 
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legitimate move, given his talk of the inevitable failure of thought to transcend the 
empirical. By what right can Derrida make this move? 
The Derridian way to liberate the originary narrativity of narration from its 
historical constraints, as is economically exemplified in this single phrase, "the 
narration narrating itself, " is to recast it in a "quasi-"transcendental structure of 
indifference; hence, his search for the kind of ahistorical "narration that narrates 
itself, " which has been, and will have been, repeatedly consumed throughout the 
history of narration, and which, at the same time, remains, and will have remained, 
inexhaustible. With this Derridian turn of reflexion, a historical narrative transforms 
or translates itself into an effect of meta-narration; it becomes a fate and not a fable - 
the "fable" of Descartes [see 4.2], for instance. Implicit in the automaticity of 
auto-narration are, therefore, both the vigour and the void; the vigour of thinking in 
Derrida comes from reflection's desire for the void; the vigour is, for Derrida, the 
becoming-void, the emptying-out of the empirical. Derrida, thus forced to think in 
this Derridian line of thought where the other is systematically given a secure place 
within the highly unified order of reflexive reason, must find a way to ensure, on the 
one hand, that this break between the transcendental narrativity of narration and its 
empirical cases is maintained, whilst, on the other, securing the self-same mode of 
reflexive complicity between the two non-identical realms of thought. Thereby, he is 
forced to submit his empirical discourse to a higher order of reason [89-91/158] 
where reason takes care of "itself' in its auto-immunised, automaton-like 
transcendental narrativity, where the originary kind of madness, the "madness itself, " 
which "has not yet been separated from the logos, " maintains its "instantaneous and 
[... ] most intense (la plus aigue) [91/58]" experience of auto-narration. 
The Derridian locus of limit-experiences where discursive reason 
acknowledges its empirical and historical limits, is precisely where the 
self-implicated deconstruction of the self becomes, and must become, an auto-critical 
endeavour; the self in this case is therefore the narrative subject. Here, a particular 
attention ought to be paid to the tenacious non-absence of the auto-critical subject in 
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Derrida's discourse. There is the subject that experiences the auto-criticism, i. e. the 
subject of reflection: the subject with an irreducible desire for transcendental 
reflection. Put otherwise, deconstructive narrative is not an impersonal happening of 
"the narration that narrates itself, " as long as there is the "there" of most intense 
experience, the "la" of "il ya lä cendre [C 21 ], " that is to say, as long as there is the 
subject that bears witness to this happening. As long as Derrida's text absolutises this 
necessity of deconstruction to become auto-critical in its tending towards its ultimate, 
and yet indefinite, reference, "hi, " which, as Derrida emphasises, is not "la, " this 
logical move of Derrida which draws on the discursive force of negative 
self-effacement cannot but retain a reflexive form of argument. In the same vein, it is 
to be emphasised again that it is his text's "meta-awareness" of the force of this law 
at work, and not "the law itself' that is a condition of the narrative production of his 
"heterological" "hauntology. " Again, implied in this claim is that the condition under 
which Derrida operates his paradoxical economy of heterological writing is 
epistemological or ideal rather than ontological or material [See 3.2]. Insofar as the 
Derridian hauntology refuses to renounce its ultimate loyalty to its proto-type, i. e. the 
Cartesian hyperbolics, the epistemological tenacity of his discourse, in turn, 
reinforces the discursive status of Derrida as a Cartesian, who is perhaps more 
Cartesian than Descartes himself, for following the true spirit of rigorous 
Cartesianism. Derrida, in this regard, is a contemporary neo-Cartesian. 
Another good example may help us conclude the chapter. Immediately after 
the paragraph quoted above, where Derrida asserts that the more originary project of 
Descartes "belongs to the narration narrating itself, " which is a project that opens 
itself up to the infinite possibilities of metaphysical hyperbolism, Derrida's 
machinery of reflexion, as if pre-programmed, in turn, comes to "reflect (reJlechir) 
[89-93/58-60]" on the moments of hyperbolical excess exhibited in the Cartesian 
scenes of "reflections. " In all of five different, and yet interrelated, meta-reflections 
on the reflective turns the cogito argument effects, Derrida highlights the significant 
discursive roles the Cartesian acts of "reflection" play in the constitution of Cartesian 
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system of thinking. Following Derrida, I suggest we reflect on these five cases of 
Derridian reflection on Cartesian reflection. 
For a start, to "cogitate" in a Cartesian manner, is to conjecture, to offer a 
thought, to "proffer" a rather "extreme" thought to oneself, to present a possible case 
of fictive thought to the court of reason [89/58]; 
As soon as Descartes has reached this extremity, he seeks to reassure himself, 
[... ] to identify the act of the Cogito with a reasonable reason. And he does so as 
soon as he pro ers (proJi re) and tXflects (reflechil) the Cogito. That is to say, he 
must (dolt) temporalise the Cogito, which itself is valid only during the instant 
of intuition, the instant of thought being attentive to itself. [89/58] 
In the same vein, Derrida says, "Foucault's interpretation seems to me illuminating 
from the moment when the Cogito must reflect and proffer itself (dolt se rdflcchir et 
se proferer) in an organised philosophical discourse [91/58]. " 
Second, the next move of the cogito is then to "retain" its own excess thus 
economised, as opposed to wasting it on an unorganised hyperbole; and the cogito 
must perform this act of self-interiorisation in a movement that returns to this order 
of economy of self-representation in order not to go mad, that is, in order to prevent 
the ego from receding further than that. "For if the Cogito is valid even if for the 
maddest madman, one must, in fact, not be mad, if one is to reflect it (le refcchir) 
and retain it (le retenir) [... ] [89/58]. " Having ceased to be natural, the "I" of the 
cogito must live as a function of calculated myth, a function in the economy of 
narration; all "hyperbolical wanderings" must "take shelter, " and are to be "given 
assurance within the order of reasons, in order once more to take possession of the 
truths they had left behind (pour reprendreposession des vdritds abandonnces) 
[90/58]. " 
Third, this necessary "assurance" comes from the generic ability of the 
Cartesian reason to utter the cogito [See also 1.31]; in other words, 
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[... ] if the Cogito is valid even for the madman, to be mad29 [... ] is not to be 
able to reflect (refechir) and to say (dire) the Cogito, that is, not to be able to 
make the Cogito appear as such for another (pour un autre); an other who may 
be (peut-eire) myself. [91/58) 
The "I" of the cogito is a case of the other, "an" other that may be myself. The cogito 
argument is an economy of doubt and one model of self-doubt, amongst possible 
ones, because it specifically turns to the following thought, because it wholly invests 
in the following conjecture, because it exclusively investigates the following 
possibility: I am an other that may be myself. However, to be more precise, at this 
point, Descartes is less cautious and more urgent than Derrida. The Cartesian project 
of reflective ontology, whose economy unfolds towards a single end, and not a 
"double" end, cannot afford to allow the "may be" any longer, longer than it 
necessitates. Descartes, to recall, does not "have the time for" further conjectures. 
Therefore, at this point, the Derridian peut-eire must give way to the Cartesian ergo. 
Descartes must, therefore, conclude, instead: I am an other that is myself. 
The difference at stake is this: the only, and yet crucial, difference between 
Descartes and Derrida, at this point, is the difference between awareness as an 
29 I iighly instructive in this regard is Deleuze's view [ 1968: 169-217/129-167 Vintage de la Pensce' ]' 
on a discursive function of the Platonic moment of "recognition": in contrast to "encounter (retxxvure) 
[ 182/139], " "recognition [.. ] measures and limits the quality (of contrary perceptions) by relating it to 
something, thereby interrupting the mad-becoming (arr&e le devenire fon) [ 184/141 ]. " Noteworthy is 
the conceptual relationship between the notion of recognition Deleuze talks about in reference to 
Plato's Republic, and the Cartesian reflexivity which "interrupts, " therefore, secures itself from the 
possibility of "becoming mad. " A clue for understanding the conceptual affinity between the two, I 
suggest, is the notion of "collaboration, " which Deleuze sets out to discuss in the opening pages of the 
chapter, where, interestingly enough, the notion of the Cartesian cogito is introduced as a prime 
example of thought's self-image [167-175/129-134]. As Delcuze says, and says rightly, the cogito is 
"the unity of all the faculties in the subject [174/133]" as well as "the collaboration of the faculties for 
'everybody' [174/133]; " "it thereby expresses the possibility that all the faculties will relate to a form of 
object which reflects the subjective identity; it provides a philosophical concept for the presupposition 
of a common sense; it is the common sense becoming philosophical [174/133]. " This motive of 
"collaboration" of all the senses, all the faculties, and all the multiple selves potentially existing within 
"a" unitary self, towards the constitution of such a self, of such a sense of subjective self-identity, is 
indeed the key point Derrida also highlights, as we will see shortly. 
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arrested assurance and awareness as an affirmed agony. It is a difference between a 
movement of thought that returns to the intelligible order of reason and a movement 
of thought that allows a higher order of reason to return (revenir); a difference 
between regulation through liberation and allowance through delimitation; a 
difference between a return to the known and a return of the unknown; a difference 
between a move towards familiar interiority and a move away from interiorised 
interiority towards a deeper level of interiority that remains to be interiorised. 
Thereby, "Cinders there are (il ya lä cendre) [C 211"; the Derridian cinder is 
that which haunts the metaphysician's house of "one". The house of the philosopher 
must, therefore, domesticate not only Descartes but a Descartes, not only the 
historical Descartes but a hypothetical Descartes, the "mad" metaphysician, the man 
who would be, by force of reflection, forced to throw himself in at the deep end of 
the flames of reflection. The house of the philosopher must, therefore, bear witness to 
this man who would still watch himself in madness, burning and burnt, at the same 
time. This is a must, the Derridian injunction. Conflagration must take place, and the 
show must go on, regardless. This is what Derrida demands in the absence of, and 
following the order of, Descartes, the Master. 
Surely, in this regard, as Derrida stresses, "in any event, the Cogito is a work 
as soon as it is assured of what it says. But (mais) before (avant) it is a work, it is a 
madness30 [92/59]. " Derrida's final remark on Descartes's reflection is uncannily fit 
to use as our concluding homage to Descartes: 
The act of the Cogilo, at the hyperbolical moment when it pits itself against 
madness, or rather lets itself be pitted against madness, must (dolt) be repeated 
and distinguished from the language or the deductive system in which Descartes 
must inscribe it as soon as he proposes it for apprehension and communication, 
that is, as soon as he reflects the Cogito for the other, which means for oneself 
30 "Le Cogilo [... I es! Folie avant I'wuvre. " 
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(des qu'i1 le reflechit pour 1 'ature, ce qui signifie pour soi). It is through this 
relationship (rapport) to the other as an other self that meaning assures itself 
against meaning and nonmeaning. ... 
And philosophy is perhaps the assurance 
given against the anguish of being mad at the point of greatest proximity to 
madness. This silent and specific moment could be called pathetic (pathetique). 
[93/59, ... 
in the original, omitted in the translation] 
A "pathetic" show must go on, Derrida insists. Thereby, the "a" of differance is to be 
staged again, and staged silently. In this pathetic show, it is, therefore, the tears of 
silence that see, not the eyes; 
-Tears that see ... Do you 
believe (Vous croyez)? 
-I don't know, one must (il faut) believe ... 
[MA 130/12931, translation revised] 
I must, then, ask, again: ... vous croyez? 
31 This is the final sentence with which the text ends. 
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"Il ya lä cendre. " One must see, with tears, that which cannot be seen, according 
to Derrida, the blind Cartesian; one must work not only with ashes, but, in the midst of 
ashes, ashes of reflexive consciousness. To bear witness to that which remains to be 
seen, regardless: this is the Derridian imperative of thinking, which Derrida follows and 
follows dutifully. Derrida's preference for doubt over certainty is pre-reflective, and in 
this regard, strangely assuring. Descartes comes before Derrida, stays with Derrida, and 
continues to haunt Derrida, in the sense that the Derridian mode of reflection is, always 
already, embedded in the epistemological structure of methodological Cartesianism, or 
put in more general terms, in the epochal order of Cartesian metaphysics. As long as 
Derrida, the rigorous Cartesian, chooses to suffer from the ordeal of transgressive 
reflection to which reflexive reason is subject, one cannot but be tempted to believe, 
there in the Derridian scene of reflection, il ya la lä-cendre. 
The very temptation to define Derrida as a Cartesian thinker, I hope to have 
articulated in this study; this temptation, I hope to have shown, is logocentric in the same 
way the transgressive gesture of deconstruction is. Deconstruction's ultimate desire for 
reference, for the "very" thing that remains to be deconstructed, cannot but remain 
undeconstructible for the very logical reason. The proto-Cartesian, phenomenological 
self-referentiality of the self, to which the deconstructive force of reflexion is subject, is 
where deconstruction's reflexive, in other words, discursive, limit is to be found; this 
limit, accordingly, delimits, as well as defines, the critical scope of deconstruction, 
deconstruction taken as a philosophical trajectory that attempts to transcend the limits of 
philosophy by philosophy. Metaphysical fatalism inscribed in the stylised self-reflexivity 
of Derrida's metaphysical moves can be viewed as productive in that the historical 
condition of "Western philosophy" it reflects, viz., the Cartesian predicaments of modern 
philosophies, can be brought into light by deconstruction's meta-reflective moves; it is, 
however, problematic, in that the very discursive force of deconstructive meta-reflexivity 
leaves the thinker, consequently, blind to other possible models of doing philosophy. 
This ambivalence of deconstruction, one may call, the paradox of deconstructive insight. 
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